[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:

The last argument for a Palestinian state (no one outside the small group of
people who still cling to the secular messianic belief that retreat to the
'67 lines will miraculously bring utopian peace seriously thinks that the
creation of a sovereign Palestinian state would improve security) is the
demographic argument.

Once again Yoram Ettinger provides numbers rather than rhetoric to punch
holes in the demographic argument.]

The Arab Demographic Revolution
Ambassador (ret.) Yoram Ettinger, "Second Thought”

www.TheEttingerReport.com
"Israel Hayom”, March 16, 2011
http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=1565

The steep decline in the Arab fertility rate west of the Jordan River – in
Judea, Samaria, Gaza and pre-1967 Israel – reflects the demographic
revolution throughout the Muslim world, especially in the Arab countries of
the Middle East.

According to the 2011 CIA Factbook, the fertility in Iran, the most
religious Shiite country, is 1.87 births per woman, in Saudi Arabia, the
most religious Sunni country – 2.5, in the small Gulf States – 2.5, in North
Africa – 2.5, in Syria – 3, in Egypt – 2.94, in Jordan – 3.4, in Iraq –
3.76, in Yemen – 4.81 and in Sudan – 4.93 births per woman.

In 1969, the Israeli Arab fertility rate (which is similar to the Judea and
Samaria Arab fertility rate) was 6 births higher than the Jewish fertility
rate. In 2012, the Arab-Jewish fertility gap plunged to 0.5 births.
Moreover, the fertility rates of younger Arab and Jewish women have
converged at 3 births per woman, while the average Israeli-born Jewish
mothers already exceed 3 births per woman. Jewish fertility trends upward
(particularly within the secular sector!), and Arab fertility trends
downward, as a result of successful integration of Arabs – and especially
Arab women - into the infrastructures of modernity.

The Jewish fertility rate in Israel is higher than any Arab countries, other
than Sudan, Yemen, Iraq and Jordan, which are trending downward.

The triggers of the demographic revolution among Arabs west of the Jordan
River are very similar to those which caused the overall Muslim/Arab
demographic implosion: urbanization, expanded primary, secondary and
tertiary education primarily among women, more assertive women at home and
in the workforce, family planning, all-time high wedding and reproductive
age, all-time low teen pregnancy, all-time high divorce rates and youthful
emigration. In 2012, an increasing number of Arab women remain unmarried
during their 20s.

Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, a leading demographer at the American Enterprise
Institute, wrote in Foreign Policy Magazine, March 9, 2012: "Declines in the
total fertility rate [in Muslim countries] have been jaw-dropping….
Throughout the global Muslim community, the average number of children per
woman is falling dramatically. According to the UN Population Division, all
Muslim-majority countries and territories witnessed fertility declines over
the past three decades…. Algeria and Morocco have total fertility rates in
the same ball park as Texas; Indonesia is almost identical to Arkansas;
Tunisia looks like Illinois; Lebanon's fertility level is lower than New
York's; Iran's is comparable to that of New England, the region in America
with the lowest fertility…. A century of research has detailed the
associations between fertility decline and socioeconomic modernization, as
represented by income levels, educational attainment, urbanization, public
health, treatment of women, and the like…. Current fertility levels seem to
be the product of intangible factors (culture, values, personal hopes and
expectations) and not just material and economic forces…. Where Muslim women
want fewer children, they are increasingly finding ways to manage it – with
the pill or without it…. The fertility decline over the past generation has
been more rapid in the Arab states than virtually anywhere else on earth…. A
new world is being born before our eye – and we would all do well to pay
much closer attention to its significance.”

Demographic studies document that dramatic declines in fertility never
bounce back to previous high levels.

While Arab demography is imploding, Israel's Jewish demography benefits from
a tailwind – a 56% surge in the number of annual Jewish births between 1995
and 2011, compared to a 10% rise in the number of Arab births. In 1995, the
Jewish births constituted 69% of total births, compared with 76% in 2011. In
1995, there were 2.34 Jewish births per one Arab birth, compared with 3.2
Jewish births per one Arab birth in 2011. Contrary to most of the world,
Israel's Jewish population is growing younger (while Israel's Arab
population is growing older) and educated, which bodes well for Israel's
economic growth.

Jewish demography is further bolstered by Aliya (Jewish immigration), an
unprecedented flow of returning expatriates, a relatively low number of
emigrants and a substantial annual net-emigration of (mostly young) Arabs
from Judea and Samaria -17,000 in each of the last three years.

A pro-active Aliya policy would leverage the global economic and political
circumstances in the former USSR, France, England, Argentina and the USA.
It could produce a wave of 500,000 Olim (Jewish immigrants) during the next
ten years, catapulting the current 66% Jewish majority – in the combined
area of Judea, Samaria and pre-1967 Israel – to an 80% Jewish majority by
2035.