Hizbollah Closes a Breach of its Outer Shield: The Threat to Israel
INSS Insight No. 648, December 25, 2014
Yoram Schweitzer, Benedetta Berti .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8447

SUMARRY: In light of the complex evolving predicament facing Hizbollah, the
alleged discovery of yet another infiltration would probably be branded by
the organization as an operational victory. Indeed, by uncovering high level
infiltrators, the group can project power and efficiency and discredit
Israel’s intelligence apparatus. Even more significant, assuming media
reports are credible, and although other intelligence assets may still be
utilized by Israel, the arrested senior operative and his four accomplices
may have contributed to the successful thwarting of Hizbollah's planned
attacks abroad. If so, their exposure can certainly be seen as harmful to
Israel in its campaign against the Shiite terror apparatus. The loss of a
high ranking asset may limit Israel’s ability to thwart future terror
operations against Israeli targets abroad.

Lebanese and international media reported recently that Hizbollah exposed
and tried a high level security operative and four of his subordinates,
accusing them of being Israeli agents. The media reports about the alleged
Israeli agents are based on a source within Hizbollah rather than an
official statement from the organization. The suspects were allegedly
members of Hizbollah’s External Operations Unit (also known as Unit 910).
The main defendant, Muhammad Shawarba, who formerly served as part of Hassan
Nasrallah's personal security cadre, was the unit's deputy commander.

This latest development joins a series of “spy ring scandals" exposed by the
organization’s security services. Hizbollah, long extremely fearful of
foreign “spies,” has historically placed an emphasis on counterintelligence.
In the early 2000s, as part of Iran's comprehensive support, the group
established an ad hoc counter-intelligence unit, while also relying on
assistance from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon to locate and
expose potential infiltrators and prevent leaks of information. One of the
lessons derived from the 2006 war with Israel was likewise to invest further
in the group’s preventive security and intelligence systems, again with
Tehran’s assistance, in order to limit the group’s vulnerability to foreign
infiltration within its ranks. Since then, Hizbollah’s counterintelligence
efforts have led to an aggressive campaign to identify and apprehend
potential spies and double agents in Lebanon in general, and within the
organization more specifically. A prominent case involved Hizbollah’s
identifying in June and November 2011 a number of members who were also
allegedly involved with the CIA. This case had an important impact on
Hizbollah, with the group admitting – and for the first time – to have been
infiltrated, in turn tarnishing its reputation of invincibility and immunity
from internal security breaches.

Though not unprecedented, the recent apprehension of a foreign agent within
Hizbollah’s highest ranks further exposes Hizbollah’s vulnerability to
external infiltration, despite its well-cultivated image as a cohesive and
loyal organization. In addition, on the operational level, this development
is of particular significance. Following the alleged assassination by Israel
in 2008 of Imad Mughniyeh, Hizbollah's top security official and the head of
external operations in Damascus, the group’s Secretary General avowed his
commitment to avenge Mughniyeh’s death. This proclamation was followed by a
string of largely foiled or failed plots against Israeli assets, personnel,
and citizens abroad.

With the alleged spy Shawarba playing such an important role within the
group’s military apparatus, his possible collaboration with Israel may have
contributed to the foiling of Hizbollah attacks abroad, from Azerbaijan to
Turkey, Cyprus, Thailand, and recently Peru (among others), as well as to
serious intelligence against the group’s leadership. In avenging Mughniyeh,
Hizbollah’s only “success" has been its attack in July 2012 against Israeli
tourists at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria, resulting in six fatalities –
five Israeli tourists and one Bulgarian. This attack, which strongly
contributed to the European community’s decision to add Hizbollah’s military
wing to its list of terror organizations, was reportedly ascribed to
Hizbollah based on information allegedly provided by Shawarba.

The recent revelations come at an especially complex time for the
Lebanese-Shiite organization: over the past year Hizbollah has been engaged
in a multi-front struggle that includes support for Bashar al-Assad in
Syria, protection of Hizbollah’s communities and infrastructure, and
assistance and coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces in dealing with
the so-called “takfiri” threat – referring to the rise in activism of
Salafi-jihadist groups in Lebanon, a phenomenon itself exacerbated by
Hizbollah’s own involvement in Syria. Over the course of 2014, successful
attacks by rival groups against Hizbollah have forced the organization to
reexamine its defense and intelligence apparatus, further focusing not only
on counterintelligence, but on internal security as well. In addition,
Hizbollah’s security landscape and calculations continue to be affected by
its post-2006 de facto deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. Preserving the status
quo has become increasingly harder since the beginning of the Syrian civil
war, with Hizbollah struggling between two competing interests. One is the
need to signal strength and resolve as well as to re-establish the rules of
the game vis-à-vis Israel, as they have been eroded by the alleged Israeli
attacks in Lebanon and Syria targeting weapons convoys on route to Hizbollah
operatives in Lebanon. Two, the group still needs to avoid escalation and
another all-out war with Israel. In this context, over the past few months
the organization has assumed responsibility for several small scale
operations in Mount Dov (Shab’a Farms) and the Golan Heights.

In light of the complex evolving predicament facing Hizbollah, the alleged
discovery of yet another infiltration would probably be branded by the
organization as an operational victory. Indeed, by uncovering high level
infiltrators, the group can project power and efficiency and discredit
Israel’s intelligence apparatus. Even more significant, assuming media
reports are credible, and although other intelligence assets may still be
utilized by Israel, the arrested senior operative and his four accomplices
may have contributed to the successful thwarting of Hizbollah's planned
attacks abroad. If so, their exposure can certainly be seen as harmful to
Israel in its campaign against the Shiite terror apparatus. The loss of a
high ranking asset may limit Israel’s ability to thwart future terror
operations against Israeli targets abroad.

The continued threat of international terror by the Shiite Lebanese
organization reinforces Israel’s need to convey a firm warning to
Hizbollah to refrain from further attempted attacks. In addition, Israel
must strengthen its international cooperation in the effort to uncover the
group’s activities abroad. Furthermore, given Hizbollah’s historical modus
operandi, which includes not claiming responsibility for its external
operations, a lack of internal informants could complicate efforts to pin
Hizbollah down as an international terror player.
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Thanks to Yael Basford and Einav Yogev for their assistance with this
article.