Former Commander: Israel Made 'Strategic Mistake'
Nov. 23, 2014 - 11:32AM | By BARBARA OPALL-ROME
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141123/DEFREG04/311230014/Former-Commander-Israel-Made-Strategic-Mistake-

TEL AVIV — Israel’s latest Gaza operation illustrates the strategic
consequences of crossing that Clausewitzian-inspired line of culminating
deterrence, where tactical actions aimed at containing escalation ended up
dragging it into an unwanted war of attrition.

Failure to understand the logic of Hamas and other Gaza-based groups — what
Israel Security College authors termed “the otherness of the enemy” — led to
a breakdown of Israeli deterrence in the weeks leading prior to and during
the war, experts here say.

It was partially restored, experts here say, through three weeks of
punishing military action that compelled Hamas to finally accept the Aug. 26
ceasefire that ended the 50-day war.

“We made the strategic mistake of miscalculating enemy rationale,” said a
retired IDF senior commander. “While Hamas was preparing for war, we
understood it to be just another round.”

The fact that Israel got dragged into a war not of its choosing was a
fundamental flaw, the retired commander said. “We must never be dragged.
Wars are won at the beginning with very high-intensity initiating offense.
You can’t win wars by climbing steps.”

It all could have been avoided — or more properly planned — had the IDF
correctly assessed the consequences of its actions in the weeks prior to
Protective Edge, said the former IDF chief.

He was referring to Operation Brother’s Keeper, which began June 13 as a
mission to return three Israeli teens abducted and murdered by a terrorist
cell linked to Hamas. It quickly evolved into a major 15-day ground
incursion throughout the West Bank.

“If [the IDF] would have told the government that what we were doing in [the
West Bank] would spark war in Gaza, at least we would have been prepared to
initiate the offensive against Hamas,” the retired commander said.

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon has publicly acknowledged that
Protective Edge was unwanted and unplanned.

In an after-action address at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National
Security Studies, Ya’alon said Israel got “rolled into” the war following
“escalation” triggered by the earlier operation targeting Hamas in the West
Bank.

But many others, including officers on the IDF General Staff, point to the
mid-April collapse of US-led efforts to restore Israeli-Palestinian peace
talks as the start of the slippery slope toward a summer-long war.

“We were 75 days in back-to-back operations,” a senior IDF officer said of
the 50-day Protective Edge that segued from Brother’s Keeper. “But it’s all
one package stemming from all that happened in the Palestinian sector months
before.”

The officer cited a chain of events that started with collapse of US-led
peace talks and continued with the PLO-Hamas agreement to form a consensus
government. Then followed the abduction of the three Israelis and the
operation against Hamas in the West Bank.

“And in parallel, without direct connection, Hamas was planning for the next
round,” he said.

The officer insisted Israel tried to communicate to Hamas that its
leadership in Gaza would not be targeted as part of the then-ongoing West
Bank incursion. “Operatively and declaratively, we tried not to escalate. We
didn’t want Gaza to start to burn.”

He dismissed claims that Hamas had been planning as early as January for a
summertime war. “We had no intel, not even crumbs of intel, on any type of
D-day,” he said.

“Yes, Hamas was maturing its infrastructure. But we believe they, too, did
not anticipate the war that, from our perspective, began on 7 July, around 8
p.m., with their salvo attacks that included the Tel Aviv area.”

When asked if Israel could have halted escalation at that point, the officer
replied: “Let’s say we didn’t respond to the salvo on Tel Aviv. What happens
to the deterrence? And what about internal political pressure?”

Ya’alon admits “It’s too early to tell” if the IDF managed to achieve
deterrence in Protective Edge and, if so, how long it will last.

Protective Edge, experts here say, is a textbook study in the limitations of
even the most impeccably applied military force.

When governments rely solely on military might to manage problems, rather
than leverage it for purposes of diplomacy, operational achievements are
temporary, at best, said retired IDF Col. Omer Bar-Lev, a lawmaker from
Israel’s opposition Labor Party.

“This has been the guiding policy of the Israeli government led by [Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu for the past six years. If there’s quiet,
then it doesn’t do anything and hope it lasts forever, which it won’t.

“And when rockets start to fall on our cities or when Jerusalem begins to
burn with terror, Israel knows only how to respond with force,” Bar-Lev
said.

This was essentially confirmed by the senior IDF officer, who insisted he
was providing a purely military, apolitical assessment. Interviewed at IDF
headquarters here, the officer stated as a matter of fact that “there is no
strategic solution to this Palestinian story.”

Without a grand strategy for resolving the conflict at the
political-diplomatic level, he said the IDF must prepare for “periodic”
combat operations when escalating tensions boil over.

“There’s nothing on the horizon that gives either side reason to think,
‘Hey, let’s wait another half year, because this might be solved.’ ” He
likened the resulting “strategic deadlock” to a glass ceiling.

“I’m not judging it, but let’s face it, this is the reality,” he said.
“Every once in a while, we get to that glass ceiling where we have to use
force.”

And at a time when Israel is ratcheting up pressure to stem a spate of
terror attacks by unorganized, so-called lone wolf operatives, Protective
Edge also serves as a cautionary tale against actions that may provoke a new
and far more dangerous type of war.

Given rising regional tensions over Israel’s perceived plan to alter the
delicate status quo governing the holy Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, any
minor tactical action could spark “a religious war of strategic proportion,”
the retired commander warned.

“The Temple Mount is a game changer, and any attempt — or perceived
attempt — to alter the status that has more or less kept the peace since
1967 will insert God into this conflict,” he said.

“If Israel doesn’t change its behavior and strategic thinking, we’ll face
much more than a third intifada. We’ll face a Holy War that will ignite all
the regional fanatics in solidarity against us.”

Email: bopallrome@defensenews.com.