The US and Gulf States Summit: What Next?
INSS Insight No. 699, May 20, 2015
Amos Yadlin, Yoel Guzansky .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=9546

SUMMARY: The coming years will likely see a test of relations between the US
and the Gulf states. Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether the conciliatory
declarations of the recent summit and the sale of advanced weapons will be
enough to put the relations back on track and alleviate the monarchies’
anxiety about what they view as the mistaken strategic direction pursued by
the US toward Iran. Still, it is possible that the summit contributed to an
understanding by the administration that it must devise a policy to roll
back Iranian involvement in various fronts in the Middle East. Such a
policy, if pursued effectively, will enable the Gulf states to ride out the
remaining period of the Obama administration – an administration with which
they disagree about most issues concerning the Middle East in general, and
the Gulf in particular.
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The summit convened last week by US President Barack Obama with
representatives of the Gulf states was designed to ease their concerns about
the emerging agreement with Iran on the nuclear question, “compensate”
them – in part through the supply of weapon systems – for the
materialization of threats that will be posed by Iran as a recognized
nuclear threshold state, and recruit support for the agreement. These goals
were achieved, if only partially and temporarily.

The unwritten alliance linking the American liberal democracy and the
absolute monarchies in the Gulf was based on the principle of action by the
monarchies to stabilize the global energy market and support US interests in
the region in exchange for protection by the US against external threats –
generally while ignoring the inadequate political freedom and human rights
in those countries. It was the Carter Doctrine that established the defense
framework for relations between the US and the Gulf states. Underlying the
policy was the US threat to use force, including military force, should any
external power seek to attain hegemony in the Gulf. Since that time, the
body of water from the Gulf of Oman through the Strait of Hormuz to Shatt
al-Arab has been an “American lake.” In recent years, however, a continued
American commitment in the Gulf region has been questioned. Meantime, the
source of the gravest threat to the strategic balance in the Gulf is not
external, but in the Gulf itself.

The US drive toward an agreement with Iran on the nuclear question, combined
with its reduced dependence on oil from the Gulf, has put the relations
between the US and the Gulf states to a new test. The royal houses fear the
possibility of an Iranian-Western deal that will enable Iran to escape the
isolation it has suffered since the nuclear crisis, while at the same time
preserve its nuclear capabilities – in other words, a rapprochement between
Iran and the West that will give Iran the status of a legitimate state among
the nations of the world and enable it to enhance its influence in the
Middle East, necessarily at the expense of the Gulf states. A gradual
detente between the US and Iran that could develop after the signing of a
nuclear treaty would deal a critical blow to the special relations between
the Gulf states and the US. Furthermore, the monarchies are worried that if
and when the US achieves full energy independence, it will no longer need
its Arab allies and will greatly reduce its involvement in the Middle East.
The Gulf monarchs also fear an American strategic pivot, in accordance with
the administration’s declaration that East Asia heads the American list of
priorities. However, it appears that the prevalent fear in the Gulf concerns
an American pivot toward Iran.

In a New York Times interview before the summit, Obama said – for the first
time – that the internal threats facing the Gulf states were at times more
severe than those threats posed by Iran. He thereby lowered the expectations
that the monarchs had from the summit, and perhaps also prompted the absence
of some leaders from the meeting (only two of the six heads of state
attended the summit). The cancellation by Saudi King Salman, which was known
before the meeting, might have been due to his frail health, but it is also
possible that it was, rather, an expression of dissatisfaction and growing
frustration with what is perceived in Riyadh as a mistaken American policy
toward Iran. Riyadh believes that Washington is shutting its eyes to Iranian
subversion in the region, which inter alia has a direct negative impact on
Saudi Arabian national security.

The most threatening scenario for the Arab monarchies is that while the US
focus is elsewhere, on East Asia, for example, Iran, with its new status,
will strengthen its grip in the Gulf region. In the eyes of the Gulf states,
the current US administration is willing to give Iran the “keys” to the
region. Recognized as a nuclear threshold state by the agreement being
formulated, Iran will find it easier to dictate the political-security
agenda both in the region and throughout the Middle East. The possible
consequences of any concrete development in this direction will also affect
the future of inter-Arab cooperation and the Arab political frameworks.
Various countries, certainly some of the vulnerable Gulf states, will likely
seek closer relations with Iran, while others will be driven to rely on the
US. Indeed, the security options currently available to the Arab monarchies
are limited. While their economic future is closely connected to China, the
burden of preserving their security still falls on the US. The problems in
the relations between the parties, however, as revealed in recent years, are
liable to put in motion long term processes with negative consequences for
regional stability, as well as for Israel’s strategic interests. On the day
after an agreement with Iran, and given the erosion of trust between Saudi
Arabia and the US, the kingdom is liable to seek to mitigate risks by
forming a parallel – albeit imperfect – set of relationships with other
countries in order to improve its security. Of these possible relations,
understandings with Pakistan on the nuclear question are a clear
possibility.

The Gulf states have no interest in a significant deterioration in their
relations with the US, since they will be the first to suffer. During the
summit, Gulf representatives therefore expressed public support for the
administration’s goals with Iran. In the long term, however, the Gulf
leaders can be expected to try to design a new framework of relations with
the US that will give those countries a larger degree of independence than
they currently enjoy in managing their defense agenda – without full
coordination with American interests and goals in the region. Even before
any agreement with Iran, several Gulf states have already shown their
readiness to take action in defense of their essential interest without the
US, and furthermore, against its advice. The current bone of contention is
the American effort at achieving a compromise agreement between the warring
parties in Yemen, which contravenes Saudi Arabia’s goals in its war against
the Houthi rebels and the desire of Saudi Arabia (and Turkey) to increase
military involvement in Syria with the aim of overthrowing the Assad regime.

The Gulf states are incapable on their own of creating a strategic balance
with Iran, which is also important for their economic prosperity. It is
doubtful, however, whether a supply of advanced American arms will create
this essential balance. Furthermore, in view of the sale of advanced arms to
the Gulf states, the Americans will find it difficult to continue
criticizing the absence of political freedom and the ongoing denial of human
rights in those countries, out of concern that such criticism will harm the
sales sorely needed by the American economy. Furthermore, if the US is truly
interested in strategic cooperation with the Gulf states, it must prove that
even if it wants a nuclear agreement with Iran, it is unwilling for such an
agreement to give Iran the green light to act as it wishes in the region.
However, the administration may find it difficult to present such proof,
since Iran will regard it as grounds for halting implementation of the
agreement. Iran can use the threat of withdrawing from the agreement as a
significant means of pressure. Indeed, in his summary remarks at the end of
the summit, Obama stressed that military cooperation with the Gulf states
would not be at Iran’s expense.

Israel too faces a related dilemma. It is in Israel’s interest for the US,
through its military presence, to continue to generate the necessary
strategic balance against Iranian power in the Gulf region. The sale of
advanced weapons to the Gulf states, however, is expected to detract from
the IDF’s qualitative edge in the region.

The coming years will likely see a test of relations between the US and the
Gulf states. These relations have already survived previous crises,
particularly the severe crisis created by the events of September 11, 2001.
Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether conciliatory declarations and the sale
of advanced weapons will be enough to put the relations back on track and
alleviate the monarchies’ anxiety about what they view as the mistaken
strategic direction pursued by the US toward Iran, Syria, Egypt, and the
Palestinian issue. To be sure, Gulf figures at the summit smiled for the
cameras and read from the agreed text; they are unlikely to publicly express
their dissatisfaction with the administration’s policy, or to speak before
both houses of Congress. However, they can be expected to continue acting to
attain their respective goals, even if these run counter to American policy.

Expectations of the summit were low, yet even so, it is questionable whether
they were achieved. The Gulf states left the summit with only half of their
wish list filled. Some of them hoped to receive an official security
undertaking from the administration, a type of classic defense pact. What
they got, however, was more of the same – declarations of support and
advanced weapons, which they still regard as not advanced enough. Several of
the countries asked for the procurement of F-35 warplanes, but encountered
an American refusal. Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to say that there
was no point in holding the summit. At work is a process, and the summit is
only one stage. It is possible that the summit contributed to an
understanding by the administration that it must devise a policy to roll
back Iranian involvement in various fronts in the Middle East. Such a
policy, if pursued effectively, will enable the Gulf states to ride out the
remainder of the Obama administration’s term – an administration with which
they disagree about almost every issue in the Middle East in general, and
the Gulf in particular.