The Jordan Valley: Israel’s Security Belt
by Prof. Efraim Inbar
January 6, 2014

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 232

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel must resist international pressure and hold on to
the Jordan Valley – its only available defensible border to the east – in a
future peace deal, as sudden changes in the volatile Middle East could
render it even more important. Israel must also build in Area E-1, which
would link the valley to an undivided Jerusalem. Israel should concentrate
its settlement efforts in these strategic areas, and not in the more remote
areas of the West Bank, which would signal both clear strategic preferences
as well as possibilities for compromise with the Palestinians.

US Secretary of State John Kerry is once again in town trying to reach an
agreement on a framework for continued peace talks between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority. One of the issues of dispute is the fate of the
Jordan Valley, which is indispensable for Israel’s national security. The
Jordan Valley is the only available defensible border on the eastern front,
the closest border to Israel’s heartland – the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa
triangle – which holds 70 percent of its population and 80 percent of its
economic infrastructure.

Some pundits claim that Israel no longer needs the Jordan Valley as a shield
against aggression from the east. They argue that the demise of the Saddam
Hussein regime in Iraq, the weakening of civil war-torn Syria, and the
impressive stability of Jordan in light of the turmoil of the Arab world
renders the threat from the east and its proximity to Israel’s center a
thing of the past.

Yet this is a very short-term perspective, motivated by the desire to
convince the Israeli public opinion that the Jordan Valley is militarily
dispensable. Such a view ignores the immense potential for political
upheaval in the Middle East, as recently demonstrated during the so-called
“Arab Spring” upheavals. The destabilization of Hashemite Jordan and Saudi
Arabia and a radical jihadist Syria are not far-fetched scenarios for the
near future. The reemergence of the eastern front as a security threat could
soon follow.

Moreover, the US has decided to cut its losses and leave Iraq and
Afghanistan, which constitutes a victory for radical forces in the Middle
East. A more energy-independent America might decide that it has less of a
stake in the Middle East, allowing greater freedom of action to Islamist
elements to take over American allies. Israel cannot count on the US to
always lend its weight to Arab moderates. Under President Obama, Washington
supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and might make the same strategic
mistake in Jordan.

Advocates of turning over the Jordan Valley to the Palestinians also
discount its topographical importance by referring to current military
technology, which allows precision strikes from a distance. They argue that
the ability to launch defensive strikes from the coast eliminates the
strategic need for the Jordan Valley as a means of defense. Yet, these
armchair strategists overlook the history of military technology, which
shows a clear oscillation between the dominance of offensive and defensive
measures over the centuries. The belief that the technology of today – which
indeed temporarily reduces the importance of topography – will remain
unchallenged constitutes a dangerous strategic fallacy.

Designing stable defensible borders in accordance with the current, but
transient, technological capabilities and political circumstances is
strategically foolish. Therefore, if Israel wants to maintain a defensible
border along the Jordan Valley it also needs to secure the road from the
coast to the valley, via an undivided Jerusalem and via the West Bank city
of Maaleh Adumim – 15 kilometers from the river. This is the only west-east
axis with a Jewish majority, and the only safe route via which Israel can
mobilize troops from the coast to the Jordan Valley in a case of emergency.

Maaleh Adumim is the linchpin in establishing an effective line of defense
along the valley against aggression from the east. Building a populated
Jewish corridor from Jerusalem to Maaleh Adumim (a 5 kilometer strip of land
in the E-1 area) will secure the road to the Jordan Valley and prevent the
division of Jerusalem. Jerusalem’s importance to the Jews is not only
historical and religious, but also strategic. There is great importance in
controlling the only highway from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River
along which Jews can travel with little interference from concentrations of
the Arab population.

The Palestinians plan to populate Area E-1 with Arabs in order to create
demographic contiguity between Samaria and East Jerusalem, thereby
facilitating the division of the city. Such a development would also isolate
Maaleh Adumim and undermine Israeli claims to the Jordan Valley. Settling
Jews in Area E-1 is an imperative to keep Jerusalem united and to
consolidate Israel’s defensible border along the Jordan Valley.

The US seems to understand Israel’s strategic need for the Jordan Valley,
but is opposed to linking Maaleh Adumim to Jerusalem as a vital component of
the eastern defensible border. Yet, we should remember that the US has
opposed Israeli settlement efforts since 1967 and only rarely did American
objections have an impact on Israeli decisions on this issue. Moreover, the
Americans can be persuaded to tacitly accept the linking of Maaleh Adumim to
Jerusalem if a clear strategic vision based upon the principle of
territorial compromise is presented.

While the wisdom of indiscriminately settling all parts of the Land of
Israel is not strategically compelling and is a hard sell diplomatically, a
selective settlement policy focusing on areas within the Israeli consensus,
including Maaleh Adumim and the Jordan Valley, can be pursued with less
foreign opposition. Willingness for a territorial compromise in Judea and
Samaria is also the position of most Israelis.

The government must act to reflect this preference. In so doing, Netanyahu’s
government will also demonstrate to the Israeli public its seriousness in
pursuing peace. Israelis need to feel that their government is seriously
pursuing peace, so that they will support the government in case of
international pressure to make dangerous concessions, and/or be prepared to
fight a war if necessary. A selective settlement policy that distinguishes
between important and less important strategic areas requires a gradual
freeze in allocations and construction permits in isolated settlements, and
should be complemented with the removal of illegal posts located outside the
areas of consensus.

Building in Area E-1 and the Jordan Valley will thus become easier in
domestic and international terms. It is imperative to build homes for Jews
there to establish a defensible line along Israel’s eastern border.
Hopefully Netanyahu will finally implement the repeatedly-announced plans to
build in E-1 and expand Israel’s presence in the Jordan Valley.
=================

Prof. Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic
Studies, is a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a
fellow at the Middle East Forum.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
Greg Rosshandler Family