Arms Control Dilemmas: Focus on the Middle East
Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz, Editors
Memorandum
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1346905935.pdf

#1 Nuclear Nonproliferation, Customary International Law, and the
Ramifications for Israel
Owen Alterman
...
Looking Ahead

...Israel has an interest in the success of the nonproliferation regime,
especially among its Middle Eastern neighbors. At the same time, the
fulfillment of that policy objective – compliance with nonproliferation
norms – increases the likelihood of the NPT’s one day becoming non-derogable
customary law. That customary law, binding on Israel, could serve to limit
Israel’s policy options. Should nonproliferation become customary law,
Israel’s policy option of possession of nuclear weapons would become legally
unavailable. Israel’s option of possessing nuclear weapons could become a
victim of the nonproliferation regime’s success.

...a future argument that the nonproliferation regime has become binding
customary law is not without risks for Israel. It could provide further
rhetorical ammunition to Israel’s foes. It could become a further claim of
violation of international law and constitute a basis (or pretense) to
maintain grievances against Israel even once regional peace agreements were
signed.

This is not to say that Israel should change its policy and encourage the
nonproliferation regime’s failure and consequent nuclearization of the
Middle East. Rather, the issue of customary law provides a reminder that
even that policy has its risks. At present, these remain potential risks
only. Should the nonproliferation regime succeed, however, Israel will need
to present an aggressive and persistent argument that no customary rule
exists or, failing that, argue that the NPT’s terms do not apply to Israel
by virtue of its persistent objection.38 Israel will need to mobilize
international support for that position and for the position that
nonproliferation will not have become a peremptory norm. At the same time,
policymakers must recognize that this need to request additional diplomatic
help would grant further leverage to Israel’s allies, who could demand
concessions on other matters in exchange for enhanced diplomatic and legal
support on nuclear issues. As such, a binding customary nonproliferation
regime could impair Israel’s overall strategic position and narrow its
policy options.

#2 The EU-3 and the Iranian Nuclear Program
Nadav Kedem
...
Conclusion

...In effect, the European sanctions regime surpasses the American one,
after many years during which America’s policy against Iran was more
aggressive than Europe’s. This state of affairs was highlighted by Israel’s
Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon, who expressed disappointment with the
White House’s partial implementation of the sanctions approved by the
American Congress. According to Yaalon, the partial implementation stems
from considerations connected to the presidential race. On the other hand,
said Yaalon, France and Britain have taken an aggressive stance and
understand that the sanctions must be implemented immediately.

Moreover, NATO’s action in Libya (2011) shows that the use of military
forces is not necessarily taboo in Europe. While France and/or Britain do
not have critical military weight in the context of Iran, the legitimacy
that EU members in general and its leaders in particular can confer on a
military strike is important. NATO even gave legitimacy to the war in Kosovo
(1999) without the authorization of the Security Council. Such legitimacy
would be important to the US in the constellation of considerations on a
military strike against Iran.

It may be that the economic and political crisis facing the EU will make it
difficult for Europe to be a principal player in confronting Iraq, both
economically and militarily. Nevertheless, the possibility of comprehensive
European support or support by key European nations for a military strike
against Iran is not unrealistic. The European desire to enhance its
international standing may make the EU accept positive decisions about such
an attack. Worrisome developments about the Iranian nuclear project and the
publication of further grim IAEA reports or the upsetting of the balance in
the Gulf region, for example, may serve as background for America
emphasizing the importance of Europe and especially the importance of the
EU-3, which could cause them to endorse a strike even in the absence of
Russian and/or Chinese agreement.

#3 Theory and Practice in China’s Arms Control Policy: Between North Korea
and Iran
Yoram Evron
...Conclusion
...As far as the Middle East system is concerned, preserving the Iranian
regime and prolonging the crisis likely serve China’s economic and
diplomatic goals. Nonetheless, these are not critical interests for which
Beijing would be prepared to pay a steep price, and therefore China may be
enlisted in significant economic moves against Iran through a balanced and
efficient mix of threats and punitive economic and image-related steps on
the one hand, and rewards on the other. Still, such steps can be expected to
have minimal impact, because China has only a limited desire and ability to
prevent the activity of elements operating against Iran. At the same time,
because of the importance China attributes to its image as a rising,
powerful, and independent power, one cannot expect that under current
circumstances China would agree to steps involving a public concession of
its official postures, such as public support for using military power or
international coercive measures against Iran – even though China is unlikely
to take real counter-measures should such steps indeed be taken.
Nevertheless, attempts to persuade it to join in open international efforts
are not superfluous, because even if they are unlikely to bear direct
results, they do have the power to increase the pressure on China because of
its ties with Iran and prevent it from taking actions that flout
international rules and understandings.

#4 The Iranian Nuclear Program: The Egyptian View
Keinan Ben-Ezra

...
The Transition Period (Starting in 2011)

...The results of the parliamentary elections held in Egypt in November-
December 2011 clearly showed the rising power of the Islamic bloc, and it is
possible that this development portends a rapprochement between Egypt and
Iran. In such a scenario, it is reasonable to assume that Egypt would
publicly support Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program, while at the
same time attempt to prevent Iran from obtaining the comparative advantage
of possessing nuclear weapons. This effort would likely be exerted both
secretly, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and
publicly, by intensively promoting the plan to free the Middle East of
weapons of mass destruction. In this way, it would also avoid the obvious
need to join the nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

At the same time, the causes of the strategic rivalry between the two
countries remain and can be expected to continue to temper relations between
them. Furthermore, in the coming period, the heads of state in Egypt will be
preoccupied with stabilizing the government. Here Egypt’s dependence on US
aid comes into play. The new leadership cannot forfeit the aid without fear
of losing public support because of inability to provide a response to
severe socio-economic distress. In addition, the Egyptian army, which relies
on US equipment, has not lost its power, and the considerations driving the
military leadership are still central to the creation of Egyptian policy.
Hence the assessment that Egyptian foreign policy will not change
fundamentally, at least in the foreseeable future. In other words, the
Egyptian political leadership is expected to adopt a policy of silence
concerning the Iranian nuclear program and avoid conflicts in the Middle
East, and certainly with Iran. While we can estimate that a new Egyptian
government in the process of formation would seek to direct the country’s
internal tension at an outside party, this would likely be Israel rather
than Iran, which is easy prey in this sense, both in the context of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and particularly in the nuclear context.

On the question of Iranian nuclearization, Egypt may adopt the line that was
promoted for years by Amr Moussa, who served as Arab League secretary.
Moussa, who was unsuccessful in his bid for the Egyptian presidency, argues
that the Middle East should be nuclear free, that the focus should not be on
Iran, and that Egypt should be a mediator working to find a solution to the
conflict between the West and Iran on the nuclear issue. On a number of
occasions, Moussa claimed that the Arab world does not have a problem with
Iran: “I feel no threat from Iran’s nuclear program toward the Arab world
and the international community, but when Israel does not accept the NPT and
does not observe it, its nuclear arsenal threatens all of us.”29 He has
thus turned the spotlight on Israel,30 claiming that Iran, like any state,
had the right to atomic energy (these comments may indicate acceptance of
the Iranian nuclear program as long as it does not serve as a basis for
nuclear weapons). He has proposed including Iran in various Middle East
issues, such as the effort to reach a solution to the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians.31

Conclusion

Tension between Iran and Egypt reflects the competition between the two
states, which aspire to dominate and lead in the Middle East. The Iranian
pursuit of military nuclear capability validates Cairo’s fear of Iran’s
ambitions for regional hegemony. For this reason, no fundamental change is
expected in Egyptian policy toward Iran, and the Iranian nuclear program in
particular, as a result of the establishment of the new post-Mubarak
government. It is possible that the rise of the Islamic bloc to power in
Egypt will foster a new era between the states. However, even if there is a
diplomatic rapprochement between Cairo and Tehran, Egypt will likely hope to
arrest Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and it is likely to do so in connection
with promoting its regional agenda, which, in continuation of the policy of
the Mubarak government, will include Israel’s capabilities. An Egyptian
effort to free the entire region of nuclear weapons would then serve its
longstanding goal, as well as another consistent objective: positioning
Egypt as a regional mediator and conciliator.

#5 Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Options
Yoel Guzansky
...Conclusions and Implications for Israel

...In light of Saudi Arabia’s vast monetary wealth and relative military
weakness, it is likely that the kingdom is seeking to establish parallel
security arrangements that would give it greater independence in making
decisions in the field and allow it to be prepared for any development in
its strategic environment. Evidence from open sources about Saudi Arabia
examining the nuclear option remains circumstantial. Nevertheless, Saudi
Arabia, perhaps more than any other player in the Middle East, has the
ideological and strategic motive as well as the financial wherewithal to act
on it. Its concern that in certain scenarios is it liable to have to face a
nuclear Iran by itself and the ramifications of this for its status and
security are liable to make it want to keep all options open, including the
nuclear one.

... it is unclear to what extent and how well Israel can follow the Saudi
file, particularly as it directs most of its attention to the Iranian
nuclear challenge. It may be that the trends outlined above are enough to
justify the need to examine Israel’s assessment of the Saudi nuclear issue
and certainly the need for an ongoing dialogue with the Americans. As a
rule, the difficulties of intelligence gathering in the non-conventional age
are not inconsiderable. Even when the intelligence gathering is good,
failure could stem from the nature of the non-conventional challenge to
intelligence research and the ability to put together a coherent picture
that can help foil the threat. It may also be that Israel is relying on the
fact that the US has better access to events on the Arabian Peninsula.
However, even should it become clear that the kingdom has dabbled in
forbidden activity, it is uncertain if and how the US would share such
information with Israel and, even if it does, the US may demand that Israel
refrain from taking action against nuclear facilities in Saudi Arabia.

Israel understands that a Saudi nuclear program would primarily be intended
as a balance against Iran. Furthermore, in recent years there have been many
reports about security and intelligence cooperation between a number of Gulf
states, including Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Nonetheless, one cannot
guarantee that nuclear installations and know-how in Saudi possession could
at some point in the future be pointed at Israel and/or fall into the hands
of terrorists.

#6 Towards Turkey’s Own Bomb? Not Yet
Gallia Lindenstrauss

...Conclusion

An assessment of whether Turkey is expected to decide to develop a military
nuclear capability in the foreseeable future indicates that the chances are
limited. As long as Iran maintains ambiguity, Turkey can apparently continue
to deny that there is a problem. Even if Iran adopts an open nuclear policy,
it is expected that NATO’s guarantees to Turkey, or at least those of the
United States, will be strengthened. It is possible that this will reduce
Turkish fears of the Iranian nuclear threat.

At the same time, special attention should be paid to Turkey’s civilian
nuclear program, which includes plans to build some twenty nuclear reactors
by 2030. In contrast to the past, it appears that this time Turkey’s chances
of succeeding in developing this capability are good. Its growing energy
needs apparently justify such a program, and today there are political and
economic conditions that will make it possible to build this capability. If
NATO is not weakened and Turkey remains a NATO member, it is nearly certain
that this civilian nuclear capability will not be viewed any more negatively
than programs in South Korea or Japan. At the same time, a civilian program
has the potential to become a military program, and the West, primarily the
United States, must identify and contend with Turkey’s security needs so
that Turkey will not join the race toward military nuclearization in the
Middle East.

......
Authors

Owen Alterman is a researcher with the International Law and National
Security Program at INSS. Before joining the program, Mr. Alterman was a
lawyer with Allen and Overy LLP in New York, a foreign law clerk in the
Israeli Supreme Court, and a US Peace Corps volunteer in Romania.

Keinan Ben-Ezra was a research assistant in the INSS Arms Control and
Regional Security Program. Mr. Ben-Ezra holds an MA in international
relations from the Lauder School of Government at the Interdisciplinary
Center in Herzliya. His areas of expertise include international conflict
resolution, the European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and
arms control in the Middle East.

Yoram Evron, a researcher at INSS, specializes in Chinese security policy.
His research involves Chinese military policy, Chinese Middle East policy,
and Chinese-Israeli relations. Dr. Evron is a faculty member in the
Department of Asian Studies at Haifa University. His publications include
“China’s Anti-Terrorism Policy” (2007); “Sino-Israeli Relations in
Retrospect” (2008); “Sino-American Relations and the New Administration”
(2009); and “China’s Capability to Fight a Regional War under
Informatization Conditions: A Practical Reassessment” (2009).

Yoel Guzansky is a researcher at INSS. His main research areas are Persian
Gulf security, relations among the Gulf states, the Gulf states’ relations
with Iran, the US, and Israel, and nuclear policy. Before joining INSS, Mr.
Guzansky coordinated the Iranian nuclear issue at the National Security
Council in the Prime Minister’s Office. He has a regular column in Maariv.
Among his recent publications are The Gulf States in a Changing Strategic
Environment (2012), The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West (co-editor,
2012), and One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications
(co-editor, 2012).

Nadav Kedem is a Neubauer research associate at INSS and a doctoral student
in international relations at Haifa University. Mr. Kedem’s research
interests include EU-Israel relations, relations between major European
countries and the United States, and arms control. Before joining INSS, Mr.
Kedem served as an economic advisor at A. Heifetz and Co., a teaching
assistant at Haifa University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and a
research assistant at the Israel Democracy Institute.

Gallia Lindenstrauss is a researcher at INSS and teaches at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem and the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. Her
research topics are Turkish foreign policy, ethnic conflicts, military
interventions, and ethno-national diasporas. As a post-doctoral fellow at
the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations of the Hebrew
University, Dr. Lindenstrauss researched the Armenian diaspora. Her
publications include Mediation and Engagement: A New Paradigm for Turkish
Foreign Policy and its Implications for Israel (2010).