The Peace Index – July 2014
14.7.2014 (N=246, Jews)
16-17.7.2014 (N=185, Jews)
23.7.2014 (N=216, Jews)
1. What is your position on holding peace negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority?
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Strongly in favor 22.8/17.8/19.7
2. Somewhat in favor 32.8/30.1/35.2
3. Somewhat opposed 16.4/18.1/20.3
4. Strongly opposed 23.9/28.5/19.3
5. Don’t know/Refuse 4.1/5.4/5.5
2. Do you believe or not believe that negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority will lead to peace between Israel and the Palestinians
in the coming years?
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Strongly believe 5.5/5.9/3.2
2. Somewhat believe 16.8/10.1/18.3
3. Somewhat don’t believe 27.7/28.0/35.2
4. Don’t believe at all 48.7/54.7/41.4
5. Don’t know/Refuse 1.3/1.3/1.8
3. In your opinion, was the launching of Operation Protective Edge
justified or not justified
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Completely justified 85.3/71.4/82.0
2. Moderately justified 10.2/20.8/14.9
3. Moderately not justified 2.3/4.5/0.4
4. Not justified at all 1.8/2.0/1.4
5. Don’t know/Refuse 0.4/1.4/1.3
4. In your opinion, is the use the IDF has made so far of its firepower
in Gaza at an appropriate level, excessive, or insufficient
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. At an appropriate level 48.1/36.7/59.5
2. Too much firepower 3.1/3.8/3.7
3. Too little firepower 44.9/57.4/33.4
4. Don’t know/Refuse 4.0/2.1/3.3
5. Please give your answer on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 meaning very poor
and 10 meaning very good
5.1 What grade would you give to the functioning of the government in
running Operation "Protective Edge" so far?
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. very poor 3.9/6.0/1.8
2. 1.3/1.8/1.5
3. 3.9/5.7/1.0
4. 0.5/5.4/1.5
5. 2.7/14.0/6.2
6. 6.8/7.6/6.2
7. 14.0/14.1/9.7
8. 31.7/19.3/23.5
9. 13.5/9.1/20.7
10. very good 21.3/13.1/25.2
Don't know 0.4/3.8/2.8
5.2 What grade would you give to the Home Front Command for its
performance in managing the defense of the home front so far?
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. very poor 1.5/2.4/0.4
2. 0.2/0.7/0
3. 0/0.9/0
4. 0.3/0.9/0.5
5. 1.5/5.0/2.3
6. 0.2/2.0/2.9
7. 3.4/8.3/5.4
8. 21.4/16.1/14.3
9. 20.0/15.4/21.0
10. very good 51.1/40.7/51.3
Don't know 0.4/7.5/2.0
5.3 In general, what grade would you give to the functioning of the local
authorities during the operation so far?
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. very poor 1.3/2.2/0.9
2. 0/0/0
3. 0/1.8/0.4
4. 1.2/1.7/2.7
5. 2.0/6.7/6.1
6. 3.2/4.2/4.0
7. 7.3/13.6/8.4
8. 24.8/17.9/20.8
9. 20.2/10.1/19.2
10. very good 30.0/25.5/24.3
Don't know 10.1/16.3/13.2
5.4 What grade would you give to the Jewish population in Israel for its
behavior since the operation began?
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. very poor 1.2/1.7/0
2. 0.6/1.4/1.0
3. 0/0.3/1.5
4. 0.8/1.5/1.5
5. 2.8/5.2/2.9
6. 4.6/5.7/5.6
7. 6.3/5.6/7.0
8. 14.6/16.5/15.5
9. 23.0/14.2/17.2
10. very good 45.5/40.8/45.4
Don't know 0.8/6.9/2.5
5.5 What grade would you give to the Arab population in Israel for its
behavior since the operation began?
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. very poor 37.6/38.5/35.6
2. 8.1/6.5/9.7
3. 3.7/7.3/9.3
4. 3.2/5.2/10.4
5. 8.9/11.8/8.4
6. 6.2/5.5/5.3
7. 7.4/4.6/6.2
8. 8.1/2.2/4.1
9. 0.8/0.9/0.8
10. very good 2.5/1.8/2.2
Don't know 13.6/15.5/8.0
6. In your opinion, what should Israel do now? To what extent do you
agree or disagree with each of the following possibilities?
6.1 Stop the fighting against Hamas unilaterally for up to 48 hours and
if the rocket fire does not stop, continue the operation
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Strongly agree 7.2/6.7/6.0
2. Moderately agree 12.7/12.7/11.3
3. Moderately disagree 11.7/11.6/12.0
4. Do not agree at all 67.1/67.2/69.7
5. Don’t know/Refuse 1.4/1.8/0.9
6.2 Agree again to an immediate ceasefire with the help of a third party
so as to discuss the conditions for maintaining the quiet
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Strongly agree 10.8/7.8/8.1
2. Moderately agree 24.7/24.4/21.3
3. Moderately disagree 18.8/14.5/18.5
4. Do not agree at all 43.9/49.0/50.8
5. Don’t know/Refuse 1.9/4.3/1.3
6.3 Agree to a ceasefire only after an agreement on the conditions for
sustaining the quiet is reached via a third party
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Strongly agree 25.7/18.7/21.3
2. Moderately agree 38.1/41.4/34.8
3. Moderately disagree 10.4/10.6/12.8
4. Do not agree at all 23.6/26.9/27.5
5. Don’t know/Refuse 2.2/2.4/3.6
6.4 Continue only with the aerial attacks until significant damage is
caused to Hamas’s capacities to fire rockets at Israel
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Strongly agree 58.4/44.0/32.0
2. Moderately agree 22.4/32.9/24.4
3. Moderately disagree 8.7/15.1/24.1
4. Do not agree at all 8.1/6.7/16.1
5. Don’t know/Refuse 2.5/1.3/3.4
6.5 Send in ground forces for a limited operation in coordination with
continued aerial attacks until significant damage is caused to Hamas’s
capacities to fire rockets at Israel
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Strongly agree 23.1/23.3/56.4
2. Moderately agree 22.7/25.6/28.8
3. Moderately disagree 15.8/21.0/7.5
4. Do not agree at all 34.2/27.0/4.5
5. Don’t know/Refuse 4.2/3.1/2.8
6.6 Send in ground forces to reconquer Gaza and topple the Hamas
government
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Strongly agree 15.9/23.2/26.3
2. Moderately agree 10.0/12.1/22.6
3. Moderately disagree 14.2/16.7/21.6
4. Do not agree at all 55.6/42.7/25.9
5. Don’t know/Refuse 4.2/5.3/3.6
7. In your opinion, what will be the outcome of Operation Protective Edge
once it has ended
14.7/16.7-17.7/23.7
1. Long-term quiet like the quiet that was achieved on the northern
border with UN mediation in 2006 8.4/16.2/29.8
2. Don’t know 15.0/18.5/20.4
3. There will be a further round against Hamas 76.6/65.2/49.8
The Peace Index:
July 2014
Date Published: 29/07/2014
http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=276#.U9ezlUD3R-Q
Conducting public opinions surveys in times of military conflict is a
problematic task, mainly because of the difficulty of producing
representative samples, the interruption of interviews by alarms,
interviewees’ impatience, and the fear of expressing unpopular opinions
because of higher-than-normal public sensitivity to questions on issues
concerning the conflict. Nevertheless, we tried in three sequential surveys
(on July 14, 16-17, and 23) to gauge, even if only in a general way, the
public mood during Operation Protective Edge. Despite the methodological
difficulties, the data point in some general directions that we will
discuss—with the appropriate caution—below.
Distribution of opinions on the justness of Operation Protective Edge: From
the beginning of the operation to the time of writing (July 27), there has
been consistent and almost complete unanimity in the Jewish public that the
launching of the operation was justified; in the three surveys we carried
out, an average of 95% thought so. It is interesting that in contrast to
previous operations, at least at this stage, more than two weeks after the
campaign began, there is no apparent erosion in the Jewish public’s support
for the military endeavor or for the government that is running it. This is
so despite the large number of dead and wounded among IDF soldiers and the
criticism of Israel in the international arena for the large number of
Palestinian civilian casualties in Gaza.
Firepower: In a similar vein, only a tiny minority of the Jewish public
(3%-4%) thinks the IDF has so far used too much firepower in the operation,
with the rest divided between those who think the army has used too little
(33%-57%) or that it has used the appropriate amount (37%-60%).
Assessing governmental bodies’ performance: The government, the local
authorities, and the Home Front Command are all looked upon quite favorably.
In all three surveys the Home Front Command came in first, with average
grades in the three surveys of 9.1, 8.6, and 9.1 (on a scale of 1 to 10).
After it come the local authorities, with average grades of 8.6, 8.0, and
8.2, while the government is ranked third with average grades of 8.0, 6.3,
and 8.0. The lower average grades were given to the three bodies at the
intermediate stage—after the possibility of a ceasefire arose and before the
ground forces were added to the campaign.
Assessing the public’s performance: Unlike the similar assessments of the
performance of the three governmental bodies, a very large gap emerges in
the Jewish interviewees’ assessment of the performance of the Jewish and
Arab populations during the operation. For all three surveys the data reveal
that the Jewish population gives itself high grades (respectively, average
grades of 8.9, 8.2, and 8.7) while assigning very low grades to the Arab
population’s performance (respectively, 4.0, 3.4, and 3.4). This apparently
stems from reports of expressions of identification with Hamas among parts
of the Arab population and some of its leaders.
And where do we go from here? We wanted to find out what course, at the
different time points, the public thought Israel should take. We presented
six possible options to the interviewees, options that were raised in the
public discourse and also by various political leaders both from coalition
and opposition parties—from unilaterally holding fire to see if Hamas would
stop the rocket fire, to continuing the ground combat and aerial attacks
until the overthrow of Hamas rule in Gaza. Although the relevance of each of
these options changed over time, the most notable finding is that, when the
ground forces entered Gaza, the rate of support for a limited ground
operation combined with continued aerial attacks until significantly
impairing Hamas’s rocket-launching capacity rose considerably (from 46% and
49%, respectively, in the first and second surveys to 85% in the last one).
Indeed, this option is currently the most popular among the Jewish public,
despite—and perhaps because of—the large number of IDF casualties.
Interestingly, concurrently there was a rise in support for the option of
reconquering Gaza and toppling Hamas (26% in the first survey, 35% in the
second, 49% in the third), though, as we see, even in the last survey that
option does not have the support of a majority.
And what will be the outcome of the operation? The prevailing expectation in
the Jewish public is of another round of fighting with Hamas in the
foreseeable future; that is, the present military operation will not achieve
a final victory. Over time, however, there has been an increase in the rate
of those who think the operation will result in a long period of quiet like
the one that has followed the Second Lebanon War of 2006 (from 8% at the
beginning of the operation to 30% today), with a decrease in the rate of
those who foresee a further round within a short time, from 77% to 50%. That
is, even though those expecting protracted quiet are still a minority, the
public is now a bit more optimistic about the possibility of attaining that
objective.
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The Peace Index is a project of the Evens Program for Mediation and Conflict
Resolution at Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute. This
month’s surveys were conducted by telephone and on the internet by the
Midgam Research Institute on July 14, 16-17, and 23. Statistical processing
was done by Ms. Yasmin Alkalay.
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