Escalation on the Northern Front: Background and Significance -
Security-Political Simulation
INSS Insight No. 649, December 29, 2014
Gabi Siboni .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8452

SUMMARY: Common to all the parties in the simulation was the desire to avoid
being dragged into escalation. All the parties tried to contain the event
and confine it to a short round of strikes. Among the restraining factors
were the challenge posed by the Islamic State and the weakening of the
Shiite axis in the region, Hizbollah’s involvement in Syria, and the
dialogue between Tehran and Washington – on both the nuclear question and in
dealing with the Islamic State, their common enemy. For Israel, one
restraining factor was a significant interest in avoiding a conflict on the
northern front – particularly due to concern that it would spread to the
Palestinian theater at a time when Israel was facing a strong international
political and diplomatic challenge.

The attack carried out by Hizbollah at Mount Dov (Shab’a Farms) in October
2014 heightened anxiety about a possible security escalation on the northern
front. This attack substantiated messages that Hizbollah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah sent Israel over the last year, in which he stressed that
Hizbollah activity against the Islamic State and other armed organizations
fighting against the forces of Bashar al-Assad would not divert it from the
struggle against Israel and the goal of avenging the killing (attributed to
Israel) of senior Hizbollah figure Imad Mughniyeh. Behind this statement,
there was information that Hizbollah was planning a series of terrorist
attacks in the Golan Heights and the Shab’a Farms area, along with its
continued attempts to transfer advanced strategic weaponry to its forces
from Iran through Syria. Some of these deliveries may have already reached
their destination.

The Military and Strategic Affairs Program at the Institute for National
Security Studies (INSS) conducted a simulation designed to test the
conditions under which Hizbollah might carry out its threats and escalation
would develop on the northern front. Among the groups represented in the
simulation: Hizbollah; Israel; the US; the radical bloc in the Middle East –
led by Iran; the Palestinians – the Palestinian Authority and Hamas; and
Russia. The roles were played by INSS researchers, joined by external
experts dealing with Middle East security-strategic issues.

Opening Scenario

According to the scenario, two simultaneous attacks were conducted by
Hizbollah against Israeli targets: one using explosive booby-traps and the
other using machine guns and anti-tank weapons against an IDF patrol in the
Har Dov area. The IDF forces suffered two dead and two wounded, plus one
soldier missing. Another attack on an IDF patrol in the northern Golan
Heights using explosive booby-traps killed one IDF soldier and moderately
wounded three others. On the following day, which was the date of the
activity in the simulation, Israel’s security cabinet ordered a response by
the IDF. Three Hizbollah targets in the Beqaa Valley and one on the Syrian
side of the Syrian-Lebanese border were attacked. Hizbollah wasted no time
in responding. That same night, there was anti-tank fire against IDF
positions, and short range rockets were fired at Nahariya, Safed, and Kiryat
Shmona. Other than a number of anxiety attacks, no casualties were reported.

Respective Positions

Israel’s starting point, as formulated by those participating in this group,
included two strategic goals: avoiding escalation and strengthening Israeli
deterrence. Because there is structural tension between these two goals –
actions to strengthen deterrence are liable to lead to escalation in the
conflict – a number of alternative actions were considered. The first was
“quiet in return for quiet,” aimed at “containment” of the events. The
second alternative focused on exerting pressure on the international
community to encourage Hizbollah to refrain from provoking Israel. The third
alternative was a military offensive that would be painful for Hizbollah,
but would not require it to respond with massive force. After considering
the alternatives, the Israel team decided on a combined response: an attack
on Hizbollah with strategic long range firepower, along with and appeal to
the international community and a public statement demanding “quiet in
return for quiet” and return of the missing soldier.

The starting point of the Hizbollah team was that a message had been
delivered to Israel that the organization sought a mutual deterrence
equation that would improve Hizbollah’s situation. At the same time, it
wanted to avoid escalation. The Hizbollah team interpreted the magnitude of
the Israeli response as an indication that at this point Israel too did not
want major escalation. The response to the Israeli attack was therefore to
fire at a military base and open space. In addition, and as part of the
measures for implementing its strategy, the organization delivered a message
that it was considering giving the Lebanese government responsibility for
the kidnapped soldier.

Perceiving a the danger that the Islamic State would gain control of
territories in Syria and Iraq, thereby threatening the stability of the
regimes in Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf countries,
the United States’ primary goal in the Middle East at this time is the
struggle against the Islamic State. The team playing the role of the
American administration therefore sought to refrain from diverting resources
in the direction of another conflict, such as that threatening to erupt
between Israel and Hizbollah. On the other hand, the administration regards
Iran as a party that could help in the struggle against the Islamic State,
even while negotiations with Iran on the nuclear question are underway. In
principle, Iran can be asked to use its close connections with Hizbollah to
persuade it to refrain from escalation, but the American team opted not to
do this so as not to invite Tehran to request a concession on the nuclear
question. Like the Israeli team and the Hizbollah team, and given the basic
assumption that neither party wanted a major conflict, the US team chose to
refrain from direct and conspicuous involvement in developments, confining
itself to monitoring the events.

The radical bloc countries, Syria and Iran, assessed the events from the
same perspective. They both wished to prevent further escalation, which was
liable to embroil them. They acted on two tracks: an attempt to restrain and
moderate Hizbollah’s response to “Israeli aggression,” and a request of the
US that it restrain Israel (the talks between Iran and the major powers made
it possible for Iran to contact the US directly). At the same time, both
countries made it clear that if the situation escalated, they would stand
behind Hizbollah. Note that where Damascus and Tehran were concerned, their
relations with Russia did not appear very relevant to the developing
conflict.

Regarding the Palestinians, an inverse relation was visible between their
weight in developments and the complications they created. The Palestinian
team in the simulation represented both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and
Hamas – two competing entities/”authorities” with different strategic
reasoning. Hamas regarded the developing conflict between Israel and
Hizbollah as an opportunity to escape its unhappy situation following
Operation Protective Edge, in view of the risk that delay in the renewal
project in the Gaza Strip would cost it support in the Palestinian home
arena. For Hamas, backing Hizbollah was designed to help it renew its
connections with Iran, while at the same time weakening the PA (since it was
not expected to encourage Hizbollah’s struggle against Israel). For its
part, the PA regarded the conflict as a risk, because it was liable to
divert international attention from the Palestinian issue and halt its
diplomatic momentum. Furthermore, the PA feared that demonstrations in
support of Hizbollah in the West Bank would lead to escalation between
Palestinians and Israel. For the reason, the PA acted to prevent
over-enthusiasm among the Palestinian public, while avoiding the impression
that it was acting in Israel’s interest.

Russia remained on the sidelines of the events. The Russian team expressed
concern about Israel being dragged into a conflict in Syria, which would
have negative consequences for its significant interests in that divided
country. The possibility of provocation was therefore considered, for
example by sending a warship to Syria. The team believed, however, that the
conditions did not justify such a spectacle. The attempt to move the US to
relax the sanctions against Russia imposed in retaliation for its policy
Ukraine was unsuccessful; the sanctions, combined with the collapse of oil
prices, triggered a severe economic crisis in Russia. The possibility of
sacrificing Assad in return for making the sanctions less restrictive, which
was considered by the team, was not tested in the simulation.

Insights

A key feature of the simulation was the lack of enthusiasm, common to all
the parties, at being dragged into escalation. All the parties tried to
contain the event and confine it to a short round of strikes. Among the
restraining factors were the challenge posed by the Islamic State and the
weakening of the Shiite axis in the region, Hizbollah’s involvement in
Syria, and the dialogue between Tehran and Washington – on both the nuclear
question and in dealing with the Islamic State, their common enemy. For
Israel, one restraining factor was a significant interest in avoiding a
conflict on the northern front – particularly due to concern that it would
spread to the Palestinian theater at a time when Israel was facing a strong
international political and diplomatic challenge. For Hizbollah, the
weakening of the Shiite axis in the region was an added restraining factor.
According to the dynamic that developed in the simulation, it appears that
Hamas remained the primary resistance factor, with Israel occupying the
leading place on the Hamas agenda.

Beyond these insights, the question remains what motivated Hizbollah to act
in the Har Dov theater in October. Despite the restraining influences, the
event passed without any significant Israeli response, which could have led
to uncontrolled escalation and ignited the northern front. A simulation
naturally gives the impression – perhaps illusory – that the developments
and the course of events are under control. Considerations involving
vengeance and honor, for example, are not expressed. Thus it appears that
Israel and Hizbollah are not interested in escalation, because there is no
clear and certain achievement that can be attained; quite the opposite. At
the same time, there is no guarantee that they will not be dragged into a
round of violence against their wills by the conflict escalating as a result
of each side misreading the other’s steps and considerations.