[Dr. Aaron Lerner - Any discussion of Israel-Chinese relations and the
potential significance of Chinese participation in a Red Sea - Mediterranean
rail that serves, among others, Chinese mother vessels from the Far East
docking in Eilat and Chinese feeder vessels serving the Mediterranean and
beyond from Ashdod can ask themselves two simple questions:

#1. What country in the world would bomb a transportation system with heavy
Chinese participation/interest?
#2. What international body could initiate or impose sanctions impacting a
transportation system with heavy Chinese participation/interest?

The bean counters who don't see the economic justification for a Red Sea -
Mediterranean rail with Chinese involvement have failed to factor in the
tremendous strategic value of the project.]

Netanyahu’s Visit to China: Opportunities beyond Iran
INSS Insight No. 422, May 2, 2013.
Evron, Yoram
http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=45&incat=&read=11395

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to make an official visit to
China in early May 2013. This would be the first visit by an Israeli prime
minister to China in over six years, and given the rarity of the meetings
between the two heads of state and China’s increased influence
internationally, the trip is important. Furthermore, this past March China
completed a change of government, and new people are now holding top
leadership positions. This will be an opportunity for Israel to meet China’s
new leaders, some of whom are expected to remain in their positions for the
next ten years.

No less important, China has been rethinking its Middle Eastern policy since
the start of the Arab Spring. Since China opened up to the world in the late
1970s, its approach to the Middle East has been characterized by a lack of
significant involvement in political and diplomatic processes in the region,
exclusive focus on promoting its economic interests, and maintenance of a
balanced policy toward states and other actors in the region. The Arab
Spring, which damaged China’s economic interests in the region, coupled with
Beijing’s declared intention in recent years to acquire a significant status
in world politics, led China to presume that its existing policy toward the
Middle East has exhausted itself. Instead, it must deepen its ties in the
region in order to establish a firm, long term foothold while exploiting the
fact that the regional array of forces is undergoing significant change. The
highly influential October 2012 article by Wang Jisi, China’s leading
Chinese scholar of international relations, created a stir by asserting that
China needs to adopt a new strategy, “march West,” strengthening its
influence and position in Central Asia and the Middle East.

This trend entails a significant challenge for Israel. If China assumes that
Israel’s close relations with the United States will prevent Israel from
strengthening its relationship with China, and at the same time, Beijing
assesses that its dependence on Arab (and Iranian) oil will grow, the
process of its increasing involvement in the Middle East is liable to bypass
Israel. In the meantime, as is demonstrated by China's invitation to Mahmoud
Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, at the same time Netanyahu
will be visiting there (albeit for a slightly shorter visit), China is
adhering to its balanced approach to Israel and the Palestinians and is
linking bilateral relations with Israel to its regional policy. Clearly, the
Sino-Israeli bilateral relationship still does not stand fully on its own.

Finding common interests with China is of great importance for Israel, and a
meeting between the heads of state at this time can promote this. In spite
of China’s traditional support for the Arab line and its energy ties with
the Muslim states, it credits Israel with several important assets. One is
that Israel holds one of the main keys to stability in the region, an issue
in which China has much interest; another is that the events of the Arab
Spring have demonstrated that Israel is an island of stability in the heart
of a volatile region. In addition, Israel is an important source of
knowledge about events in a region in which China often feels at a loss.
Israel is also seen in China as a source of advanced technologies, and China
has an interest in promoting its science and technology ties with Israel,
and perhaps even energy ties as Israel’s natural gas industry develops.
Finally, while China no longer believes, as it once did, that Israel has
unlimited influence in Washington, it does feel that strengthening its
relationship with Jerusalem would be a sign that it gradually is coming to
possess a foothold in the region, while somewhat offsetting, and perhaps
even undermining, American political influence there.

Under these circumstances, Netanyahu’s visit to China provides a significant
opportunity that should not be missed. One way, in fact, to miss the
opportunity would be to place too much emphasis on the Iranian issue. The
importance of the Iranian threat is clear and certainly Israel must do
everything it can to thwart it, including raising the issue with China’s new
top leaders. However, the issue has been discussed in recent years at every
significant meeting between the states, and more than once it has taken up
the lion’s share of the agenda while pushing aside topics that—from China’s
point of view—are no less important. Consequently, if Israel makes Iran the
main focus of discussion, China’s will take this to mean that strengthening
bilateral ties is not of primary importance to Israel; rather, from Israel’s
perspective, China’s importance is limited to promoting Israel’s security
interests.

Therefore, discussions should be balanced between subjects important to
Israel (Iran), topics important to China, and to bilateral relations between
the states. First and foremost, Israel should demonstrate to China that it
is interested in promoting bilateral relations, and that to this end it is
prepared to help, with its limited capabilities, to further China’s
interests in the Middle East. Specific issues that can be raised in this
context are promoting Chinese investments in Israel (an interest of both
countries) and establishing formal and semi-formal high level dialogues
between the two states. As for the China-Israel-United States triangle,
Israel can make it clear to China that while its technological ties will
remain subject to the framework of understandings between Jerusalem and
Washington, it is working to promote its activities with China in a wide
variety of non-sensitive areas. Finally, in light of China’s desire to play
a more visible role in Middle Eastern politics, Israel can suggest that
China participate in various international frameworks connected to the
Middle East and discuss with it burning regional developments, such as
Syria. Mahmoud Abbas' visit to Beijing at the same time as Netanyahu also
invites a discussion of China’s possible contribution to progress on the
Israeli-Palestinian problem. Placing these issues on the table would convey
Israel's recognition of China’s rising status and its increasing importance
in the region, and would make it possible to express Israel’s concerns and
expectations to China in a more balanced manner.

Finally, more than any other Israeli politician, Benjamin Netanyahu is
identified with the close US-Israel relationship. This likely leads China to
assume that he would refrain from taking significant steps to promote
relations with China so as not to arouse the displeasure of the United
States, which, since its decisive action against Sino-Israeli security
relations, has been perceived as an impediment to their further development.
In addition, Netanyahu has not played a significant role in the development
of relations in the past, and on two occasions he canceled planned visits to
China. On the other hand, it was during Netanyahu’s first term as prime
minister that an agreement was signed, later canceled, to provide the
Phalcon early warning system to China. Netanyahu was not involved in
canceling the deal, nor was he involved in another security crisis between
Israel and China in 2004-2005. Thus in spite of his limited role in the
development of relations, his “balance sheet” is positive. This has been
especially noticeable in recent years given his moves to promote economic
and diplomatic ties between the two countries. His intentions to include
Chinese companies in large infrastructure projects in Israel, for example,
are known, as is his instruction to ministers in his government during a
time of budget cuts to reduce official trips to every country except China.
Therefore, despite his commitment to ties with the United States, Netanyahu’s
contribution to relations with China is largely positive, and the planned
visit can help bolster this dynamic.

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