Future Israeli Strikes in Syria: Shifting Dynamics? As Reflected in Syrian
Discourse on the Social Media
INSS Insight No. 644, December 21, 2014
Udi Dekel, Orit Perlov .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8394

SUMMARY: As presented in the Syrian social media, public opinion holds that
damage to the US interest in Syria will lead to a conflict of interests
between the US and Israel, and an American red light regarding Israeli
action against targets belonging to the Assad regime within Syria – as long
as the war against the Islamic State continues. It is believed that this
strategy, which urges a strong response against the rebel organizations in
Syria in response to Israeli attacks in Syria, will restore deterrence
against Israel, because even if Israel is not worried about a military
response from Syria or Hizbollah, it will take the American interest into
consideration and avoid a confrontation with the US administration. This
logic, however, should be assessed critically, as the coordination and
strategic understandings with the US give Israel some leeway. The American
administration understands Israel’s essential need to defend itself, and it
is therefore difficult to believe that it would prevent Israel from taking
action aimed at preventing a significant strategic arms buildup by
Hizbollah.


According to a report from official Syrian sources, on December 7, 2014,
Israel once again attacked targets near the Damascus International Airport
and the Syria-Lebanon border. After the attack, the Syrian army announced
that the attack was designed to boost the rebels' morale, following
important victories by the regime in Deir ez-Zor, Aleppo, and other areas.
Reporters who visited the area of the attacked sites relayed that a shipment
of ground-to-ground missiles and advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
systems had been hit. Serious damage to the military section of the Damascus
International Airport, which serves as the gateway for arms and military
aid – mostly from Iran and Russia – was also reported.


Following the attack, Israel’s alleged military operation sparked an
extensive debate on the social networks in Syria; some 30 percent of the
Syrian population are active social media users. A recurrent narrative was
that from the beginning of the uprising against the Bashar al-Assad regime,
Israel concluded that the regime, backed by Hizbollah and Iran, was focused
on domestic challenges, and would therefore refrain from opening another
front, i.e., against Israel. Furthermore, in the first stages of the civil
war, the idea of retaliatory action against Israel seemingly had little
legitimacy among the public. However, over time, the Syrian and Lebanese
populations began to feel contempt toward the Assad regime and Hizbollah,
due to their failure to respond to the attacks and their inability to
translate the slogan "the right to respond" [in the right place at the right
time] into action, leading Israel to believe that it enjoyed much freedom of
action in attacking Syria.


At the same time, online discourse suggests that the window of opportunity
that allegedly enabled Israel to act freely on Syrian territory against arms
shipments and other targets without any response from the Assad regime and
Hizbollah is closing. In February, an attack in the Beqaa Valley near the
border between Syria and Lebanon was attributed to Israel. According to
Voice of Lebanon radio, the attack targeted Hizbollah convoys transporting
advanced rockets from Syria to Hizbollah stockpiles in the Beqaa Valley.
Though not claiming responsibility, Hizbollah responded with three attacks
in the Golan Heights and Har Dov, and over the next 10 months Israel
reportedly refrained from attacking targets in Syria. Presumably Israel
prefers to attack in Syrian territory in order to avoid provoking Hizbollah,
which has recently bolstered its status as “defender of Lebanon” and gained
self-confidence, following its proven capability (superior to that of the
Lebanese army) in combating Sunni radical jihadist groups, primarily the
Islamic State organization (IS) and Jabhat al-Nusra.



Discussion on the social networks suggests that Iran, Syria, and Hizbollah
understand that their deterrence against Israel has weakened and that they
must therefore devise a new strategy that demonstrates that the price Israel
will pay for aerial attacks in Syria will be greater than the benefit
derived from them.



At the same time, the online discourse among the leadership of the rebel
groups in Syria reflects a sense of resentment over the price that they have
paid for the Israeli attacks. The assumption is that the regime has chosen
to respond to Israeli attacks by targeting the rebel groups Free Syrian Army
(FSA) and Islamic Front (IF) and their supporting constituencies with a
decisive blow. Online discussions also suggested that given the need to
coordinate with Iran against IS, the United States was focusing its attacks
on IS targets while refraining from attacks against Assad regime targets. At
the same time, in the framework of strategic coordination with Israel, the
US allows Israel to strike targets of the Assad regime and Hizbollah in
Syria.



Posited, therefore, is that Iran has formulated a new strategy, based on a
forceful response by the Assad regime and Hizbollah to any Israeli attack
against regime or Hizbollah targets in Syria. According to this strategy,
the regime’s response will be reflected in attacks against the leaders and
infrastructure of the rebel organizations that are among the allies of the
Western and Arab coalition – the Islamic Front, the Free Syrian Army, and
the supporting civilian infrastructure. A comment posted on the internet by
Jaysh al-Islam (part of the Islamic Front) leader Zahran Alloush about an
hour after the December 7 attack in the Damascus area supports this theory.
Alloush blamed Israel for the fact that “every time [Israel]…strikes Assad
and Hizbollah targets, it gives Assad legitimacy to take revenge against the
rebels.” According to this suggested analysis, this will counter American
interests, weaken the “moderate rebel groups,” and strengthen the extremist
organizations – Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.



Assessment

The analysis of the discourse on the social networks reflects public opinion
among the groups opposing the Assad regime, and leads to : (1) An attack by
Israel against the assets of Assad/Hizbollah (2) prompts an attack in
response by the Assad regime against the rebel groups (FSA and IF) and the
population; (3) consequently, the opposition is weakened and ISIS is
strengthened, (4) which undermines the efforts of the US in the war against
the Islamic State, (5) and as a result, the US will demand that Israel now
refrain from attacks in Syria.



The logic driving the Iranian strategy, as presented in the Syrian social
media, is that damage to the US interest in Syria will lead to a conflict of
interests between the US and Israel and an American red light regarding
Israeli action against targets belonging to the Assad regime within Syria,
as long as the war against the Islamic State continues. It is believed that
this strategy, which urges a strong response against the rebel organizations
in Syria in response to Israeli attacks in Syria, will restore deterrence
against Israel, because even if Israel is not worried about a military
response from Syria or Hizbollah, it will take the American interest into
consideration and avoid a confrontation with the US administration. This
logic, however, should be assessed critically, as the coordination and
strategic understandings with the US give Israel some leeway. The American
administration understands Israel’s essential need to defend itself, and it
is therefore difficult to believe that it would prevent Israel from taking
action aimed at preventing a significant strategic arms buildup by
Hizbollah.



To date, Israel’s policy has been to avoid involvement in events in Syria
and Lebanon while strengthening defense, mainly along the border and against
high trajectory weapons. At the same time, Israel has reportedly taken
action against immediate threats, including the transfer of weapons from
Syria to Lebanon that threaten to detract from its military advantage.
Israel has kept a low profile and has not confirmed reports about the
attacks, in part in order not to harm Assad’s dignity and force him to
respond. In the past, it has been the US that has revealed that attacks were
carried out by Israel; the administration may have been eager to disavow
responsibility for the attacks. However, in contrast to previous incidents,
the administration did not respond to the most recent attack and did not
make any announcement, official or unofficial, that the attack had a
negative impact on the US struggle against the Islamic State.



Since the formation of the Western and Arab coalition against IS, rumors
have been circulating that some of the coalition members regard the Assad
regime as a partner in the war against the Islamic State, and as part of the
future solution in Syria. Iran’s status in the region has also greatly
improved, following its efforts against the Islamic State on the side of and
in coordination with the coalition. Iran has made its contribution to the
war against the Islamic State and the utilization of the its Quds force and
Shiite militias conditional on the coalition not taking action against the
Assad regime. Iran may therefore attempt to drive a wedge between Israel and
the US by delivering a message that Israeli attacks damage the joint effort
against the Islamic State. If no related development ensues, Iran may
encourage action by Hizbollah and possibly also by Assad’s forces in
response to an Israeli attack, in order to illustrate that a change has
occurred in the balance of power and the rules of the game in the region.