Are the P5+1 Waging a Campaign against the Military Option?
INSS Insight No. 493, December 5, 2013
Zaki Shalom
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6117

Summary: Since the signing of the Geneva agreement, the P5+1 leaders,
especially President Obama, have made numerous statements that challenge the
very idea of a military option against Iran as a realistic option. Evidenced
by the conduct of the P5+1 states – even if this was not their intention –
Iran is now presented as a country increasingly integrated into the family
of nations and as an element that will help resolve the crisis, more than as
the country responsible for the crisis in the first place. The strategic
significance of this image is that Iran is increasingly distanced from its
status as a radical, isolated state that under certain circumstances
constitutes a legitimate object of military action.

In response to the ongoing public criticism of the Geneva agreement, the
P5+1 have expressed understanding of the skepticism in Israel and other
Middle East states about Iran’s sincerity and its intention to honor its
commitments under the agreement. They contend, however, that it is valuable
as a partial interim agreement intended to create a better atmosphere for
important discussions on a permanent settlement with Iran on the issue of
its nuclear activity.

It is difficult, therefore, to understand the outbursts of joy and the
affection shown toward the Iranians by the P5+1 leaders after the agreement
was signed. It is hard to believe that the P5+1 representatives did not
realize that this sends a message that the agreement has led to a dramatic
change toward Iran. Evidenced by the conduct of the P5+1 states – even if
this was not their intention – Iran is now presented as a country
increasingly integrated into the family of nations and as an element that
will help resolve the crisis, more than as the country responsible for the
crisis in the first place. The strategic significance of this image is that
Iran is increasingly distanced from its status as a radical, isolated state
that under certain circumstances constitutes a legitimate object of military
action.

Since the signing of the agreement, the P5+1 leaders, especially President
Obama, have made numerous statements that challenge the very idea of a
military option against Iran as a realistic option. Furthermore, in almost
every speech, Obama has taken the trouble to criticize harshly, albeit
implicitly, Prime Minister Netanyahu, who despite his denials has been
portrayed as preaching the value of the military option.

These comments clearly indicate that the P5+1 reject the message of the
agreement’s critics, particularly Netanyahu, that Iran views its nuclear
project as a supreme national interest and that it would agree to give it up
only if it were clearly convinced that a sharp sword were being held to its
neck – i.e., that there is a credible military option and the US
administration is determined to use it if Iran does not fulfill its
commitments. Comments by the P5+1 leaders categorically show a very
different way of thinking.

Even before the agreement was signed, President Obama made his reservations
clear about the military option and his strong preference for achieving a
peaceful settlement. On November 14, 2013 he indicated that the United
States prefers to have Iran make a decision not to possess nuclear weapons
and for the United States to verify this. The President emphasized the
obvious risks involved in a military action, since “no matter how good our
military is, military options are always messy, are always difficult, always
have unintended consequences.”

The President further questioned the expectations of the military option
against Iran. It is in no way clear, he argued, that this option would halt
Iran’s nuclear activity, and it is even possible that it would lead Iran to
accelerate work in this direction “more vigorously.” These comments send a
clear message: Even if a military strike ended “successfully,” it is not
certain that it would deter Iran from continuing its nuclear activity with
full force. These comments also likely contained an implicit message to
Israel: if the United States, whose military capabilities are far superior
to Israel’s, is dubious about the expectations of a military strike against
Iran, then Israel ought to be far more skeptical.

On November 23, 2013, immediately after the agreement was reached, the
President returned to this motif: “Ultimately,” he stated, “only diplomacy
can bring about a durable solution to the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear
program. As President and Commander-in-Chief, I will do what is necessary to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” In a statement that suggests
that the President was seeking to distinguish himself from other leaders
(presumably Netanyahu), Obama added that “I have a profound responsibility
to try to resolve our differences peacefully, rather than rush towards
conflict.”

On November 25, 2013, Obama repeated a message which again seems to be
directed to Prime Minister Netanyahu: “We cannot close the door on
diplomacy,” he stated, to applause from the audience, “and we cannot rule
out peaceful solutions to the world’s problems. We cannot commit ourselves
to an endless cycle of conflict. And tough talk and bluster may be the easy
thing to do politically, but it’s not the right thing for our security.”

The following day the President reiterated the US commitment to prevent Iran
from obtaining nuclear capability. At the same time, he highlighted his
visits to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, where he met with
young soldiers who had been sent to fight for their country and paid a very
heavy price, and noted that therefore, he would do “every single thing that
I can to try to resolve these issues without resorting to military
conflict.” The President added that for the United States “this is not
politics; these are not games. And the stakes are extraordinarily high. And
we [perhaps in contrast to other countries] make decisions like the one we
made, we don’t make them based on political expedience; we don’t make them
on the basis of what might make a good headline today or tomorrow.”

British Foreign Secretary William Hague was much more direct – even
threatening – in cautioning that a military strike against Iran could
sabotage the existing agreement. He stressed that Britain “would discourage
anybody in the world, including Israel, from taking any steps that would
undermine this agreement,” adding that “we will make that very clear to all
concerned.”

Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius of France also warned against use of the
military option. In a media interview on November 25, he expressed the
belief that ultimately, the agreement with Iran would improve the security
of countries in the region. When asked whether there was a threat of an
Israeli preemptive strike during the next six months, he replied, “At this
stage, no, because no one would understand it.”

It thus appears that Prime Minister Netanyahu’s repeated statements that
Israel does not consider itself bound by the agreement with Iran and his
harsh criticism of the accord have raised concerns among the P5+1 states
about a possible Israeli military strike against Iran during the next six
months. Such an attack, they correctly fear, would cause the collapse of the
agreement in which they invested considerable efforts.

Perhaps it is for this reason that the P5+1 leaders seem to be making
intensive efforts to delegitimize the military option. At this stage their
effort is presumably focused on preventing an Israeli military strike until
the current agreement expires. President Obama has been the most explicit on
this issue.