Inspired by the "Arab Spring": Saudi Arabia's Volatile Shiite Minority
INSS Insight No. 374, October 14, 2012 Guzansky, Yoel
http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=10214

The eastern province of Saudi Arabia, home to the kingdom’s Shiite minority,
has recently been revisited by violence. The latest wave of protests that
began in July 2012 in Awamiyah, a radical Shiite town, was sparked by the
arrest and injury of Nemer al-Nemer, a popular Shiite cleric. Nemer, a key
figure in the protest movement in the province, was known for his outspoken
anti-royal family remarks. Particularly popular among the young, Nemer had
called for toppling the House of Saud and for independence for the eastern
province; he apparently also instructed his followers to celebrate the death
of Crown Prince Nayef in June 2012. In late September 2012, the attempt to
arrest some "wanted" individuals resulted in shootings, fatalities, and
injuries.

The longstanding domestic background to the unrest is that Islam’s Wahhabi
sect questions the Shiites' Muslim legitimacy and Arab ancestry, to the
point that Saudi Arabia instituted severe restrictions on Shiites in the
kingdom as a way to isolate them and keep them from gaining political
representation and religious freedom. The Islamic Revolution in Iran seemed
to the Shiites to offer an alternative to the oppression they felt at the
hand of the Wahhabi establishment. Thus between 1979 and 1981, for the first
time in the history of the modern kingdom, the Shiite province experienced
rioting among the Shiites. The conflict receded upon Khomeini’s death, when
the revolutionary fervor in Iran also died out. In addition, the Shiites,
recognizing the power of the Wahhabi establishment, worked steadily with the
rulers to improve their situation.

However, Saudi Arabia has more than once accused Iran of supporting the
Saudi Shiite minority. In the Saudi view, the Iranian threat is serious not
only because of its ramifications for the balance of power in the Gulf, but
also because of the implications for the kingdom’s stability: should Iran
succeed in its hegemonic ambitions, the Shiites are liable to challenge the
legitimacy of the royal house. Moreover, the Shiites remain a security
problem for Saudi Arabia not only because of their geographical proximity
and ideological affinity to Iran but also – perhaps especially – because of
their presence near the largest oil reserves in the world. While still crown
prince, King Abdullah took steps to defuse tensions with the Shiite
minority, including the announcement of a “national dialogue”; he even
allowed a few Shiites to become members of the Shura Council, a prestigious
institution but lacking any real authority. However, the House of Saud did
not go so far as to recognize the Shia as a central stream of Islam, and it
refused to extend Shiites equal rights as citizens. The basic oppression of
the Shiite population in the kingdom remains firmly in place, and at times
rises to the surface. Key figures in the royal house, chiefly former Crown
Prince and Interior Minister Nayef, fiercely opposed what they viewed as
King Abdullah’s conciliatory approach. They view Shiites as Iran’s lackeys
and support a zero-tolerance policy towards them. Nayef apparently also
pushed for Saudi troops to enter Bahrain in order to suppress the Shiite
protest, aware that the protest would spill over into the oases of Hasa and
Qatif.

The Shiites gained a tailwind in the "Arab Spring," and the eastern province
has been unsettled for the last eighteen months, despite the royal house’s
efforts, including the use of force and economic incentives, to quell the
unrest. In February 2011 a violent incident occurred in Medina between
Shiite pilgrims and the Saudi religious police, and protests intensified
with the entry of Saudi forces into Bahrain the following month. The protest
movement, comprising almost entirely young people, has held mass
demonstration that to date have left 15 people killed. Many have been
arrested and jailed, most of them without due process. The funerals of those
killed became a demonstration of force unseen in the province since the
Islamic Revolution. Moreover, at least according to the Saudi Interior
Ministry, the Shiites have started to make greater use of firearms against
the security forces.

The Saudi authorities have announced that they will crush the protest with
an iron fist and have accused “foreigners” – a code word for Iran – of
fanning the flames. The narrative of the Shiites being a fifth column helps
the royal house close ranks and prevent criticism at home. However, it may
be that other Saudi sectors – women and students, for example – will draw
encouragement from the Shiites’ struggle and increase their criticism of the
royal house, a scenario that would play directly into Iran’s hands. Thus it
is possible that improving the Shiites’ conditions and establishing a social
contract with them would be Saudi Arabia’s best bet for distancing them from
Iran’s open arms.

There are internal explanations for the wave of arrests, including Prince
Ahmed’s stepping into the job of interior minister and his attempt to
fortify his standing at home by adopting an aggressive stance against any
threat to the kingdom’s stability. However, the timing of the arrests may be
linked to the royal house’s effort to take preparatory steps before a
possible confrontation with Iran. The tensions on both sides of the Gulf are
rising, and there have been reports of alerts and reinforcements of the
Saudi security forces. As any confrontation with Iran is liable to enflame
the entire eastern province, a charismatic radical preacher such as Nemer
could easily become an element igniting more extensive protests. Mansour
Turki, spokesman for the Saudi Interior Ministry, asserted that the security
forces would not tolerate inciters “who serve as pawns for the nation’s
enemies,” a clear reference to Iran.

The fact that al-Alam, Iran’s Arabic-language TV station – highly popular
among Saudi Shiites – repeatedly calls for demonstrations only underscores
the Saudi fear about Iran’s intent to upset the kingdom’s stability. Perhaps
the royal house assumes that removing key inciters from the scene will nip
the protest in the bud; it will certainly be helpful in any future conflict
with Iran, given the clerics’ ability to sweep many followers in their wake.
But in the short term, the arrests are liable to inflame the region,
resulting in growing unrest. And in fact, after the funerals of those killed
in the demonstrations, thousands of Shiites took to the streets to call for
toppling the House of Saud, chanting “Qatif and Bahrain are one people.”

In Riyadh’s view, the Shiite protest is linked to Iranian activity to foment
unrest among the Shiite minority. This unrest, Riyadh assumes, is meant to
demonstrate the cost of harming Iranian interests in the Gulf or, farther
away, in Syria. Should the events escalate, the Saudi dilemma will only
grow: how will it justify identifying with the Syrian masses who are taking
to the streets to protest longstanding oppression but maintain its own
oppressive political situation at home? From the perspective of the aging
royal house, there is no contradiction as long as the situation serves to
restrain Iran.

In reality, the Shiites in Saudi Arabia, numbering about 2 million (close to
10 percent of the general population), were never close to threatening the
kingdom’s stability, and most are far from identifying ideologically with
the Iranian religious establishment. But continued unrest is liable to lead
to a more active and violent pattern of protests, at least among the younger
generation, which resists the traditional call for calm. An increase in
violence will provide an opportunity for Iran – if it hasn’t done so
already – to try to exploit the unrest for its own ends.
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