The Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli Triangle
INSS Insight No. 547, May 9, 2014
Oded Eran .

SUMMARY: On one level, less covered in the media, Jordan and Israel are =

developing a relationship based on shared economic interests and the need t=
o =

cope with political and security constraints resulting from the turmoil in =

the region over the past three and a half years. At the same time, because =

of developments anticipated in the wake of the freeze of Israeli-Palestinia=
n =

negotiations, the internal Palestinian political process, the continued =

struggle in Syria, and the possible implications of a crisis with regional =

dimensions in the context of the Iranian nuclear program, the political =

leaderships in Jordan and Israel are likely to face difficult challenges an=
d =

will need to demonstrate great restraint in their conduct. Israel's effort =

to preserve its relationship with Jordan=92s political-military leadership =
is =

highly important. As such, Israeli reactions to various actions and comment=
s =

by Jordanian officials, even if they are justified, should be grounded in a =

comprehensive strategic view of Israel=92s regional interests.

The separation in 1921 by mandatory Britain of the east bank of the Jordan =

River from the area from the river to the Mediterranean did not eradicate =

longstanding communal allegiances, which continue to surface and evolve =

according to political developments. Over the years there has been a very =

wide range in the various positions on the Jordanian-Palestinian connection=
, =

from Jordan=92s annexation of the West Bank in 1950, which remained under t=
he =

control of the Arab Legion after the war in 1948, until the complete break =

of 1988. Nonetheless, Jordan=92s interest in events on the western side of =
the =

Jordan River continues, particularly in connection to Jerusalem. Jordan=92s =

demographic reality =96 more than half of Jordan=92s citizens are of Palest=
inian =

origin =96 in itself creates a need for Jordanian involvement. However, the =

issue of Jerusalem gives the Hashemite Kingdom a special status in the Arab =

world, although not on the same level as the status Saudi Arabia enjoys by =

virtue of its control of Mecca and Kaaba.

Jordan expressed its practical interest in Jerusalem in two main documents. =

Article 9 of the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel states: =93Isr=
ael =

respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in =

Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status =

will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic =

role in these shrines.=94 A Jordanian-Palestinian parallel of sorts can be =

found in the agreement signed on March 31, 2013 between King Abdullah II as =

=93the Custodian of the holy sites in Jerusalem=94 (without distinction bet=
ween =

Muslims and Christians) and Mahmoud Abbas as =93president of the State of =

Palestine.=94 According to Article 2 of the agreement, the Jordanian king =

affirms =93that all Muslims, now and forever, may travel to and from the =

Islamic holy sites and worship there=94 (in the agreement, there is no such =

promise given to Christians). The King will =93administer the Islamic holy =

sites and=85maintain them=94 and will =93represent the interests of the hol=
y sites =

in relevant international forums.=94 He will also =93oversee and manage the =

institution of Waqf in Jerusalem and its properties in accordance with the =

laws of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.=94 This agreement likewise provide=
d =

Palestinian affirmation of Jordan=92s claim that its guardianship of the ho=
ly =

places in Jerusalem is based on a Palestinian appeal from 1924 (Haj Amin =

al-Husseini and then-Jerusalem mayor Raghib Nashashibi to Sharif Hussein, =

father of King Abdullah I).

In recent months, tempers have flared on a number of issues on the =

Israeli-Jordanian leg of the triangle, first and foremost on Jerusalem. The =

discussion has been conducted on the parliamentary level: Jordanian members =

of parliament called for a freeze on the peace treaty between the two =

countries and the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador (after a Jordanian =

citizen was killed at the Allenby Bridge), and MK Moshe Feiglin initiated a =

discussion on Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount. In both cases, in =

Jordan and in Israel, the political leadership acted to end the discussions =

without decisions that could have caused serious political damage.

Despite this intervention, the debate has spilled over into the diplomatic =

realm as well. The ambassadors of Israel and Jordan recently released =

statements on events in Jerusalem. On April 2, 2014, Prince Zeid Ra=92ad, =

Jordan=92s ambassador to the United Nations (who has since announced his =

resignation), stated in the UN Security Council (of which Jordan is a =

non-permanent member for 2014-15) that actions by right wing members of the =

Israeli government and the Knesset =93are a challenge and threat to Jordan.=
=94 =

Among the actions he mentioned were =93regular incursions into the compound=
,=94 =

=93illegal and intrusive excavations,=94 and renovation of =93parts of the =
wall of =

the al-Aqsa Mosque without the approval of the Jordanian side.=94 In his =

response to the UN secretary general, Ron Prosor, Israel=92s ambassador to =
the =

UN, mentioned Article 9 of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and described =

Israel=92s efforts to restore calm on the Temple Mount.

On one level, less covered in the media, Jordan and Israel are developing a =

relationship based on shared economic interests and the need to cope with =

political and security constraints resulting from the turmoil in the region =

over the past three and a half years. The agreements on water and natural =

gas signed in recent months by Israel, Jordan, and companies in both =

countries are an important trend, and they show the ability of the two =

countries=92 political leaders to separate political interests from =

provocative attempts to harm this fabric of relations. Cooperation is =

increasing on the issue of security as well, especially in light of the new =

challenges created by the situation in Syria and the heavy burden it impose=
s =

on the Jordanian defense establishment, which is attempting to seal its =

common border with its northern neighbor.

The freezing of the negotiating process between Israel and the Palestinians =

could have a detrimental effect on relations with Jordan. In an April 28, =

2014 article in the Jordan Times, former Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamal =

Abu Jaber virulently attacked Israel while using a quotation from Hitler=92=
s =

Mein Kampf, and accused Israel of causing the failure of mediation efforts =

by US Secretary of State John Kerry. Indeed, the Jordanian regime is highly =

sensitive to changes in the relations between Israel and the Palestinians =

and the lack of a peace process. If the political stalemate deteriorates =

into violence, this would certainly arouse anxiety in Amman. Officially =

Jordan has not been enthusiastic about the reconciliation agreement between =

the Palestinian factions, and the Prime Minister merely commented on =

television that his country supports the agreement. Jordan=92s complex =

relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, and especially its Jordanian faction=
, =

dictate caution and restraint, but circumspection cannot hide the Hashemite =

regime=92s preferences, and it can be assumed that Jordan will continue to =
act =

behind the scenes to help Abu Mazen and his Fatah movement.

Because of developments anticipated in the wake of the freeze of =

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the internal Palestinian political =

process, the continued struggle in Syria, and the possible implications of =
a =

crisis with regional dimensions in the context of the Iranian nuclear =

program, the political leaderships in Jordan and Israel are likely to face =

difficult challenges and will need to demonstrate great restraint in their =

conduct. Israel's effort to preserve its relationship with Jordan=92s =

political-military leadership is highly important. As such, Israeli =

reactions to various actions and comments by Jordanian officials, even if =

they are justified, should be grounded in a comprehensive strategic view of =

Israel=92s regional interests.

________________________________________
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