[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: This remark by David Ivry stands in sharp
contrast to the large collection of Israeli politicians, military officials
and talking heads who keep claiming that the relative quiet on the Lebanese
border since the Second Lebanon War is a testament to the deterrence
achieved by Israel's military success in that war.

"The deterrence of the last eight years was not achieved because of the
accomplishments of the Israeli military. It was the result of other
interests that had evolved and over which we had no control or influence.
Additionally, in the last three years Hezbollah has been extensively
involved in the civil war in Syria and was not interested in heating up the
border with Israel."

Conduct of Operations in Limited-Scale Conflicts
The decision-making processes and conduct of operations during Operation
Protective Edge will be analyzed extensively in the future. A good starting
point will be a profound revision of our glossary of concepts regarding
deterrence and overbalance
David Ivry 25/9/2014
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=3132

Conduct of Operations in Limited-Scale Conflicts While limited-scale,
asymmetrical conflicts have become the norm, all-out wars between state
entities where both parties invest all of their national resources in an
attempt to achieve overbalance have become less and less relevant.

Theories of warfare or conduct-of-operations doctrines that have been
studied and discussed over the course of decades, like the theory of war of
Carl von Clausewitz or Ben-Gurion's trinity of deterrence, early warning and
overbalance, remained valid with regard to past situations like all-out
wars, but are no longer relevant to the new routine situation. On the other
hand, many people use these theories in analyzing and evaluating military
and political moves made in the context of the new situation.

A point of clarification: deterrence remains relevant when it applies to
total war, but to the same extent that we achieve deterrence in preventing a
total war, we may lose our deterrence with regard to the launching of
rockets in a specific sector.

As far as early warning is concerned, an intelligence layout may be prepared
for a total war. A list of warning indicators may be compiled that would
indicate, with certainty, an intention by the other side to initiate a
confrontation. This intelligence layout and those warning indicators will
not be relevant, however, to suicide bomber terror.

According to von Clausewitz, overbalance compels the losing side to
negotiate the terms of surrender. For this reason, an element of government
must be retained on the losing side, so that it may implement the terms of
surrender agreed upon. Those who claim that a certain overbalance is
achieved in the context of limited-scale conflicts mean, in fact, that a
local military victory may be achieved, but even if it is very substantial,
no overbalance will be achieved. Negotiations may be arranged under
international or superpower sponsorship for the purpose of reaching
ceasefire agreements, or a situation may emerge where it will be in the best
interests of both parties to hold their fire with each party claiming
certain political accomplishments, but normally, the fundamental conflict
will not come to an end.

In the last war in Iraq, UN forces under US leadership achieved overbalance
over the Iraqi Army as long as the war was between "states". Whereas the
entire Iraqi regime had been eradicated, no government entity was left to
resume any form of rule. To continue the process, the winning forces were
compelled to remain in Iraq where they became entangled in an asymmetrical
confrontation with terrorist elements – a struggle with no end and no
decisive overbalance.

In the Second Lebanon War, military victory was unclear, but no overbalance
had been achieved. The severe blow inflicted on the Dahiyeh suburb of Beirut
and the destruction of Hezbollah's long-range missiles were significant
achievements, but even during the last day before the ceasefire came into
effect, Hezbollah launched some 250 rockets into Israeli territory, despite
the fact that IDF ground forces had entered southern Lebanon. This amount of
launches may have been the record of the entire campaign. From a Lebanese
perspective, Hezbollah declared victory and subsequently dominated the
regime in Lebanon. The deterrence achieved at that point remained in effect
since 2006 – for the past eight years. It was not the result of the Israeli
military blow, but the result of the fact that Hezbollah is apprehensive
about losing their political accomplishments in Lebanon in the event of
another conflict with Israel. At the same time, they never stopped preparing
forces, materiel and arms for a future war.

The deterrence of the last eight years was not achieved because of the
accomplishments of the Israeli military. It was the result of other
interests that had evolved and over which we had no control or influence.
Additionally, in the last three years Hezbollah has been extensively
involved in the civil war in Syria and was not interested in heating up the
border with Israel.

It may be right to stress that the Second Lebanon War led to the loss of
deterrence with regard to rockets – which encouraged the massive acquisition
of rockets by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. The fact that
IDF ground forces had entered Lebanese territory in 2006 did not stop the
launching of rockets and the massive attack of the last day proved that
deterrence had been lost.

The Iron Dome system was the factor that partly restored Israeli deterrence
with regard to rockets – during Operation Pillar of Defense and most
certainly during Operation Protective Edge. It was a defensive operation, of
all things, that rendered the rocket arsenal ineffective and took the edge
off the enormous investments made in this field.

The first problem I have mentioned is the fact that we use concepts and
theories that are no longer suitable to the existing conflicts. This has led
to endless arguments on the subject of achieving either deterrence or
overbalance. The conclusion here is that we should prepare concepts, combat
doctrines and force employment theories that match the situation and the
conflicts in which we are currently involved – and test ourselves according
to these new concepts, doctrines and theories.

In the new situations, even a brilliant military victory can lead to a
political fiasco or to diplomatic damage. In some cases, deterrence can be
achieved without using military force. A loaded gun is more threatening than
a smoking gun. Such deterrence can be achieved by creating a situation where
the parties are not interested in a military confrontation, as each party
stands to lose something.

In limited-scale and asymmetrical conflicts there is a restriction on the
use of force for reasons that are very familiar today: the presence of the
media and the video photography options available on the battlefield along
with the ability to broadcast the footage almost in real time. Additionally,
there is the need for internal national consensus – the need for
self-conviction that the employment of the military is really necessary.
There is also a need for international backing, at least on the part of
certain superpowers. The intensity of this backing will determine the
duration of the fighting and the proportions of the use of force. Finally,
there is the sensitivity to losses among uninvolved enemy civilians and to
losses among our own civilians, and the sensitivity to casualties sustained
by our military forces.

Accordingly, under these conditions, achieving a military overbalance is
impossible. A proportionate victory may be achieved according to our status
with regard to the aforementioned parameters, but hard-to-watch images, an
operational error or diminished international backing, or a combination of
parameters may lead to a situation where the combat operations should be
stopped.

Effectively Protected Rear Area - Prepared Military

The lessons with regard to the force build-up field are highly significant.
Investments should be made in active and passive defense so as to enable
intelligent discretion regarding the offensive military activity. In other
words, the better protected the rear area feels, the less we will be dragged
into unreasonable or insufficiently prepared operations.

According to the force employment theory, it is desirable to aspire for
short-term confrontations lasting no more than a few days. By doing so, we
will achieve a higher degree of effectiveness of our superior firepower and
a powerful, temporary psychological effect that may diminish over time.
International political backing will last as long as the effect of the
destruction images has not set in. The casualty parameter is still within
the range regarded as proportionate.

Whereas the intention is to gain a political accomplishment, the military
operation is only a means toward that end. The place where we should aspire
to stop the fighting is the moment when we realize that we are beginning to
lose politically. Admittedly, this depends not just on us, but we can always
declare a unilateral ceasefire, so we will maintain the initiative on the
one hand, while on the other hand our chances of regaining political backing
will be perfectly reasonable.

Schematically, the conduct of wartime operations does not have to consist of
continuous military activity. We must constantly monitor the trends of the
parameters outlined above. In every confrontation, different parameters
become dominant. In some cases it is the parameter of our own losses, while
in other cases it is the parameter of the local public opinion, but
sometimes it may even be an operational error or the position of the
conflict in the context of other international events or processes.

If we decide in advance that continuous military activity is not mandatory,
we will be able to define the objectives of our military operations in a
more precise and achievable manner. We will be able to progress through
stages or steps of the intensity of the conflict in a controlled manner, so
as not to find ourselves in situations where we had lost the initiative and
are forced to execute unwise moves.

Achieving deterrence is not the most important objective. The national
defense interest transcends deterrence. For example, during the First Gulf
War, the State of Israel, under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak
Shamir, avoided responding to the missiles launched into Israel from Iraq,
thereby leading many people to claim that we lost our deterrence. However,
the other national strategic interests we upheld were more important, which
means that deterrence is not the dominant strategic goal, which is
definitely within the realm of pure political decision rather than in the
military sphere.

Additionally, it is important to understand that deterrence is not always
achieved through a decisive military blow, but rather by creating interests
that both parties would like to maintain or would be afraid of losing. ?
==========================
Maj. Gen. (Ret.) David Ivry is President of Boeing Israel. He was the
Commander of the IAF, Chairman of the National Security Council, and Israel’s
Ambassador to the US