Hamas restraint: Israeli deterrence or desire to enhance weapons without
interference?
Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA 29 May 2012

Senior Israeli ministers, among them former COS Minister Moshe "Bogie"
Ya'alon, who support the "quiet for quiet" policy towards Hamas according to
which Israel will not respond to the importation or construction of
essentially any weapons system by Hamas in the Gaza Strip as long as Hamas
doesn't use it (a radical change from the rhetoric that if "balance
breaking" weapons were deployed that Israel would respond [that's rhetoric
because in practice Israel never actually specifically responded to a long
series of "balance breaking" advances]) point to the decision of Hamas not
to openly participate in attacks against Israel as some kind of evidence if
Israel's deterrent strength.

As the excerpt below from a report of The Meir Amit Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center indicates, there is an alternative narrative:
namely that Hamas isn't shooting now out of a "desire to buy time to build
up its military might without interruption, and especially to improve its
capabilities to hit the Israeli heartland with long-range rockets."

Consider this disturbing alternative interpretation: by the same token that
Israeli officials can take comfort in the notion that Hamas is not shooting
rockets at Israel because of Israel's "deterrent strength" can Hamas take
comfort in the notion that Israel is not interfering with their massive
weapons programs because of Hamas' deterrent strength?

==============

Hamas' restraint policy in the Gaza Strip: the results of the tension
between Hamas' jihadist ideology and pragmatic considerations, which include
governmental obligations and Israel's deterrent capabilities.
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
(at the Israeli Intelligence and Heritage Commemoration Center)
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20335/E_097_12_1901847935.pdf

Constraints and Considerations Influencing Hamas' Terrorist Attack Policy
...
3) Other considerations: ... Another consideration is Hamas' desire to buy
time to build up its military might without interruption, and especially to
improve its
capabilities to hit the Israeli heartland with long-range rockets.

...

6. Since Operation Cast Lead the restraint policy has given Hamas and the
other terrorist organizations breathing space to rebuild the Gaza Strip and
accelerate their military buildup. One of the results is that since
Operation Cast Lead Hamas and the other terrorist organizations have doubled
the number of rockets in their arsenals (most of them provided by
Iran) and acquired higher-quality rockets. Currently Hamas and the other
terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip have several thousand rockets,
both standard and of local manufacture, of varying ranges. Among them are
Fajr-5 rockets provided by Iran (not yet used). They have a range of 75
kilometers, or 46.6 miles, and can reach Tel Aviv and the densely-populated
areas in the center of Israel.

...