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Tuesday, February 26, 2013
Is Jerusalem Really Negotiable? An Analysis of Jerusalems Place in the Peace Process

Is Jerusalem Really Negotiable?
An Analysis of Jerusalem’s Place in the Peace Process

Alan Baker
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES Number 11 2013
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation
http://jcpa.org/article/is-jerusalem-really-negotiable-an-analysis-of-jerusalems-place-in-the-peace-process/

Executive Summary

zz On August 21, 2012, Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas,
referring to “the alleged [Jewish] Temple” in Jerusalem, stated that “there
will be no peace, security, or stability unless the occupation, its
settlements and settlers will be evacuated from our holy city and the
eternal capital of our state.”1

zz This statement, basically denying any Jewish linkage or right to
Jerusalem, uttered by the head of the Palestinian Authority who is
considered in the international community to be moderate and reasonable,
serves as an example of the tremendous political, historical,
psychological, legal, and religious challenge that the issue of Jerusalem
poses to the Middle East negotiating process.

zz This study analyzes the various aspects of this challenge, with a view
to determining why a resolution of the Jerusalem question has defied all
past negotiators, raising serious questions about the possibility of
reaching agreement between the parties regarding Jerusalem.

zz Beginning with a brief summary of the significance of Jerusalem to each
religious community as well as to the world at large, this study
analyzes the various international instruments making reference to
Jerusalem, and lists proposals published over the years for solving the
issue of Jerusalem.

Introduction

Perhaps the most complex, special and intractable item on the negotiating
agenda between the State of Israel and the Arab world in general, and the
Palestinian people in particular, is Jerusalem. Israelis oppose re-dividing
Jerusalem. A December 2012 poll by the Dahaf Institute, headed by Mina
Tzemach, showed that 71 percent of Israeli Jews would oppose withdrawing
from east Jerusalem, even if Israel could retain the Old City alone. When
asked specifically about control over the Jewish holy places in Jerusalem,
77 percent of Israeli Jews stated that Israel could not rely on the
Palestinians to ensure freedom of worship.2

A year earlier, the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion conducted a
poll on Palestinian positions with regard to the peace process. When asked
about Jerusalem, while 92 percent wanted it as a Palestinian capital, only 3
percent were prepared for Jerusalem to be both the capital of Israel and the
Palestinian capital. Seventy-two percent supported denying the idea that
there were thousands of years of Jewish history in Jerusalem.3 This was
consistent with the rhetoric of Palestinian leaders, like Mahmoud Abbas,
who spoke about the “alleged” Temple in a speech on August 21, 2012.

The complexity of Jerusalem as a negotiating issue stems from a number of
factors – historical, religious, legal, political, emotional, and
psychological – each on its own or all together. The significance and
importance of Jerusalem extend beyond the immediate questions of
territorial control, legal and administrative authority, public order, or
economic and touristic potential. It verges on the basic relationships
between the three monotheistic religions.

But beyond that, it represents a subject of direct political interest to
the entire international community. It has figured in one way or another on
the agenda of the United Nations since the establishment of that
organization and up to the present day. Its centrality to world peace and
tranquility extends beyond any logical reason, and even achieves a spiritual
level equal to the nature of the city itself.

In colloquial terms and as a negotiating issue, Jerusalem represents the
classic “hot potato” that, in light of its complexities, might never be
permanently or definitively solved, and will forever pose spiritual,
theoretical, and practical dilemmas to anyone that has to deal with it.

Significance of Jerusalem to Judaism

The significance of Jerusalem to Judaism is paramount. It is Zion, the
epicenter of the Jewish faith and the very magnet for all Jewish belief. In
a speech in Jerusalem on December 1, 1948, former President of Israel Chaim
Weizmann said:

To the followers of the two other great monotheistic religions, Jerusalem is
a site of sacred associations and holy memories. To us it is that and more.
It is the center of our ancient national glory. It was our lodestar in all
our wanderings. It embodies all that is noblest in our hopes for the
future. Jerusalem is the eternal mother of the Jewish people, precious and
beloved even in her desolation. When David made Jerusalem the capital of
Judea, on that day there began the Jewish Commonwealth.... An almost
unbroken chain of Jewish settlement connects the Jerusalem of our day with
the holy city of antiquity. To countless generations of Jews in every land
of their dispersion the ascent to Jerusalem was the highest that life could
offer.4

Significance of Jerusalem to Christianity

Christianity in its various denominations and sects – whether
Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Russian Provo Slavic , Ethiopian Copt, Egyptian
Copt, Anglican, Presbyterian or others – views Jerusalem as one of the
central components of its historical and religious beliefs and philosophy.
The Holy Sepulchre Church, the Stations of the Cross on the Via Dolorosa,
the tomb of Jesus – all constitute the connecting factors between the
Christian faith, the life of Jesus, and history. In this context, one need
only note the “Jerusalem Peace Treaty of Jaffa,” dated February 11, 1229,
concluded between the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and
the Sultan of Babylon and Damascus Malik al-Kamel, according to which:

The Emperor shall respect the inviolability of Golgotha, not only with
regard to the Temple of Solomon and the Temple of Our Lord, but also with
regard to the surrounding wall and the related structures. He shall not
tolerate any disturbance whatsoever of these Holy Sites…so that the
latter may conduct their prayers and proclaim their law without either
interdiction or contradiction.5

Significance of Jerusalem to Islam

The centrality of Jerusalem in Muslim spirituality is apparent in the
story of Muhammad's mystical, spiritual night journey from the Kabah in
Mecca to Jerusalem's Temple Mount, as appearing in Sura 17:1 of the Koran.
Muslim texts have multiple interpretations of this verse. Some make it clear
that this was not a physical experience but a visionary one, where Muhammad
was conveyed miraculously to Jerusalem and welcomed by all the great
prophets of the past before ascending through the seven heavens. On his way
up he sought the advice of Moses, Aaron, Enoch, Jesus, John the Baptist and
Abraham before entering the presence of God. The story shows the yearning
of the Muslims to come from far-off Arabia right into the heart of the
monotheistic family, symbolized by Jerusalem. Similarly, in the words of
the Prophet himself:

There are only three mosques to which you should embark on a journey: the
sacred mosque (Mecca, Saudi Arabia), this mosque of mine (Medina, Saudi
Arabia), and the mosque of Al-Aqsa (Jerusalem). 6

Thus, Islam, with all its various streams, sees Jerusalem as its third most
important location connecting it to history and to the tenets of Muslim
belief, with the holy mosques representing a direct connection to the
Prophet Muhammad.

Significance of Jerusalem to the International Community

Humanity in general views Jerusalem as the genuine, living, historic remnant
of the Holy Bible as an historic source document, giving credence to the
events described there and serving also as the source for believers
throughout the world and the core of the three monotheistic religions.

Given all of the above, with the long, sad, rich but often tragic history
since time immemorial of campaigns to capture and rule Jerusalem – whether
by the Romans, the Greeks, the Crusaders, the Ottoman rule, the
British Mandate, Jordanian occupation and administration, and Israeli
control and rule – any potential solution envisaged today to the issue
of Jerusalem can only appear to be miniscule in relation to the vast
historical panoply of the city, and raises the question whether any
potential solution negotiated between the current political elements in the
area could indeed bring about a definitive and permanent solution for all
times, that would be accepted by all and bring genuine peace to what is
sometimes termed “The City of Peace.”

The Negotiating Context

Moving from the spiritual and universal to the practical, the following
pointers attempt to establish the negotiating context which, up to the
present, has served, and potentially may yet serve, as a basis for
negotiating the Jerusalem issue within the current or any future peace
process, whether from the point of view of the international community in
general, or of Israel and all its neighbors in particular.

Balfour Declaration, 1917

The most appropriate starting-point for such an analysis would perhaps be
the 1917 Balfour Declaration which, as a policy document with clear
international implications, and basing itself specifically on “Jewish
Zionist inspirations,” laid the foundation for the concept of a Jewish
national home in Zion.

However, the very idea that the holy places in Jerusalem would be under
the control and jurisdiction of a Jewish state generated, from the start, an
element of opposability that has from then and up to the present day
permeated the international discourse on Jerusalem. Thus, the Vatican
reaction to the Balfour Declaration, as enunciated by Pope Benedict XV to
the College of Cardinals on March 10, 1919, after Great Britain took control
of Palestine, was as follows:

There is one matter on which we are specially anxious and that is the fate
of the Holy Places, on account of the special dignity and importance for
which they are so venerated by every Christian. Who can tell the full story
of all the efforts of Our Predecessors to free them from the dominion of
infidels, the heroic deeds and the blood shed by Christians of the West
through the centuries? And now that, amid the rejoicing of all good men,
they have finally returned to the hands of Christians, our anxiety is most
keen as to the decisions which the Peace Congress in Paris is soon to take
concerning them. For surely it would be a terrible grief for us and for the
Christian faithful if infidels were placed in a privileged and prominent
position: much more if those most holy sanctuaries of the Christian
religion were given to the charge of non-Christians.7

Amid considerable opposition in the Arab world,8 Dr. Chaim Weizmann,
representing the Zionist Organization, and Emir Feisal, representing the
Arab Kingdom of the Hedjaz, finalized an agreement on January 3, 1919,
immediately prior to the convening of the Paris Peace Conference,
regarding collaboration and understanding between the Arabs and Jews in
giving effect to the Balfour Declaration. Article 6 of this agreement,
relating to the Muslim holy sites, determined that “The Mohammedan Holy
places shall be under Mohammedan control,”9 a determination that still
carries an element of realism, not to mention expectation, up to the
present day.

San Remo Declaration, 1920 and Mandate for Palestine, 1922

During the session of the Paris Peace Conference held in San Remo,
Italy, in April 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers reaffirmed
and ratified the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration into the British
Mandate for Palestine, which was consequently confirmed by the Council of
the League of Nations on July 24, 1922. The Mandate required that the “Holy
Places and religious buildings” be under the direct responsibility of the
Mandatory power, responsible solely to the League of Nations, and called for
the appointment of a special commission to study, define and determine the
rights and claims in connection with the holy places of the various
religious communities.10

This international interest and involvement in the holy places was
reiterated in Article 28 of the Mandate, which specified that in the
event of its termination, arrangements would be made by the Council of the
League of Nations to safeguard “in perpetuity” the rights of the different
religious communities. One may assume that the provision of Articles 13,
14 and 28 of the League of Nations Palestine Mandate basically
crystallized the “vision” of a separate, international administration of the
holy places in Jerusalem, a vision which still remains to this day, in the
eyes of various elements of the international community, the most viable
prospect for solving the Jerusalem issue.

Internationalization of Jerusalem

The concept of international administration over Jerusalem ultimately
materialized into a resolution of the UN General Assembly dated November 29,
1947,11 entitled: “Future Government of Palestine,” recommending partition
of the territory into “independent Arab and Jewish states and the Special
International Regime for the City of Jerusalem.”12

The origin of UN/international responsibility for and involvement in the
issue of Jerusalem is set out in Part III of the Partition Plan, which
established a “Special Regime”:

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a Corpus Separatum under
special international regime and shall be administered by the United
Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the
responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United
Nations.

The plan set out provisions for the appointment of a governor of the city
(not a citizen of either state), empowered to administer the city and to
conduct external affairs. The plan determined demilitarization and
neutrality of the city, with a special police force recruited from outside
Palestine.

The Jewish leadership, after intense introspection and argument (due to the
limited boundaries and the exclusion of Jerusalem from the bounds of
the envisioned Jewish state), accepted this plan for establishing a Jewish
state,13 assuming and hoping that the referendum to be conducted ten years
hence would ultimately lead to the incorporation of the Corpus Separatum
into the State of Israel.14

On the other hand, the Arab population as well as the neighboring
Arab/Muslim states – Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and
Turkey – opposed this resolution and forcefully and blatantly rejected it
.15 Britain refused to implement it in light of the fact that it was not
accepted by both sides.

The historian Prof. Shlomo Avineri commented on the Arab rejection:
Tragically, a parallel debate (to that in the Jewish community) did not
occur within the Arab community. Here an absolutist position – we have
all the rights, the Jews don't have any right – continued to be the
foundation of their response to the idea of partition. Not only that: the
Arabs of Palestine, and the Arab states (some of them members of the United
Nations) went to war not only against the emerging Jewish state, but also a
UN resolution: the only case known to me when member states of the UN not
only did not abide by a UN resolution but went to war against it.16

Jerusalem in UN Resolutions

The vision of Jerusalem as the responsibility of the international
community received further re-affirmation and enhancement in a chain of
UN resolutions adopted during the course of, and immediately following, the
1948 war for Israel's independence, and especially in light of the fact that
the outcome of the war left the city divided between the two sides, with the
walled Old City, containing the bulk of the places holy to all three
faiths, in the hands of Jordan.17

The concept of internationalization was further developed after the
division of the city between Jordan and Israel, in the UN Trusteeship
Council's 1950 Draft Statute for Jerusalem, proposing the establishment of a
UN-administered Corpus Separatum over the whole of Jerusalem – east and
west. This was not welcomed by either side, the Jordanians considering it
interference with their sovereign control over the eastern part of the
city, and Israel fearing that it would lose control over those areas of the
city it held as a result of the war.

In light of this developing popularity of the concept of
internationalization, and with a view to minimizing the extent of
international control and ensuring that even in such a framework, Israeli
citizens would be guaranteed access to the holy places, Israel's formal
position on these demands for internationalization of the Jerusalem area
were outlined by Foreign Minister Abba Eban to the UN General Assembly
during the deliberations on the admission of Israel to the UN. On May 5,
1949, he stated: “the government of Israel advocated the establishment by
the United Nations of an international regime with full juridical status
for Jerusalem concerned exclusively with the control and protection of the
holy places, and would co-operate with such a regime.”18

In a speech in the Knesset on December 5, 1949, Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion completely rejected the idea of putting Jerusalem under UN
control. He explained that the international regime that it envisioned had
failed to prevent the invasion by the Arab states and the attacks on the
Old City. He bluntly told the Knesset that the UN “did not lift a finger”
when a war was imposed on the nascent State of Israel. For that reason, as
far as he was concerned, the Corpus Separatum was “null and void.” But he
left the door open for international supervision over the holy places as
distinct from internationalization.19 His suggestion assumed Israel’s
sovereignty over those parts of Jerusalem where it exercised its
jurisdiction.

The declared Jordanian position was adamantly opposed to any
concept of internationalization. King Abdullah proclaimed that the Arab
section of Jerusalem was joined to his kingdom, and that any attempt to
impose an international system and take away the city from the Arab state
would be resisted by force.20

In spite of the vehement opposition of Israel and Jordan, the General
Assembly restated its aim that Jerusalem be placed under a permanent
international regime, with the city as a Corpus Separatum administered by
the UN, and the Trusteeship Council was called upon to prepare a statute
for the city. Resolution 303(IV ) of December 9, 1949, invited the
Trusteeship Council to draw up a Statute of Jerusalem.

At the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, on December 5, 1950, a
draft resolution was proposed by Sweden for an International Regime for
the Holy Places.21 Israel supported the proposal which, however, failed
to win a majority in the Political Committee. A Belgian proposal,
reiterating the idea of a Corpus Separatum, also failed to muster the
necessary two-thirds majority in the Assembly. In December 1952, the
Philippines proposed an amendment to a draft resolution, calling for direct
negotiations, mentioning specifically the principle of the
internationalization of Jerusalem. The amendment was not accepted.

In the meantime, despite this international interest, the rights of access
of the Jewish people to their holy sites within the Old City of Jerusalem
were denied by the Jordanians. As a result of the occupation of the Old
City by the Arab Legion, 55 synagogues and religious seminaries within the
Jewish Quarter were either destroyed or desecrated by the invading forces.
Its Jewish population was expelled. While Article VIII (2) of the 1949
Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement guaranteed “free access to the Holy
Places” and “use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives,” Israelis were
barred from their holy sites, like the Western Wall, until the 1967 Six-Day
War, when the Old City was captured by the Israel Defense Forces.

Clearly, in view of the situation in which the holy places located within
the Old City in Jerusalem were under the territorial control of Jordan,
Israel's major concern, in favoring international control and supervision
over the holy places, was to ensure freedom of access for worship for
all. However, despite Israel's concerns and the designs of the international
community, such freedom of access did not materialize during Jordan's
administration of Jerusalem, in clear violation of the will of the
international community and of all attempts through the institutions of the
international community to devise a way of ensuring, guaranteeing, and
supervising such freedom of access.

Despite this blatant violation by Jordan of its international
commitments pursuant to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, between 1952 and 1967
the UN did not consider the question of the status of Jerusalem and
Jordan’s violations as being worthy of being placed on its agenda.

Jerusalem after 1967

With Israel's attaining control over all of Jerusalem in 1967, including
over all the holy sites, Foreign Minister Abba Eban, in his statement to the
UN General Assembly
on June 19, 1967, clearly set out Israel's intentions regarding the
accessibility and openness of the holy places in Jerusalem, as follows:22

For twenty years there has not been free access by men of all faiths to the
shrines which they hold in unique reverence. This access now exists. Israel
is resolved to give effective expression, in cooperation with the world's
great religions, to the immunity and sanctity of all the Holy Places.

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, while confirming Israel's political sovereignty
over the entire city, announced before a group of religious leaders that
“it is our intention to place the international administration and
organization of the Holy Places in the hands of the respective religious
leaders.”23

In the Protection of Holy Places law, enacted on June 27, 1967, the Knesset
proceeded to enact the same guarantee of freedom of access to all holy
places that had eluded the international community for so long,
determining that “The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and
any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of
access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to
them or their feelings with regard to those places.”24

The Knesset also extended Israel's law, jurisdiction, and administration
over all of Jerusalem with a view to integrating Jerusalem into the Israeli
administrative and municipal spheres and the extension of public utility
services and municipal and administrative facilities to all parts of the
city.25 With respect to the Muslim holy places, like the Dome of the Rock
and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, Israel allowed practical administration and
supervision of the site to remain in the hands of the Jordanian Waqf
religious authority, which came under the Ministry of Religious Endowments
in the Jordanian Government.

Despite the realization and practical implementation by Israel of the
guarantees for freedom of access to the Jerusalem holy places, the
international community, through repeated resolutions in the UN from 1967
up to the present day, primarily at the behest and initiative of Jordan
and later at the initiative of the Palestinians, nevertheless consistently
considered and still considers Israel's actions regarding the status of
Jerusalem to be invalid, curiously demanding that Israel rescind such
measures with a view to restoring the clearly absurd and irregular
situation that existed prior to Israel's actions.26

U.S. Position on Jerusalem

The U.S. position regarding Jerusalem was enunciated in a number of
statements:

zz U.S. Ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg in the General Assembly, June
14, 1967:

I wish to make it clear that the US does not accept or recognize these
measures [annexation of east Jerusalem] as altering the status of
Jerusalem…we insist that the measures taken cannot be considered other than
interim and provisional and not prejudging the permanent status of
Jerusalem.

…we believe that the most fruitful approach to a discussion on the future of
Jerusalem lies in dealing with the entire problem as one aspect of the
broader arrangements that must be made to restore a just and durable peace
in the area.27

zz U.S. Ambassador to the UN Charles Yost, July 1969:

The U.S. considers that the part of Jerusalem that came under the control of
Israel in the June war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is occupied
territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law regarding
the rights and obligations of an occupying power….

The occupant has no right to make changes in laws or in administration other
than those which are temporarily necessitated by his security interest, and
that an occupier may not confiscate or destroy private property.

zz U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers on December 9, 1969:

We have made clear repeatedly in the past two and a half years that we
cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of
the city. We believe its status can be determined only through the
agreement of the parties concerned…taking into account the interests of
other countries in the area and the international community.

…We believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within which there would
no longer be restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. There
should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and
nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified city
should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the
Jewish, Islamic, and Christian communities. And there should be roles for
both Israel and Jordan in the civil and religious life of the city.28

Camp David Accords, 1978

With the commencement of the Middle East peace process following the 1977
visit to Jerusalem by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the ensuing 1978
negotiations at Camp David under the auspices of U.S. President Jimmy
Carter, the issue of Jerusalem did not figure as a negotiating issue in the
outcome document – “Framework for Peace in the Middle East.”29

However, in a series of answers to questions posed by Jordan's King Hussein
during the Camp David negotiations, President Carter is on record expressing
the following views regarding the status of Jerusalem:30

We believe a distinction must be made between Jerusalem and the rest of the
West Bank because of the city's special status and circumstances. We would
envisage, therefore, a negotiated solution for the final status of Jerusalem
that could be different in character in some respects from that of the rest
of the West Bank.

Whatever solution is agreed upon should preserve Jerusalem as a
physically undivided city.

He spoke about free access to holy places and the basic rights of the city's
residents and that “the holy places of each faith should be under the full
authority of their representatives.”

In a statement issued by President Carter explaining the U.S. vote on
Security Council Resolution 465 on March 3, 1980, he stated:

As to Jerusalem, we strongly believe that Jerusalem should be undivided,
with free access to the holy places for all faiths, and that its
status should be determined in the negotiation for a comprehensive peace
settlement.31

In an exchange of letters accompanying the agreed-upon peace framework,
the respective positions of each of the three negotiating partners was
placed on international record. In his letter to President Carter dated
September 17, 1978,
President Sadat reaffirmed Egypt's position as follows:

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and
historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored.
2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.
3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise
their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian People in
the West Bank.
4. Relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolutions
242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures
taken by Israel to alter the status of the city are null and void and should
be rescinded.
5. All peoples must have free access to the city and enjoy the free
exercises of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places
without distinction or discrimination.
6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and
control of their representatives.
7. Essential functions in the city should be undivided and a joint
municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli
members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the
city shall be undivided.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin wrote to President Carter informing him:

On 28 June 1967, Israel's parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted
a law to the effect: “the Government is empowered by a decree to apply the
law, the jurisdiction and administration of the State to any part of Eretz
Israel (Land of Israel - Palestine), as stated in that decree.”

On the basis of this law, the government of Israel decreed in July 1967
that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel.

President Carter responded to the two letters as follows:

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by
Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967,
and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council
on July 1, 1969.32

Oslo I Accord, 1993

The advent of direct negotiations between official Palestinian
and Israeli delegations, following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference
convened by the U.S. and Russia, provided for the first time in the
negotiating process a framework for detailed discussion of the issues of
direct bilateral concern between Israel and the Palestinians, including
Jerusalem. These negotiations, held in parallel between 1991 and 1993 in
Washington, D.C., and in Oslo, resulted in an exchange of letters of mutual
recognition between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat,33 and a framework document entitled “Israel-Palestinian Declaration
of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (commonly described
as “Oslo I”), with a significant pre-ambular declaration by both sides
according to which they “recognize their mutual legitimate and political
rights,” and agree to steps for achieving “peaceful coexistence and mutual
dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace
settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political
process.”34

While this historic declaration did not specify, in and of itself, which
legitimate and political rights were mutually recognized, clearly the rights
of each side regarding Jerusalem, among other possible rights (including
Israel's right to a Jewish national home and the Palestinian right to
self-determination), were considered to be part and parcel of this mutual
commitment.

In this context, perhaps the most significant milestone in the negotiating
history of Jerusalem occurred in Article V of this document regarding
permanent status negotiations scheduled to take place during the course of a
five-year “transitional period” of Palestinian interim self-government:
It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues,
including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders,
relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of
common interest (emphasis added).

The significance of this commitment was striking in the wider context
of the negotiating history of Jerusalem. It referred to the issue of
Jerusalem in general, implying possibly the whole of Jerusalem and not
merely the fate of east Jerusalem or the holy places. In fact, as noted by
Dore Gold, “when Israel signed the Oslo Agreements in 1993, for the first
time since 1967 it agreed to make Jerusalem an issue for future
negotiations.”35

The participation by Palestinian residents of Jerusalem in the projected
Palestinian Authority elections, as foreseen by the agreement, was referred
to in a “Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections” annexed to the
agreement, stating:

Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate
in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.

The presence of Jerusalem as a negotiating issue in the negotiation
process, and the Palestinian interest in east Jerusalem, were given
prominence in a letter dated October 11, 1993, from then Israeli Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgan Holst in
which Peres confirmed:

The palestinian [sic] institutions of East Jerusalem and the interests
and well-being of the Palestinians [sic] of East Jerusalem are of great
importance and will be preserved.

Therefore, all the palestinian [sic] institutions of East Jerusalem,
including the economic, social, educational, and cultural, and the holy
Christian and Moslem places, are performing an essential task for the
palestinian [sic] population.

Israel undertook “not to hamper their activity.”

Washington Declaration, 1994

With Jerusalem formally ensconced within the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiation process, there was nevertheless a necessity to protect the
role of Jordan in the context of negotiating Jerusalem. This was realized
in the Washington Declaration of July 25, 1994, the precursor to the
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, in which Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and
Jordan's King Hussein formally terminated the state of belligerency that
had existed between the two countries. In addition, with regard to Jordan's
role in any future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians
regarding Jerusalem, the two leaders declared:

Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the
permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the
Jordanian historic role in these shrines. In addition the two sides have
agreed to act together to promote interfaith relations among the three
monotheistic religions.36

This commitment was repeated and formally reaffirmed in Article 9(2) of the
Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty, signed shortly thereafter on October 26,
1994.37

Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 1995

While the Oslo I declaration deferred the substantive negotiating issue of
Jerusalem to the permanent status negotiations, the “Israeli-Palestinian
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” between the PLO and Israel
signed in September 1995 (commonly known as “Oslo II”), contained
detailed provisions enabling Palestinian residents of [east] Jerusalem to
participate in the elections determined by this agreement for the
Palestinian administrative institutions and for the election of the “Ra'ees”
(head).38

Annex II to this agreement entitled “Protocol Concerning Elections” details
in Article VI entitled “Election Arrangements Concerning Jerusalem” such
issues as election campaigning, polling arrangements, location of polling
stations in east Jerusalem and voting procedures, based on the use of post
offices located in east Jerusalem as centers for polling.39

Saudi Arabian Peace Plan, March 200240

A Saudi-inspired peace plan adopted by an Arab summit in Beirut in March
2002, and considered by many in the international community, including the
EU and the U.S., as a viable initiative for regional peace, made reference
to Jerusalem by conditioning the establishment of normal relations in the
context of a comprehensive peace, with Israel's acceptance of an
independent Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital.

Jerusalem in the Quartet “Roadmap,” April 2003

The U.S.-initiated “Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” drafted under the auspices of
the Quartet – the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and
Russia – specified steps and time-lines for reaching a settlement. 41

The first phase, intended to be completed by May 2003 in the context of
“Palestinian Institution-Building,”required Israel to reopen the Palestinian
Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in east
Jerusalem, based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in
accordance with prior agreements between the parties.

By the third phase, projected to be completed by 2005, the Roadmap
envisioned a final and comprehensive permanent status agreement ending the
conflict and ending “the occupation that began in 1967,” including a
“negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account
the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the
religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide.”

One may view an element of complementarity in the terminology
regarding Jerusalem used in the 2003 Roadmap (“the political and
religious concerns of both sides”) and that used in a more general
expression in the 1993 Oslo I Accord (“recognize their mutual legitimate and
political rights”).

Negotiating Proposals for the Final Disposition of Jerusalem

With the possibility of resumption of negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians and entry into a substantive discussion of Jerusalem as a
permanent status issue at some stage in the future, various suggestions,
some more practical than others, have been proffered by international and
local bodies, international legal scholars and other individuals, aimed at
serving as a basis for such negotiations, all intended to encapsulate some
element of international influence in Jerusalem as well as
elements of shared sovereignty and/or administration of the city.

zz In 1988, Walid Khalidi proposed the designation of west Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel and east Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.
Extraterritorial status and access to the Jewish holy places would be
assured, and a Grand Ecumenical Council formed to represent the three
monotheistic faiths (with rotating chairmanship), to oversee inter-religious
harmony. Reciprocal rights of movement and residencebetween the two capitals
within agreed-upon limits would be negotiated.42

zz In 1992, a “Blueprint for Jerusalem” was developed by former
Jerusalem Municipal Council member Moshe Amirav in association with Israeli
and Palestinian intellectuals, proposing an enlarged greater Jerusalem
with an overall council comprising 20 municipal units, each under the
sovereignty of their respective side, and a joint metropolitan council
composed of representatives of the two sides and of the three religions
managing the holy places.43

zz In 1992, Adnan Abu Odeh proposed “Two Capitals in an Undivided
Jerusalem,” dividing sovereignty over urban areas outside the walls of the
Old City based on the demographic nature of the population, with no
state having political sovereignty over the walled city, which would belong
to the world and to the three religions, governed by a council representing
the highest religious authorities of each religion.44

zz In 1993, Hanna Siniora, editor-in-chief of Al-Fajr, proposed that based
on the 1947 Partition Plan divisions, all the institutions of both peoples
could be located in the Greater Jerusalem area. West Jerusalem would have
the Knesset, the seat of the Israeli government and all other Israeli
government institutions, and in east Jerusalem would be the Palestinian
National Council, the seat of the Palestinian government, and all other
Palestinian government institutions. The plan calls for mutual agreement
between the two countries to suspend the issue of sovereignty over
the entire area of Greater Jerusalem or the Metropolitan Council of
Jerusalem.45

zz The 1994 IPCRI Plan (from the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and
Information) proposed a geographically undivided city politically divided
into two capitals, with two sovereignties, two municipal administrations,
coordination of administration of each side's neighborhoods, and joint
administration of the Old City, joint planning forums, and joint
coordination between the two mayors.46

zz The 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen Plan47 was developed through a secret
Stockholm channel on permanent status run by Israeli Deputy Foreign
Minister Yossi Beilin and Arafat's deputy, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). Their
joint working paper proposed a Palestinian capital in Abu Dis, joint
administration of an expanded city incorporating Palestinian and Israeli
neighborhoods, each serving as the respective national capital,
guaranteeing Jerusalem as an open and undivided city with free and unimpeded
access for people of all faiths and nationalities without impediment or
restriction. The working paper was not ultimately signed by either side and
Arafat called it a “basis for further negotiations.”

The ultimate sovereignty of the area outside the respective capitals
of the two states would be determined by the parties in subsequent
negotiations. A Palestinian flag – not a Jordanian flag – would fly in the
area of the Temple Mount.

zz A 1999 EU Note-Verbale to the Israel Foreign Ministry stated: “The
European Union reaffirms its known position concerning the specific status
of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum.”48

zz In the February 15, 2000, “Basic Agreement between the Holy See and the
PLO,”
the preamble calls:

...for a special statute for Jerusalem, internationally guaranteed, which
should safeguard the following:

a. Freedom of religion and conscience for all
b. The equality before the law of the three monotheistic religions and
their institutions and followers in the city
c. The proper identity and sacred character of the city and its
universally significant religious and cultural heritage
d. The holy places, the freedom of access to them and of worship in
them
e. The regime of “Status Quo” in those holy places where it applies.49

zz In May 2000, Gershon Baskin, co-director of IPCRI, offered a proposal
based on the principle of “scattered sovereignty”:

1. Essential “non-negotiables”:

a. Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall of the Temple and the
entrance to the Western Wall compound
b. Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City
c. Israeli sovereignty over the Israeli neighborhoods of east Jerusalem
that were constructed after 1967 (such as Ramot, Ramat Eshkol, French
Hill, East Talpiot, Gilo, etc.)
d. Security arrangements and mechanisms guaranteeing the security of
Israelis in all parts of the city
e. A guarantee that the city will remain open; in other words, free,
unrestricted movement for all in all parts of the city
f. Limitations on Palestinian building and digging on the Temple
Mount

2. The boundaries of Palestinian east Jerusalem will be the boundaries of
June 4, 1967, based UN Resolution 242.

3. Jerusalem will remain open, united and undivided, with no physical
boundaries in east or west Jerusalem, and freedom of movement for all
throughout the entire city.

4. As sovereign power in east Jerusalem, the Palestinians will agree
to relinquish their sovereignty over the Western Wall and the entrance
to the Western Wall, the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and the Israeli
neighborhoods in east Jerusalem.

5. The Temple Mount (Haram al Sharif ) will continue to be under the
control of the Muslim Waqf, which will not build any buildings on the Mount
or engage in any digging under the mount, unless mutually agreed to with
Israel.

6. The area directly above the Western Wall will be a “no congregation”
area in order to meet Israeli demands for security against stoning the
Western Wall compound.

7. A council of elected representatives from all four quarters will
manage the Old City which will be a tax-free zone.

8. Both sides will legislate a “Basic Law” that promises freedom of
access and movement to the holy places and sites, freedom of worship and the
protection of holy places and sites.50

zz “Clinton Parameters,” December 23, 2000:

1. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram, and Israeli sovereignty over

a) the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part;

b) the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part.

There will be a firm commitment by both not to excavate beneath the
Haram or behind the Wall.

2. Or - Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty
over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue
of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall such that mutual consent
would be requested before any excavation can take place. 51

Clinton later summarized his Jerusalem proposal before the Israel
Policy
Forum on January 7, 2001, as follows:

First, Jerusalem shall be an open and undivided city, with assured
freedom of access and worship for all. It should encompass the
internationally recognized capitals of two states, Israel and Palestine.
Second, what is Arab should be Palestinian, for why would Israel want
to govern, in perpetuity, the lives of hundreds and thousands of
Palestinians? Third, what is Jewish should be Israeli. That would give rise
to a Jewish Jerusalem larger and more vibrant than any in history.52

zz Munk Centre of the University of Toronto, in coordination with the
Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs, December 2005

•z Establishment of an interim special regime within the framework of a
two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, with Yerushalayim and al- Quds
as their capitals.

•z Appointment of an internationally respected individual possibly nominated
by the Quartet and agreed-to by the parties as administrator with executive
powers.

•z A governing council, composed of Israelis, Palestinians, and possibly
outside representatives drawn from countries acceptable to the parties.

•z Vesting in the administrator and council responsibility for
security, law enforcement, public services, infrastructure, residency,
property ownership, the legal regime, zoning and building and other
relevant regulations.

•z Israeli and Palestinian authorities’ responsibility for issues
affecting their nationals, including health, education, family law and
religious observance.

•z Establishment of a single Old City police force composed of
internationals, Israelis and Palestinians.

•z International agencies could transfer offices to the Jerusalem area to
provide economic stabilization and encourage political stability.53

zz Prof. John Witbeck’s “Condominium Solution,” 2007

In the context of a two-state solution, Jerusalem could form an undivided
part of both states, constitute the capital of both states and be
administered by
local district councils, to which as many aspects of municipal governance
as possible would be devolved, and an umbrella municipal council, which
would coordinate only those major matters which can only be dealt with
efficiently at a city-wide level. In the proper terminology of international
law, Jerusalem would be a “condominium” of Israel and Palestine.

Assigning sovereignty over an undivided city both to Israel and to
Palestine should satisfy to the maximum degree possible the symbolic and
psychological needs of both Israelis and Palestinians.54

zz The 2010 Working Group on “The Historic Basin of Jerusalem: Problems and
Possible Solutions,” headed by Prof. Ruth Lapidoth and Dr. Amnon Ramon,55
recommended international involvement on the assumption that it would
improve chances of reaching agreement in light of the mistrust between the
sides as well as the cultural-religious importance. Neither side would be
required to relinquish sovereignty, thereby enabling a long-term interim
arrangement until the sides
build up the mutual trust needed for achieving a permanent agreement.

Conclusion

Despite the many proposals for negotiating the Jerusalem issue, any
agreed plan for resolving the future status of the Holy City has
defied generations of negotiators. On the Israeli side there has been a
paradox in its formal position. While the Oslo Agreements in September 1993
made Jerusalem one of the subjects for the permanent status negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made
clear in his final Knesset address in October 1995 that Jerusalem was to
remain united under Israeli sovereignty. But by formalizing past
understandings with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan over its role in the
administration of the Muslim holy sites, through instruments like the
Washington Declaration, he appeared to be drawing a distinction between
sovereignty over Jerusalem, which in his view had to be retained by
Israel, and an international administrative role for the holy sites, which
he was prepared to explore with Israel’s eastern neighbor. Thus, while
insisting on Israeli sovereignty over a united Jerusalem, he did not view
the issue of Jerusalem as a “zero sum game.”

However, any such solution for Jerusalem can only be predicated on a firm
political and legal agreement between the parties establishing genuine,
peaceful relations between them and detailing the respective spheres
of joint and/or separate administration, control, responsibility and
cooperation. Such an agreement would have to be accepted universally
throughout the international community. It must, in and of itself, be
predicated on absolute acknowledgement of, respect for, and acceptance by
each side of the historic and religious rights of the other in Jerusalem.
Continued mistrust, attempts to dislodge, undermine or destabilize the other
side vis-à-vis its own constituency or the international community, and
attempts to delegitimize the integrity or historical rights of the other
side would clearly render hopeless any possibility of peacefully governing
Jerusalem.

About the Author

Amb. Alan Baker, Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, is former Legal Adviser to Israel's
Foreign Ministry and former Ambassador of Israel to Canada.

Notes

1 WAFA, Aug. 21, 2012, and Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Aug. 22, 2012,
http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=7284#.UFRBTszjWGw.mailto
2 “Views of the Israel Public on Israeli Security and Resolution of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Dahaf
Institute Survey 3114, December 2012,
http://jcpa.org/article/dahaf-survey-18-december-2012
3 Gil Hoffman, “6 in 10 Palestinians Reject 2-State Solution, Survey
Finds,” Jerusalem Post, July 15,
2011, http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=229493.
4 For the complete text of the speech see Weizmann Papers, vol. II,
Paper 98, pp. 700-702. See also Jacques Paul Gauthier, “Sovereignty over the
Old City of Jerusalem,” 2007, p. 600; Martin Gilbert, “Jerusalem: A
Microcosm of Jewish Rights,” Israel at 60: Confronting the Rising Challenge
to its Historical and Legal Rights (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
2009). See also Dore Gold, “Defending Israel’s Legal Rights to Jerusalem,”
Israel’s Rights as a Nation-State in International Diplomacy (Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs, 2011), p. 91.
5 9 Encyclopedia Britannica 824 (1969).
6 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,999674,00.html. See
also http://www. mostmerciful.com/night-journey-of-prophet-muhammad.htm, and
http://islam.about. com/od/jerusalem/a/quds.htm. See also Zvi Verblovsky
“The Meaning of Jerusalem to Jews, Christians and Moslems,” Jerusalem, 1988.
7 Constantine Rackausas, The Internationalization of Jerusalem
(Washington: Catholic Association for International Peace, 1957), p. 9,
quoted also in Jacques Paul Gauthier, “Sovereignty over the Old City of
Jerusalem,” 2007, p. 315.
8 Gauthier, ibid., pp. 302-305.
9 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Documents of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New
York, 2005), vol. 1, p. 20.
10 Articles 13 and 14 of the Mandate, see
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/
Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/The+Mandate+for+Palestine.htm. Due to objections
from the religious communities, attempts by Britain to establish the special
commission were abandoned in October 1922. See Gauthier, p. 426.
11 A/Res 181(II) of 29 November 1947.
12 Ibid., Part IA3 of the resolution.
13 See statement by Moshe Sharett of February 27, 1948, to the UN
Security Council, Gauthier, p. 581. See also discussion of Israel’s
acceptance of the partition resolution by Dore Gold, in “Defending Israel’s
Legal Rights to Jerusalem,” Israel’s Rights, op. cit., p. 101.
14 L. Kleter, “The Sovereignty of Jerusalem in International Law,” 20
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1981, p. 350, cited by Dore Gold,
ibid.
15 Statement by the Arab Higher Committee, November 29, 1947. See GAOR,
2nd Sess., 1947, Ad- Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, pp. 5-11. See
also M. Cheriif Bassiouni, op. cit., p. 101. See also the Arab formal
declaration on their intention to invade Palestine at http://www.
mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/5+Arab+League+declaration+on+the+invasion+of+Pales.htm
16 Shlomo Avineri, “Self-Determination and Israel’s Declaration of
Independence,” in Israel’s Rights as a Nation-State in International
Diplomacy, p. 39,
http://jcpa.org/article/rights-of-israel-as-the-nation-state-of-the-jewish-people/
17 Resolution 185 (S-2) of April 26, 1948, considered “that the
maintenance of order and security in Jerusalem is an urgent question which
concerns the United Nations as a whole” and called upon the UN Trusteeship
Council to study measures for the protection of the city and its
inhabitants. Resolution 186 (S-2) of May 14, 1948, empowered the
appointment of a UN Mediator to promote peaceful adjustment of the future
situation of Palestine, including assuring the protection of the holy and
religious buildings and sites. Resolution 187 (S-2) of May 6, 1948,
appointed a Special Municipal Commissioner for the administration of
Jerusalem. Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, concerning a report of
the UN mediator and establishing a conciliation commission, resolved in its
seventh and eighth paragraphs that Jerusalem and its environs “should be
accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine, and
should be placed under effective United Nations control.” It went on to
instruct the Conciliation Commission to prepare “detailed proposals for a
permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for
the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the
special international status of the Jerusalem area.”
The UN Conciliation Commission proposal dated September 1, 1949, called for
a functional international regime, with two municipalities – one for each
side, and a UN Commissioner to govern the holy places.
18 GAOR, 3rd Sess., part 2, 1949, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 45th
meeting, May 5, 1949 (A/818), pp.
230-236, reproduced in Ruth Lapidoth and Moshe Hirsch, eds., The Jerusalem
Question and its
Resolution: Selected Documents (1994), pp. 43-48.
19 Knesset Records, vol. 4 (2nd Sess.), pp. 81-2.
20 N. Bentwich, “Israel Resurgent,” pp. 186-7, reproduced in Gauthier,
op. cit., p. 634.
21 Draft Resolution Concerning an International Regime for the Holy
Places, Proposed by Sweden, A/ AC.38/L63, December 5, 1950, see
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign
+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/9+Draft+Resolution+Concerning+an+International+Reg.htm
22
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/25+Statement+to+the+General+Assembly+by+Foreign+Mi.htm
23 Yehuda Blum, The Juridical Status of Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Leonard
Davis Institute, 1974), p. 31.
24 Protection of Holy Places Law, 1967
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Forei
gn+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/14+Protection+of+Holy+Places+Law.htm
25 Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law, June 27,
1967. Municipal Corporation Ordinance (Amendment) Law, 1967,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/13+Law+and+Administr
ation+Ordinance+-Amendment+No.htm
26 See Security Council Resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969), 271 (1969),
298 of September 25, 1971,
446 of March 22, 1979, 452 of September 20, 1979, 476 of March 1, 1980, 471
of June 5, 1980,
592 of June 30, 1980, 478 of August 20, 1980, 592 of September 8, 1986, 605
of December
22, 1986, 904 of March 13, 1994, 55/50 of December 1, 2000. See also General
Assembly
Resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of July 4, 1967, 2254 (ES-V) of July 14, 1967, 2949
of December 8, 1972,
36/120E of December 10, 1981, 37/123C of December 16, 1982, 38/180C of
December 19,
1983, 29/146 C of December 14, 1984, 40/168 C of December 16, 1985, 41/162C
of December 4,
1986,42/209D of December 11, 1987, 43/54 C of December 6, 1988, 44/40 of
December 4, 1989,
45/83C of December 13, 1990, 46/82B of December 16, 1991, 47/63 of December
11, 1992,
49/59 of December 14, 1993, 49/87 of December 16, 1994, 50/22 of December 4,
1995, 51/27 of
December 4, 1996, 52/53 of December 9, 1997, 53/37 of December 2, 1998,
54/37 of December
1, 1999.
27 GAOR, 5th Emergency Special Sess., Plenary, 1544th Mtg, June 14,
1967, pp. 9-11.
28 Lapidoth and Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 282-3.
29
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Camp+David+Accords.htm
30 William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington:
Brookings Institution,
1986), pp. 388-396, cited in Jerusalem Perspectives Towards a Political
Settlement (Tel Aviv: New Outlook/U.S. Institute for Peace, 1993), pp. 20-1.
31 American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (1983), p. 705,
cited in Lapdoth and
Hirsch, op. cit., p. 313.
32 http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/letters.phtml
33
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-PLO+Recognition+-+Exchange+of+Letters+betwe.htm,
see preamble.
34 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/
Declaration+of+Principles.htm
35 Dore Gold, op. cit., Israel’s Rights, p. 103.
36
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/The+Washington+
Declaration.htm
37
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-
Jordan+Peace+Treaty.htm
38
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip+and+Jericho+Area.htm
39
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN+INTERIM+AGREEMENT+-+Annex+II.htm
40 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/
Beirut+Declaration+on +Saudi+Peace+Initiative+-+28-.htm. See also
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3691148,00.html
41
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/A+Performance-
Based+Roadmap+to+a+Permanent+Two-Sta.htm
42 Walid Khalidi, “Toward Peace in the Holy Land,” Foreign Affairs
(Spring 1988): 771-789.
43 Quoted in a UN Report on “The Status of Jerusalem,” UN Doc. 97-24262
(1997), cited in
Bassiouni, op. cit., p. 1143, quoting an article by Moshe Amirav in the
Jerusalem Report, March
12, 1992.
44 Report, ibid., quoting Adnan abu Odeh, Foreign Affairs (Spring 1992):
83-8, cited in Bassiouni,
p. 1144.
45 Hanna Siniora, “The Siniora-Amirav Model,” quoted in Jerusalem
Perspectives Toward a Political
Settlement (Tel Aviv: New Outlook/U.S. Institute for Peace, 1993), pp. 30-1.
46 UN Report cited in Bassiouni, p. 1142, quoting an article by Gershon
Baskin, “A Strategic Analysis for Implementing a Peace Plan in Jerusalem,”
JADE News, April 1994, summarizing the outcome of a series of roundtable
discussions in 1992-94.
47 http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=732
48 Cited in Dore Gold, “The Political Dimension: The Positions of the
Principal Parties to the Jerusalem Question,” Jerusalem in International
Diplomacy, p. 13, http://jcpa.org/art/jid- poldim.htm
49 L’Osservatore Romano, February 16, 2000.
50 Gershon Baskin, “The Agreement on Jerusalem and its Price,” May 2000,
http://www.ipcri.org/
files/solution.htm
51 http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm
52 http://jcpa.org/art/jid-campdavid.htm
53 MCISD Briefings, December 2005, Michael Bell, Michael J. Molloy, John
Bell and Marketa Evans, “The Jerusalem Old City Initiative Discussion
Document – New Directions for Deliberation and Dialogue.” See Executive
Summary at pp. ix-x.
54 John V. Whitbeck, “Sharing Jerusalem: The Condominium Solution,” May
3, 2007, http://www.cgnews.org/article.php?id=20780&lan=en&sp=0
55 http://www.jiis.org/.upload/publications/basin.pdf, p. 10.

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