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Sunday, April 12, 2015
Syrian Scud Unveils Turk Vulnerabilities

Syrian Scud Unveils Turk Vulnerabilities
By Burak Ege Bekdil 4:53 p.m. EDT April 11, 2015
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/weapons/2015/04/11/turkey-scud-patriot-missile-defense-radar-nato-syria-iran/25523519/

ANKARA, Turkey — On the morning of March 25, a Russian-made Syrian scud
missile estimated to have been fired from a range of 180 kilometers exploded
near the Reyhanli district in Turkey's southernmost city of Hatay,
neighboring Syria.

The projectile left a 15-meter-wide crater in a stream bed, broke the
windows of the surrounding houses, caused the roof of a building in the
nearby military unit to collapse, damaged two military vehicles and
inflicted minor injuries on five Turkish civilians.

The Syrian scud luckily did not cause any casualties on Turkish soil but
left behind pressing questions: Why did the NATO Patriot systems stationed
in southern Turkey not intercept the Syrian missile? How vulnerable is
Turkey to tactical missile threats from its unstable neighbors to the south?

The Turkish military headquarters said that Turkish howitzers immediately
retaliated and shelled unspecified Syrian targets. Military officials told
Defense News the Syrian missile was probably fired from a Russian naval base
in Tartus to target anti-regime rebels who have been fighting Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad's forces since 2011.

Germany, the Netherlands and the United States currently provide two Patriot
batteries each, located in the provinces of KahramanmaraÅŸ, Adana and
Gaziantep.

A Feb. 20, 2013, Defense News story said the six Patriot anti-missile
batteries deployed in Turkey ostensibly to protect Turkish airspace from a
potential missile strike from neighboring Syria, in fact, had the primary
purpose of protecting a radar that would track Iranian missile launches,
instead of protecting the Turkish civilian population or military bases.

The story quoted officials and analysts as saying the mini missile defense
architecture actually provided the pretext to guard a US-owned,
NATO-assigned radar deployed since 2012 in Turkey in the event hostilities
break out with Iran. NATO officials vehemently denied the story.

Slightly over two years later, a Turkish military official said the Syrian
scud was not intercepted because it fell in an area outside the radar range
of Patriot batteries in Turkey.

"Patriots cannot provide a blanket protection to vast lands in their
vicinity," the official said. "They can only protect areas in their
immediate vicinity."

Sitki Egeli, a missile defense expert, agrees. He said the Patriots are not
designed to protect large swathes of land; wherever they are deployed, they
can only protect areas in their near vicinity. And, Egeli said, the X-band
NATO radar in Kurecik (in eastern Turkey) is designed not to intercept a
Syrian scud coming from 180 kilometers away but (probably) an Iranian
ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers.

Aware of its vulnerability to such missile attacks, Turkey in 2007 designed
a program to indigenously develop and produce short- and medium-altitude air
defense systems. Ankara chose a partnership of military specialist Aselsan
and missile maker Roketsan, both government-controlled companies.

In October 2013, Aselsan completed the test launch of its first domestically
developed and manufactured low-altitude air defense missile, Hisar-A, and
set off to work on Hisar-O, the medium-altitude system.

Aselsan, the prime contractor, is developing all radar, fire control,
command, control and communication systems for the program while Roketsan is
acting as the executive subcontractor. Ideally, the Hisar-A system, which
will provide protection against all kinds of airborne targets thanks to its
vertical launch capability, will enter the Turkish military inventory in
2017, but industry sources said the program faces delays due to technical
snags.

When combined and made interoperable, Hisar-A and Hisar-O will destroy
threats at low-medium altitude. The program involves the development and
production of two types of ground systems, self-propelled armored
vehicle-mounted air defense missile systems, and the missile.

Hisar-A is an air defense missile system mounted on a self-propelled armored
vehicle and can be fully autonomous by means of 3D radar, electro-optic
system, command, control and fire control.

Hisar-O is composed of one battalion headquarters and headquarters company
and three batteries, each of which has a sufficient amount of launchers,
missiles, radars, command, control and communication systems and other
support equipment.

Email: bbekdil@defensenews.com

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