Operation Protective Edge:
Trends in Public Opinion in Social Media in Gaza and Egypt
by Orit Perlov, INSS
http://d26e8pvoto2x3r.cloudfront.net/uploadImages/systemFiles/Protective%20Edge_English570681646.pdf

My conversations with select leaders of public opinion in social media in
Gaza and Egypt paint a complex picture, largely contradicting some Israeli
working assumptions regarding Hamas and the situation in Gaza, which have
been raised by leading voices in the traditional Israeli media. These
opinions challenge the Israeli interpretation of Hamas’ conduct, public
opinion in the Gaza Strip, and Egypt’s role as mediator between Israel and
Hamas.

The four questions I posed to these leaders of public opinion in Gaza and
Egypt were:

a. Why does the Gazan public, the majority of which is opposed to Hamas’
rule, not take to the streets and rebel against the organization, or
at the very least, publicly criticize the organization’s leaders?

b. Is Abbas an alternative to Hamas? Are Gazans willing to accept the rule
of the Palestinian Authority and Abbas should the Hamas regime collapse?

c. What is the opinion in the Egyptian street regarding President el-Sisi’s
position on the operation in Gaza? Why is Egypt not ending the confrontation
as soon as possible? Why are the Egyptians not pressuring the President on
this matter, as they have in the past?

d. Is Israel the winner and Hamas the loser? Why is Hamas in no hurry to
end the fighting? What does the organization hope to gain from this round of
fighting?

If the Gazan public is Opposed to Hamas, why doesn’t it Revolt?

Although over the past year public opinion in the social media in Gaza has
indicated waning legitimacy for Hamas (a recent survey taken by the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy indicates the same trend), a civil
uprising in Gaza has yet to take place and public criticism of the
organization is not being heard. There are two principal explanations for
this. First, “Hamas has the weapons and so when we [the Gazan public] see
what’s happening in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Iran, and Turkey, we understand
that Hamas won’t think twice about shooting us.” The people of Gaza are
exhausted and beaten after seven years of a blockade, and do not
believe they can topple the Hamas regime and create a better
alternative. Similarly, “If we fail, we will have to deal and live with them
after the operation is over, and neither Israel nor Abu Mazen nor Egypt will
help us then.” The second answer is that as long as there is no reasonable
alternative to Hamas, Gazans fear the potential ensuing chaos and
infiltration of jihadists more than Hamas.

Is Abbas the Alternative to Hamas?

Talk of a ceasefire has raised the possibility that the Palestinian
Authority, led by Abbas, will return to the Gaza Strip. My question was:
Will the PA's position and legitimacy as the Palestinian leadership be
strengthened, if it is included in the ceasefire agreement? Can Abbas serve
as an alternative to Hamas?

The discourse in the social media reveals that Gazans do not want the PA and
Abbas to replace Hamas; they perceive both regimes as "corrupted to the
core." Further confirmation came when Abbas decided to send the PA minister
of health to Gaza to see what sort of aid to extend to the local population:
the minister was pelted with stones and eggs, the windows of his car were
smashed, and the streets of Gaza were covered in graffiti calling Abbas a
traitor and demanding his death.

The Egyptian Angle: Hatred for Hamas is Greater than Solidarity with the
Palestinian People

Conversations with public opinion leaders in the social media reflect the
following:

a. “Gaza, unlike Libya, does not present a strategic threat to Egyptian
stability.” “Gaza is a humanitarian disaster, not a strategic threat.” The
threat of armed militias, Qaddafi loyalists, jihadist movements in Benghazi
and Tripoli, and concern about Libya’s dissolution with terrorism trickling
into Egypt all worry the el-Sisi government and Egyptian public more than
Gaza. The disintegration of Iraq and the rising power of ISIS are also seen
as higher priorities for Egypt's national security than Gaza.

b. After President el-Sisi announced that during his tenure there would be
"nothing called the Muslim Brotherhood" in Egypt, it would be very hard for
him politically to engage in talks with Hamas. Without domestic pressure,
el-Sisi will not be in a rush to pay the minimal price of permanently
opening the Rafah crossing. Similarly, social media discourse reveals that
hatred for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas is greater than the solidarity
with the Gazans. A growing number of Egyptians is interested in seeing Hamas
collapse and therefore, despite the pain over the suffering of the Gazan
public, many voices in Egypt are happy about Israel’s continued war against
Hamas and encourage its continuation, rather than condemn it.

c. Most Egyptians are interested in their economic hardships, such as the
rising prices of gas, fuel, and cigarettes. The Egyptian public, which has
had its fill of demonstrations, is reluctant to take to the streets again,
and certainly not on behalf of the Palestinians. “As long as Egypt is not
affected by this crisis, it will not be willing to pay the price.”

Is Israel the Winner and Hamas the Loser?

There is a working assumption in Israel that since the fall of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas is in trouble and fighting for its survival;
Hamas' popularity is eroding and it has failed to foment a “popular
awakening” (i.e., a third intifada). There is an asymmetrical struggle
between “the strongest army in the Middle East” and a fading terrorist
organization. Thus, Operation Protective Edge has weakened the organization
further and has dealt the organization and its infrastructures a harsh blow.
Furthermore, the Iron Dome system strengthens the resilience of Israel’s
civilian front and undermines the threat of Hamas’ rockets, while the Gazan
rear is vulnerable and exposed.

This question suggests an answer in the form of two equations. The first
equation is: “It’s either Hamas or chaos.” In Hamas’ view – as explained in
the social media – the very fact that the organization positions itself in
the equation as “us or chaos” is a point of strength. Neither Israel nor
Egypt, the two countries most interested in the collapse of Hamas, are
unable to topple the regime, out of fear of the alternative. The fact that
the two strongest countries in the region are worried about the alternative
provides the organization with a life insurance policy.

The second equation is “rockets for prisoners and border crossings.” In
response to the Israeli equation of “calm for calm,” Hamas is trying to
generate its own equation, which is highly problematic for Israel: rockets
for prisoners and crossings. Hamas, backed by the force of rocket fire aimed
at the heart of Israel, has no intention of giving up. It will continue to
launch rockets until Egypt and Israel agree to a ceasefire and the Hamas
demands will be met: a renewed opening of the crossings, the release of
prisoners and economic aid from Qatar and Turkey.

Perhaps most demoralizing among the social media discourse is the slogan of
leading social media opinion shapers: “In the Middle East, there are no
absolute winners and losers; the public in this region has become hostage to
weak leaders.”