President Obama’s Shift on Syria and Western Strategy
Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi
Jerusalem Issue Briefs Vol. 13, No. 24 1 September 2013
http://jcpa.org/article/president-obamas-shift-syria-western-strategy/

The Assad regime has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity
amounting to genocide, and rebel forces have perpetrated similar crimes,
their leaders supporting genocide against the Alawite minority in the
aftermath of the eventual toppling of the Assad regime. There is no
guarantee that U.S. military action will bring an end to war crimes, but may
only shift the balance of power from one despot to another.

The Syrian regime is far weaker than most observers think. Rebel forces are
continuing to gain momentum in all districts. The regime’s dire situation is
manifested in its ever-increasing reliance on irregular and volunteer forces
from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon (Hizbullah).

The Muslim Brotherhood is making a huge effort to establish an
organizational infrastructure within Syria that will allow it to lead the
opposition and take over after the overthrow of the Assad regime. It has
placed its battalions within the Civilian Protection Committee under Free
Syrian Army leadership, unlike the organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda,
as the Brotherhood strives to take control from within the official groups.

If the U.S. attacks, the rebels will not express any gratitude and will view
it as an imperial force attempting to promote its own narrow interests in
the region and assist Israel. If it fails to attack, it will stand accused
of keeping silent in the face of genocide, in practice abetting the Assad
regime.

A limited military move has advantages. It will allow the Syrian regime to
maneuver, yet will provide fresh impetus to the rebel forces to step up
their military pressure without the need for foreign intervention.

The true test for the U.S. will be in its ability to influence the outcome
of the conflict so that a responsible leadership replaces the Assad regime,
and prevents chaos and the takeover of chemical weapons stockpiles by
terrorist organizations.

The West’s Dilemma in Syria
U.S. President Barack Obama’s decision to seek congressional approval for
military action against Syria will delay any punitive military action
against the Assad regime at least until mid-September. The American
commitment to act in Syria now depends to a large extent on President Obama’s
ability to garner broad legitimacy at home, an outcome not to be taken for
granted.

U.S. vacillation reflects the West’s dilemma regarding the civil war in
Syria between President Assad’s Alawite regime, supported by Shiite Iran,
and a coalition of forces dominated by elements affiliated with radical
Islam and al-Qaeda.

The Assad regime has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity
amounting to genocide, and rebel forces have perpetrated similar crimes,
their leaders supporting genocide against the Alawite minority in the
aftermath of the eventual toppling of the Assad regime.

The sense of moral obligation to respond to the chemical attack by the Assad
regime clashes with a realistic understanding of “the day after,” and the
fear that the West will pave the way for radical Islamic rebel forces to
take over Syria (including its stockpiles of chemical weapons), thus
facilitating their own war crimes. In other words, there is no guarantee
that U.S. military action will bring an end to war crimes, but may only
shift the balance of power from one despot to another.

Syria Fears U.S. Military Action
The official Syrian response interprets American policy as indecisive and
weak. Yet beneath the heavy blanket of propaganda, the Syrian regime fears
U.S. military action, understanding that it will focus on incapacitating the
Syrian air force, military headquarters, anti-aircraft systems,
surface-to-surface rockets, and chemical weapons stockpiles.

An American strike could hasten the disintegration of the Syrian army, which
has suffered heavy losses in the past two and a half years, and has
witnessed thousands of officers and soldiers defecting to the rebel ranks.
The regime’s dire situation is manifested in its ever-increasing reliance on
irregular and volunteer forces coming mainly from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon
(Hizbullah).

Assad himself told Le Figaro recently: “I can confidently state that the
situation on the ground is much better than it was before.” But is this what
the Syrian elites really believe?

The Regime Is Weaker than It Seems
Despite the self-confidence the Assad regime is trying to convey, the
situation on the ground is entirely different. Syrian military forces
succeeded several months ago in making tactical advances on the battlefield
in al-Qusair and Homs, but ever since they have been on the losing side,
with rebel forces continuing to gain momentum in all districts. U.S.
military force will then be applied against a Syrian regime that is far
weaker than most observers think.

In recent weeks the rebels have captured the two strategic villages of
Khanser and Ariha in a military move aimed at severing the main supply route
to the besieged Syrian army forces in Aleppo and Idlib. At the same time,
the rebel military assault is continuing in the Latakia region and in
villages in the Damascus area. Video footage from the fighting displays the
Syrian soldiers’ low morale and successful rebel attacks against Syrian
armor.

Islamists Oppose U.S. Intervention
The radical Islamic groups, including those identified with al-Qaeda,
strongly oppose any U.S. attack on Syria, viewing it as a ploy intended to
serve Israel’s interests and seeing it as ultimately leading to an American
assault against the mujahedeen (radical militant Islamic groups).

In an official announcement, the Muslim Brotherhood explained that it
opposed any punitive military action against Syria, as this could have
unwanted consequences and strengthen the Assad regime. The Brotherhood
supports the imposition of a no-fly zone over Syria, the demarcation of safe
zones for the civilian population, and the transfer of qualitative weapons
to the rebels.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategy
The Muslim Brotherhood movement, outlawed three decades ago in Syria, is
making a huge effort to establish an organizational infrastructure within
Syria that will allow it to lead the opposition and take over key positions
after the overthrow of the Assad regime.

In August 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood launched its first official bureau in
the city of Aleppo, at the same time lending support to the Civilian
Protection Committee, described by various elements within Syria (yet
officially denied) as the military wing of the Brotherhood. This structure
has provided a useful instrument for Islamist penetration of the Free Syrian
Army.

Placing its battalions within the Civilian Protection Committee under Free
Syrian Army leadership shows the Brotherhood’s strategic thinking. Unlike
the organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda, it strives to take control from
within the official groups representing the rebels (the Free Syrian Army,
the “Coalition,” the “National Council”) in order to mobilize international
recognition and advance its political agenda to take over Damascus.

“The Day After” Scenarios
In the absence of significant liberal secular opposition forces, “the day
after” scenarios for Syria alternate between genocide of the Alawite
minority, chaos and disintegration of the Syrian state into areas controlled
along ethnic lines, or a takeover by radical Islamic forces wishing to
establish a Muslim religious state (according to al-Qaeda and the Muslim
Brotherhood).

The American decision to attack in Syria is opposed by the Syrian opposition
forces and lacks the backing of the Arab League. The meeting of Arab League
foreign ministers on September 1 in Cairo did not give expressed support to
an American or Western military assault against Syria, and settled on a more
general statement calling on the international community to “take necessary
and deterring measures against the perpetrators of the crimes.”

U.S. Interests and Actions
The U.S. may find itself hurt by any of the likely scenarios. If it attacks,
the rebels will not express any gratitude and will view it as an imperial
force attempting to promote its own narrow interests in the region and
assist Israel. If it fails to attack, it will stand accused of keeping
silent in the face of genocide, in practice abetting the Assad regime.

Additionally, the U.S. could risk the expansion of the conflict to other
regions in the Middle East and beyond by Syria and Iran and its allies. At
this stage, this could mean the launching of terrorist attacks and firing
long-range missiles at Israel.

The supreme interest of the U.S. administration at present is to ensure
control of Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles, the Assad regime’s last
resort. Any military assault will have to give this issue top priority.

Against this backdrop and in the absence of a broad international coalition
(Britain has said it will not participate in any attack), and in view of
Russia and China’s support for the Assad regime, the U.S. administration may
follow the middle ground of sending a message of determined commitment to
respond when chemical weapons are used, but will not instigate a large-scale
military move to replace the Syrian regime.

A limited military move has many advantages. It will allow the Syrian regime
to maneuver, yet will provide fresh impetus to the rebel forces to step up
their military pressure without the need for foreign intervention in the
decisive stages.

The West needs to approach the use of force in Syria with a well-defined
sense of its strategic goals. The true test for the U.S. will not be on the
battlefield, where it has an overwhelming advantage, but in its ability to
influence the outcome of the conflict so that a responsible and significant
leadership replaces the Assad regime, and prevents chaos and the takeover of
chemical weapons stockpiles by terrorist organizations.
=====
About Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi
is a senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs. He is a co-founder of the Orient Research Group
Ltd. and is a former advisor to the Policy Planning Division of the Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. view all posts by Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D.
Halevi