IDF Spokesperson Announcement
March 19, 2015
Location : Tel Aviv

IDF Military Advocate General Decisions on Reported Incidents during
Operation Protective Edge


Today, the IDF Military Advocate General (MAG) has released additional
information regarding decisions on reported incidents during Operation
Protective Edge. The process, in accordance with the MAG's investigation
policy, is an ongoing activity to review, inquire and, when required,
instruct the commencement of a criminal investigation.

Major General Danny Efroni has instructed the opening of six criminal
investigations, one of which followed the FFA Mechanism's assessment. Two of
the six were closed upon conclusion.

Dozens of additional incidents are still in various stages of examination by
the FFA Mechanism and their findings will be provided by the MAG in due
course.

Below is the full report for your convenience.
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Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General regarding Exceptional

Incidents during Operation 'Protective Edge' – Update No. 3

Press Release – 19 March 2015

In accordance with the IDF's policy to ensure transparency with regard to
the examination and investigation of exceptional incidents that allegedly
occurred during Operation 'Protective Edge' (8 July – 26 August 2014; the
‘Operation’), and further to previous Press Releases dated September 10th
and December 4th, additional information has been cleared for publication
concerning decisions the MAG has reached with regard to several individual
incidents.

The Military Advocate General' (the 'MAG') Corps continues to receive
complaints regarding exceptional incidents alleged to have occurred over the
course of the Operation. Many of these complaints are filed on behalf of
Palestinian residents from the Gaza Strip or by non- governmental
organizations ('NGO') – Israeli, Palestinian and international. In addition,
the MAG Corps actively works to identify incidents warranting examination or
investigation. Each complaint or piece of information suggesting a fault in
the conduct of IDF forces undergoes an initial examination, in order to
determine the credibility and concrete nature of the allegation. If the
allegation is deemed credible, prima facie, and is sufficiently concrete, it
is referred to the MAG, who shall decide whether a criminal
investigation is warranted without further examination or whether a
factual examination is required by the General Staff Mechanism for
Fact-Finding Assessments prior to such a decision.

As previously publicized, soon after the commencement of Operation
'Protective Edge', and whilst the hostilities were ongoing, the previous IDF
Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin (Benny) Gantz, ordered
that a General Staff Mechanism for Fact Finding Assessments (the 'FFA
Mechanism'), headed by a Major General, examine exceptional incidents
allegedly occurring during the operation. The FFA Mechanism was tasked with
collating information and relevant materials in order to assess the facts of
individual incidents. These efforts are intended to provide the MAG with as
much factual information as possible in order to enable the MAG to reach
decisions regarding whether or not to open a criminal investigation, as well
as for the purpose of a 'lessons-learned' process and the issuance of
operational recommendations that will assist in preventing exceptional
incidents in the future. Recently, Major General (Res.) Yitzhak Eitan was
appointed to head the FFA Mechanism, replacing Major General Noam Tibon who
had previously filled this position and who has retired from the IDF.

To date, allegations with regard to approximately 126 incidents have been
referred by the MAG for examination by the FFA Mechanism. Sixty-five
of these incidents have already been examined and referred to the MAG
for decision. Of these incidents, six have been referred for criminal
investigation by the MAG. With regard to an additional 17 incidents, the MAG
decided to close the case without opening a criminal investigation, after
the MAG reviewed the findings and materials collected by the FFA Mechanism
and did not find that the force's actions gave rise to reasonable grounds
for suspicion of criminal behavior. However, in relation to some of these
cases, the MAG recommended changes to operational methods. In relation to a
few of the cases that were closed, the MAG found that no involvement of IDF
forces was indentified with regard to the incident. In regard to some of the
incidents that were examined and referred to the MAG, the MAG considered
that further information was needed in order to reach a decision, and
accordingly these incidents were referred back to the FFA Mechanism for
further examination. Tens of additional incidents are still in various
stages of examination by the FFA Mechanism, and their findings will be
provided to the MAG in due course.

In addition, on the basis of allegations that indicated prima facie grounds
for a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct without the need for prior
examination by the FFA Mechanism, at the time of publication, the MAG has
ordered the opening of 13 criminal investigations. Of these criminal
investigations, the MAG decided to close two without undertaking any
criminal or disciplinary proceedings, as will be detailed herein. The
remainder of the investigations are still ongoing, or have been completed
and their findings are awaiting review by the MAG.

All criminal investigations are carried out in a thorough and prompt fashion
by a special investigation team assembled by the Military Police's Criminal
Investigation Division in order to investigate incidents alleged to have
occurred during Operation 'Protective Edge'. This team has collected
testimonies from many IDF soldiers and commanders, as well as from a
substantial number of Palestinians who were witnesses to some of the
incidents in question. The investigations undertaken by the MPCID are
progressing at a rapid pace.

Where a complaint had been submitted in a written form, a reply has been
sent to the complainant organization or individual.

Below is information which has been cleared for publication regarding
decisions the MAG has reached with regard to specific incidents.

Cases Closed by the MAG Following a Fact-Finding Assessment by the FFA
Mechanism

1. Allegation Concerning the Deaths of Members of the Abu Itta Family in
Tel Al-Za'atar (24 July 2014) –

In media reports, as well as complaints received by the MAG Corps from NGOs,
it was alleged that on 24 July 2014, as a result of an air strike on the
house of the Al-Ajrami family in Tel Al- Za'atar, five members of the Abu
Itta family who were in an adjoining building were killed. Subsequently, and
in accordance with the MAG's investigation policy, the incident was referred
to the FFA Mechanism for examination.

According to the factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and
presented to the MAG, at the time in question, a weapons cache was struck
that was located in the house of a senior military operative in Hamas, Ahmad
Al-Ajrami. Prior to the strike on the cache, the IDF issued a number of
detailed warnings over the telephone, wherein the residents of the building
in which the weapons cache was located, and the residents of a number of
surrounding buildings that were expected to be damaged as a result of the
strike, were asked to vacate the premises. Additionally, a warning strike
was executed on the roof of the building in which the weapons cache was
located, as well as on the roof of the adjoining building which was expected
to be significantly impacted as a result of the strike, as part of the
"knock on the roof" procedure. During this time, many people were seen
leaving these buildings. The strike was carried out after it was assessed
that it was possible to conclude that civilians were not expected to be
harmed in the building targeted and the adjoining buildings, as a result of
the strike.

After the event, it appears that as a result of the strike, five civilians,
members of the Abu Itta family, were killed, and others were injured. It was
not fully determined whether those deceased had been present in an
adjoining building whose evacuation was specifically asked for, or
whether they were in another adjoining building that had been damaged more
significantly than had been expected.

After reviewing the factual findings and the material collated by the FFA
Mechanism, the MAG found that the targeting process in question accorded
with Israeli domestic law and international law requirements. The decision
to strike was taken by the competent authorities, and was aimed at a
military objective – a weapons cache. The strike complied with the principle
of proportionality, as at the time the decision was taken, it was considered
that the collateral damage expected from the strike would not be excessive
in relation to the military advantage anticipated from it, and it appears
that this estimation was not unreasonable under the circumstances. Moreover,
the strike was carried out while undertaking a series of precautionary
measures which aimed to minimize civilian harm. Inter alia, a specific
warning was provided to the residents of the buildings which were expected
to be impacted as a result of the strike, and ongoing visual surveillance of
the event was used to confirm their evacuation.

In light of these findings, the MAG did not find that the actions of IDF
forces raised grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. As
a result, the MAG ordered the case to be closed, without opening a criminal
investigation or ordering further action against those involved in the
incident.

2. Allegation Concerning Strikes on a School in Al-Bureij and an
UNRWA School in Nusseirat (25 July 2014) –

In an operational report received by the MAG Corps, it arose that on 25 July
2014, IDF forces struck a school in Al-Bureij and an UNRWA school in
Nusseirat (in an initial report it was alleged that as a result of one of
these strikes, five civilians were injured, however, from a later report it
arose that there were no individuals harmed in this incident). Subsequently,
and in accordance with the MAG's investigation policy, the incident
was referred to the FFA Mechanism for examination.

According to the factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and
presented to the MAG, the incident started with an attack carried out on 25
July 2014 against IDF forces in the Gaza Strip that were located in an area
to the East of Al-Bureij, by means of mortar shells and anti-tank missiles.
During this incident, first sergeant Guy Levi was killed, and another
Israeli soldier was injured. Concurrently, high-trajectory fire was also
being launched at other forces that were located within the same area of
operations, including fire which resulted in a direct hit on a structure in
which one of the brigade's companies was located. IDF technological systems
identified the source of this fire in real-time as emanating from two
sites – the mortar fire and anti-tank rockets from the area of Al-Bureij,
very close to a school; and mortar fire from the area of Nusseirat close to
an UNRWA school and next to (at a distance of a few meters away) an UNRWA
center which provided sanitation, aid, welfare, food distribution and
employment services. This area, which is normally a residential area, was
known to the IDF forces as a hub of Hamas' and Palestinian Islamic Jihad's
military activity over the course of the Operation.

In an attempt to stop the attack and suppress the fire, IDF forces carried
out targeted tank fire towards certain spots in the vicinity of the school
in Al-Bureij, which were identified as the sources of the fire, all the
while being careful to avoid hitting the school itself. Apparently, as a
result of one of the projectiles fired, the wall surrounding the school was
struck (though no shells landed within the school). As mentioned, a later
report did not allege that any civilians were injured by this strike.

At the same time, the IDF carried out targeted aerial strikes in Nusseirat
against individuals who had been identified as directly participating in the
aforementioned high-trajectory fire on IDF forces. Apparently, as a result
of one of these strikes, carried out against a militant who was at a
distance of a few tens of meters from the UNRWA school in Nusseirat, the
wall surrounding the school was struck (though no fire hit the school
itself). Again, a later report did not allege that any civilians were
injured by this strike.

After reviewing the factual findings and the material collated by the FFA
Mechanism, the MAG found that the targeting processes in question
accorded with Israeli domestic law and international law requirements.
The decisions regarding the strikes were taken by the competent authorities.
The strikes were aimed against lawful targets – militants who were directly
participating in hostilities, and who fired on IDF troops. The strikes
complied with the principle of proportionality, as at the time the decision
was taken it was considered that the collateral damage expected from the
strikes would not be excessive in relation to the military advantage
anticipated from the strikes. Moreover, the strikes were carried out while
undertaking precautionary measures which aimed to mitigate the risk
of civilian harm and damage to UNRWA facilities, the existence of which
were known to the forces, despite what appears to be an attempt by terror
organizations to misuse these sites in order to fire upon IDF forces.

In light of these findings, the MAG did not find that the actions of IDF
forces raised grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. As
a result, the MAG ordered the case to be closed, without opening a criminal
investigation or ordering further action against those involved in the
incident.

3. Allegation Concerning the Deaths of 31 Individuals as a Result of
Strikes on the House of the Al-Salak Family and Its Surroundings in
Shuja'iyya (30 July 2014) –

In reports published in various media sources, it was alleged that on 30
July 2014, IDF forces fired upon the marketplace in Shuja'iyya, at a time
when a ceasefire was in place, and as a result of these strikes, between 15
to 17 people were killed, including children, emergency services personnel,
and reporters. Subsequently, and in accordance with the MAG's investigation
policy, the incident was referred to the FFA Mechanism for examination.

After the incident was referred to the FFA Mechanism for examination, the
MAG Corps received an additional complaint from an NGO, in which a different
account of the event was provided. According to the account provided in the
complaint, the incident described above actually took place in an area that
was at a distance of around 150 meters from the market in Shuja'iyya, and
not within the market itself. According to the allegations, the event
commenced with a strike by a shell on a number of individuals from the
Al-Salak family, who were up on the roof of their house, a fact which
resulted in the death of seven members of the family. After the strike, a
large number of people started to gather in the open area next to the
family's house, including medical personnel, reporters, and others. While
people were gathered there, another two shells struck the area, resulting in
the deaths of 21 of those present. Additionally, it was alleged that as a
result of additional shell strikes, an individual in an adjacent building
was killed, along with two individuals part of Hamas' Civil Defence. All
total, according to this account, 31 people were killed in the course of
this incident. It was further alleged, that over the course of the incident,
a total of 16 shells were fired at the area.

According to the factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and
presented to the MAG, the events associated with the incident started at
approximately 16:10, when an anti-tank (AT) missile was fired at IDF
forces operating in an open area on the outskirts of the Shuja'iyya
neighborhood. Immediately after the anti-tank missile was fired, there
commenced an intense and ongoing burst of mortar fire, emanating from a
built-up area in the neighborhood, targeting the forces. As a result of this
fire an IDF soldier was injured and the rest of the soldiers at the scene
were placed in real danger. Further, in light of this use of fire, and the
situation in which the forces found themselves (including a tank that
could not move due to malfunction), the conclusion drawn by the
commanders in the field was that this fire could provide cover for an
attempt to abduct a soldier. During this episode of mortar fire, five sites
in a built-up area were identified as points from which shells had been
fired at IDF forces. Nevertheless, IDF forces did not return fire towards
the sources of this fire, because of their proximity to "sensitive sites"
(in the IDF, "sensitive sites" are civilian sites that receive special
protection from attack under the law of armed conflict (such as medical
facilities), as well as other civilian sites that warrant special
consideration for policy reasons, even when there is no legal obligation
(such as schools); such sites are identified in advance by the IDF and
integrated into IDF's operational systems).

At approximately 16:40, when the mortar fire had not yet ceased, IDF forces
fired a number of rounds of smoke-screening shells, in order to screen the
troops, and frustrate the enemy fire. At approximately 17:00, as the mortar
fire upon the troops from the built-up area continued, and in light of the
ongoing threat to the lives of the troops, the forces were able to
identify two additional sources of fire, from which most of the fire towards
them was originating at that time. After it was concluded that one of these
points was sufficiently distant from sensitive sites, it was decided to
return a limited amount of fire, of five mortar shells, with the aim of
suppressing the fire targeted at IDF forces. The IDF fire was carried out
using mortars, since there was no available alternative for carrying out the
strike, including aerial alternatives, which would allow the necessary
operational effect to be achieved. In this context, the possibility of using
155 mm high-explosive artillery shells was also considered, in order to
address the danger faced by the forces. This possibility was dismissed for
the reason that the collateral damage expected from mortar shells was more
limited.

Approximately 18 minutes after the initial mortar fire was carried out by
the forces, towards the source of the fire, and after the fire emanating
from that site had not ceased, it was decided to fire an additional ten
mortars towards it. After this round of fire, the mortar fire on IDF forces
ceased. Only around 40 minutes after the execution of the above-mentioned
fire were reports received by the IDF regarding the hit on civilians in this
area.

The FFA Mechanism's findings further revealed that at the time of the
incident, the forces had believed that the likelihood of civilians being
harmed as a result of the fire was low. Before the start of the ground
incursion in Shuja'iyya, a widespread warning to evacuate had been provided,
which, according to the information in the force's possession, had resulted
in the evacuation of the vast majority of the civilian population in the
neighborhood? An additional warning to evacuate was made two days prior to
the incident, on 28 July, in order to keep the civilian population at a
distance from the area of hostilities. Moreover, during the ongoing aerial
surveillance carried out in the area in the period leading up to the
incident, no civilian presence was identified on the roads and in the open
areas of the neighborhood – which are the areas in which the danger posed by
mortar shells is generally greater than the danger to those inside a
building. In real time, no aerial surveillance capabilities were available
to the forces. Thus, even if the possibility of civilian presence in the
area had not been entirely ruled out, in consideration of the assessment
that most of the population had evacuated and that no civilian presence was
identified in the area prior to the incident, the understanding was that the
risk of harm as a result of the limited fire was low.

After the event, by comparing the actions taken by IDF forces with the
allegations contained in the complaint received by the MAG Corps, it can be
concluded that one of the shells from the first round of fire carried out by
IDF forces apparently struck the roof of the Al-Salak family, at a time when
the family was on the roof, and killed seven family members; and that two
shells from the second round of fire carried out by IDF forces apparently
struck the crowd which had gathered next to the Al-Salak house in the wake
of the first strike. At the same time, the possibility that the harm to
civilians during this incident resulted from a misfire by a Palestinian
terror organization has not been ruled out, in light of the extensive enemy
mortar fire emanating from the area at the time.

In addition to the above, intelligence information indicated that six of
the deceased in this incident appear to have been militants, and thus the
total civilian fatalities is lower than that alleged in the complaint.

The FFA Mechanism's findings further concluded that the incident in question
did not take place during a ceasefire in Shuja'iyya. The IDF announced a
unilateral humanitarian ceasefire between the hours of 15:00 and 19:00 on
that day, but clarified that this would not apply in a number of specific
areas in which IDF forces were operating at that time, including Shuja'iyya
(along with a number of other areas). This was transmitted in the media and
in messages that were passed to the Palestinian side.

After reviewing the factual findings and the material collated by the FFA
Mechanism, the MAG found that the fire was carried out in a manner that
accorded with Israeli domestic law and international law requirements. The
fire was aimed towards mortars and their operators, with the aim of
neutralizing their capacity to continue carrying out ongoing and intensive
fire on IDF forces, who found themselves in a situation of clear and present
mortal danger. Prior to the execution of the fire, and during it, IDF forces
acted in a restrained and calculated manner, and undertook a number of
precautions which were intended to avoid, and in any event to minimize, harm
to civilians. Initially the forces refrained entirely from returning fire,
and thereafter they attempted to frustrate and cause the cessation of this
fire by creating a smoke screen. After the fire did not cease, a number of
alternatives were considered for returning fire to the sources of the fire,
and out of the available and effective alternatives, they chose the means
that was expected to result in the least collateral damage. Even then, the
return fire was carried out in a measured and limited fashion.

As regards the strike's compliance with the principle of proportionality,
the MAG considered the reasonableness of the commander's decision, taking
into account the information that he had at his disposal at that time, both
as regards the imperative military necessity of stopping the fire and
neutralizing the danger posed to the forces, as well as in regard to the
harm expected to result to civilians as a result of the strike. The MAG
found, that in the incident in question, there occurred a number of
coincidences and series of events that a military commander should not be
expected to predict – the shell that resulted in the first instance of
extensive harm to civilians (members of the Al-Salak family) landed on a
roof, at a time where there was a group of people on the roof (while the
chance that the shell would penetrate the building and cause similar harm to
persons inside, was lower); and the second instance of extensive harm was
caused to a group who had gathered outside the house of the Al-Salak family,
in the wake of the previous strike. At the time when the decision was made
to carry out the second round of fire, IDF forces were not aware of the hit
on the Al-Salak house as a result of the first round of fire, nor of the
crowd which had gathered outside the Al-Salak house. In light of the above,
the MAG found that the commander's assessment that the collateral damage
expected from the strike would not be excessive in relation to the military
advantage anticipated from it, was not unreasonable under the circumstances,
in light of the information that was at his disposal at that time. As such
the MAG found that there had been no misconduct on the part of IDF forces in
regards to the incident in question, and that even though the ultimate
outcome of the action was tragic, it does not affect the legality of the
fire post facto.

In light of these findings, the MAG did not find that the actions of IDF
forces raised grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. As
a result, the MAG ordered the case to be closed, without opening a criminal
investigation or ordering further action against those involved in the
incident.


4. Allegation Concerning the Injury of 10 Individuals as a Result of a
Strike on an UNRWA School in Jabalia (next to the Omar Ibn Al-Khattab
Mosque) (31 July 2014) –

According to various media reports, as well as a report from OCHA (United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), it was alleged
that on 31 July 2014, IDF forces shot a number of shells at the Omar Ibn
Al-Khattab mosque in Jabalia. According to the reports, shrapnel from these
shells hit an UNRWA school, and caused injury to 10 civilians who were using
the school as a shelter (two of whom were severely injured). Subsequently,
and in accordance with the MAG's investigation policy, the incident
was referred to the FFA Mechanism for examination.

According to the factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and
presented to the MAG, no such strikes were identified as having been carried
out by IDF forces. However, the path of a rocket fired from inside the Gaza
Strip, apparently by Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was identified by
the IDF in real time, and which struck in the immediate vicinity of the
mosque at the exact time in question. In light of the fact that the injury
to the individuals in the school resulted from rocket fire by Palestinian
terror organizations, the MAG ordered the case to be closed.

5. Allegation Concerning the Deaths of 10 Individuals During a Strike on
the House of the Abu Najam Family in Jabalia (3 August 2014) –


According to a report received by the MAG Corps from an NGO, it was alleged
that on 3 August 2014 eight persons were killed as a result of an IDF strike
on the home of the Abu Najam family. In other reports in the media, it was
alleged that ten people were killed, including two who were Palestinian
Islamic Jihad militants – Danian Mansour and Abd Al-Nasser Al-Ajouri. It was
further claimed in these reports, that during this strike five civilians
were killed (members of the Abu Najam family) who were staying in the house
where the two aforementioned Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants were
located, while in an adjacent house, three civilians were killed.
Subsequently, and in accordance with the MAG's investigation policy, the
incident was referred to the FFA Mechanism for examination.

According to the factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and
presented to the MAG, the strike in question was directed at Danian Mansour,
a very senior commander in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror
organization, with a rank equivalent to that of a brigade commander,
responsible for the organization's operations in the northern Gaza Strip,
and with overall responsibility for the organization's intelligence service.
At the time of the strike, Mansour was staying in the home of Mohammad Abu
Najam. During the planning stages of the strike, it was assessed that there
might be civilians present in the building, but that the extent of the harm
to those civilians would not be excessive in relation to the significant
military advantage anticipated to be achieved as a result of the strike. In
this context, it should be noted that the building in question was thought
to consist of only one residential apartment – the apartment in which
Mansour was staying. The strike on the building was planned for execution by
means of a precise munition, and in a way in which would allow achieving the
aim of the strike whilst minimizing harm to the surrounding buildings.
Likewise, a number of different checks were conducted in order to assess the
extent of expected harm to civilians in the surrounding buildings.

After the event, it appears that as a result of the strike the target,
Danian Mansour, was killed, along with Abd Al-Nasser Al-Ajouri, a
senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad military operative. Immad Al-Masri,
Danian Mansour's deputy, was injured, along with two additional terror
operatives (Mohammad Al-Masri of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Vaal Kassam
of Hamas). Likewise, according to the above-mentioned reports, it appears
that as a result of the strike an additional eight civilians were killed –
five in the Abu Najam house that was struck, and three in the house adjacent
to it.

After reviewing the factual findings and the material collated by the FFA
Mechanism, the MAG found that the targeting process in question accorded
with Israeli domestic law and international law requirements. The decision
to strike was taken by the competent authorities and aimed at a lawful
target – a very senior commander in Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The strike
complied with the principle of proportionality, as at the time the decision
was taken, it was considered that the collateral damage expected from the
strike would not be excessive in relation to the military advantage
anticipated from it. Moreover, the strike was carried out while undertaking
precautionary measures which aimed to mitigate the risk of civilian harm,
with an emphasis on those who were present in the surrounding buildings.
Such measures included, inter alia, the choice of munition to be used, as
well as the deployment of real-time visual coverage. Additionally, it was
found that the provision of a specific warning prior to the attack, to the
people present in the structure in which the target was located, or to those
in adjacent buildings, was not required by law and was expected to result in
the frustration of the strike's objective.

In light of these findings, the MAG did not find that the actions of IDF
forces raised grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. As
a result, the MAG ordered the case to be closed, without opening a criminal
investigation or ordering further action against those involved in the
incident.

6. Allegation Concerning the Deaths of Six Individuals During a Strike on
the House of the Al- Bakri family in Gaza City (4 August 2014) –

In media reports, as well as complaints received by the MAG Corps from NGOs,
it was alleged that on 4 August 2014, five members of the Al-Bakri
family were killed, along with one additional person who was staying at
their home, as the result of an IDF strike on the house. According to some
of the reports, two of the deceased – Ramadan Al-Bakri and Ibrahim Al-
Masharawi – were militants in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, while the
remaining four deceased were civilians. Subsequently, and in accordance
with the MAG's investigation policy, the incident was referred to the
FFA Mechanism for examination.

According to the factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and
presented to the MAG, the strike in question was aimed at Omar Al-Rahim, a
senior commander, at a rank equivalent to that of a deputy brigade
commander, in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror organization. Al-Rahim
was staying in the house of Ramadan Al-Bakri, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad
militant. During the target planning process, it was assessed that there
might be a number of civilians present in the building, but that the extent
of the harm expected to these civilians would not be excessive in relation
to the significant military advantage anticipated to result from the strike.
It was planned that the strike on the building would be carried out using a
precise munition, and in a way in which would allow achieving the aim of the
strike whilst minimizing harm to the surrounding buildings.

After the event, as a result of the strike, the target, Omar Al-Rahim, was
severely injured, and Ibrahim Al-Masharawi, who was a senior commander at a
rank equivalent to a battalion commander in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
was killed, along with Ramadan Al-Bakri, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad
militant, and four civilians.

After reviewing the factual findings and the material collated by the FFA
Mechanism, the MAG found that the targeting process in question accorded
with Israeli domestic law and international law requirements. The decision
to strike was taken by the competent authorities and aimed at a lawful
target – a senior commander in Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The strike
complied with the principle of proportionality, as at the time the decision
was taken, it was considered that the collateral damage expected from the
strike would not be excessive in relation to the military advantage
anticipated from it. Moreover, the strike was carried out while undertaking
precautionary measures which aimed to mitigate the risk of civilian harm,
with an emphasis on those who were present in the surrounding buildings.
Such measures included, inter alia, the choice of munition to be used, as
well as the deployment of real-time visual coverage. Additionally, it was
found that the provision of a specific warning prior to the attack, to the
people present in the structure in which the target was located, or to those
in adjacent buildings, was not required by law and was expected to result in
the frustration of the strike's objective.

In light of these findings, the MAG did not find that the actions of IDF
forces raised grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. As
a result, the MAG ordered the case to be closed, without opening a criminal
investigation or ordering further action against those involved in the
incident.

7. Allegation Concerning the Deaths of Members of the Abu Dahrouj
Family in the Al- Zuwayda Village (23 August 2014) –

In media reports, as well as complaints received by the MAG Corps from NGOs,
it was alleged that on 23 August 2014, five members of the Abu Dahrouj
family were killed in the Al-Zuwayda village, as a result of an air strike
carried out by the IDF. In a report published by an NGO, it was mentioned
that one of the deceased, Hayel Abu Dahrouj, was a militant with the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization. Subsequently, and in
accordance with the MAG's investigation policy, the incident was
referred to the FFA Mechanism for examination.

According to the factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and
presented to the MAG, at the time in question, around midnight, an IDF
fighter jet dropped a bomb which was aimed at a weapons cache located in an
open area, at a distance of around 100 meters from the building in which the
Abu Dahrouj family stayed. As part of the strike, a number of precautionary
measures were taken in order to prevent any harm to civilians, such as the
deployment of real-time visual coverage, and the utilization of a relatively
small and precise munition. This notwithstanding, it appears that as the
result of an unforeseen technical failure, during the course of the strike
the bomb diverged from its intended trajectory and struck the home of the
Abu Dahrouj family. A short time later, an additional bomb was dropped,
which struck the weapons cache.

As noted above, it was revealed, post facto, that one of the five deceased,
Hayel Abu Dahrouj, was a military operative in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
organization; nonetheless, he was not the object of the strike.

After reviewing the factual findings and the material collated by the FFA
Mechanism, the MAG found that the targeting process in question accorded
with Israeli domestic law and international law requirements. The decision
to carry out the strike was made by the competent authorities, and the
strike was aimed at a military objective – a weapons cache. At the time that
the decision was made, the strike was not, according to the assessment of
the operational authorities, expected to result in any collateral damage to
individuals or to property that was not the military objective (and was, as
such, in accordance with the principle of proportionality). Several
precautionary measures were undertaken as part of the strike in order to
realize that expectation. Such measures included, inter alia, the choice of
munition to be used, as well as the timing of the strike and real- time
visual coverage on the weapons cache that was targeted.

The fact that in practice there occurred an unforeseen failure, which
resulted in it going off- trajectory and causing harm to civilians and to
property, is regrettable, but does not affect the legality of the attack
post facto.

Consequently, and in light of the above, the MAG did not find that the
actions of IDF forces raised grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal
misconduct. As a result, the MAG ordered the case to be closed, without
opening a criminal investigation or ordering further action against those
involved in the incident.

Incidents into Which the MAG has Ordered Criminal Investigations
Following an Assessment by the FFA Mechanism

Allegation Concerning a Strike on an UNRWA School in Jabalia, which Resulted
in the Deaths of Approximately 20 Individuals (30 July 2014) –

The MAG Corps received reports, as well as complaints from NGOs, wherein it
was alleged that as the result of an IDF strike on 30 July 2014,
approximately 20 people were killed, and tens more were injured in an UNRWA
school located in Jabalia, which was serving as a shelter at the time of the
incident. Subsequently, and in accordance with the MAG's investigation
policy, it was decided to refer the incident to the FFA Mechanism for
examination.

The factual findings collated by the FFA Mechanism and presented to the MAG,
indicated the existence of grounds for a reasonable suspicion that the
strike was not carried out in accordance with the rules and procedures
applicable to IDF forces. As a result, the MAG has ordered the opening of a
criminal investigation into the incident.

Incidents Regarding Which the MAG Ordered Criminal Investigations without
Prior Fact- Finding Assessment

1. Allegation Concerning an Abuse of a Resident of Khuza'a under Detention
(23 July 2014) –

The MAG Corps received a complaint, on behalf of a resident of Khuza'a,
alleging that after his capture by IDF forces, he was struck by IDF soldiers
without provocation, whilst he was handcuffed and blindfolded. In response
to these reports, the MAG ordered the opening of a criminal investigation
into the incident.

2. Allegation Concerning an Abuse of a Resident of Khuza'a under Detention
(23 July 2014) –

The MAG Corps received a complaint, on behalf of another resident of
Khuza'a, alleging that after his capture by IDF forces, he was struck by IDF
soldiers, without provocation, whilst he was handcuffed and blindfolded. In
response to these reports, the MAG ordered the opening of a criminal
investigation into the incident.

3. Allegation Concerning Looting in Deir Al-Balah (the second half of July
2014) –

The MAG Corps received a complaint, on behalf of a resident of Deir
Al-Balah, alleging that IDF soldiers looted his property, allegedly during
the period in which he and his family had evacuated their home, during the
second half of the month of July. Subsequently, the MAG ordered the opening
of a criminal investigation into the incident.

4. Allegation Concerning Looting in Khan Yunis (the second half of July
2014) –

The MAG Corps received a complaint, on behalf of a resident of Khan Yunis,
alleging that IDF soldiers looted his property, allegedly during the period
in which he and his family had evacuated their home, during the second half
of the month of July. Subsequently, the MAG ordered the opening of a
criminal investigation into the incident.

5. Allegation Concerning Abuse of Detainees in Rafah (1 August 2014) –

The MAG Corps received a complaint, on behalf of two residents of Rafah,
alleging that after their arrest by IDF forces, they were struck by IDF
soldiers, without provocation, and whilst they were handcuffed and
blindfolded. Subsequently, the MAG ordered the opening of a criminal
investigation into the incident.

Criminal Investigations which were Completed and in Regard to which the MAG
has made a decision

1. Allegations Concerning Looting in Khuza'a (the second half of July
2014) –

The investigation file was closed after the complainant failed to appear to
provide testimony before MPCID investigators. The complainant failed to
appear despite the fact that in the wake of the complaint made by his legal
representative, he was provided with a document guaranteeing him immunity
from arrest at the time of his arrival to provide testimony. Under these
circumstances, and in the absence of evidence to support his claim and thus
provide a basis for a suspicion of criminal misconduct by IDF soldiers, it
was decided to close the case.

2. Allegations Concerning Looting in Khuza'a (the second half of July
2014) –

The investigation file was closed after the complainant failed to appear to
provide testimony before MPCID investigators. The complainant failed to
appear despite the fact that in the wake of the complaint made by his legal
representative, he was provided with a document guaranteeing him immunity
from arrest at the time of his arrival to provide testimony. The mother
provided testimony to MPCID investigators, yet her testimony was essentially
hearsay. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of evidence to
support his claim and thus provide a basis for a suspicion of criminal
misconduct by IDF soldiers, it was decided to close the case.