[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: A clarification: The Iranian isn't saying that
under the AP an inspector can enter a military site if there is proof that
something is going on inside the site. The idea is that after presenting
documented proof of wrongdoings in an area that is off limits, and this
proof has been reviewed and days, weeks, months or more passes, under the
AP, someone can come within proximity of the site to take some ground and
air samples to try and detect evidence of the wrongdoing. That's right -
after the Iranians have carted off as many layers of soil that they believe
necessary - and possibly carted in soil from somewhere else and covered the
whole area with fresh asphalt, it is possible that an inspector will be
allowed to take a sample.

Mr. Kerry - Break out the champagne!! We've got a deal!!! ]

"We will not allow anybody to enter the military complexes... The AP is
about providing access to certain areas where there is proof that there have
been some alleged wrongdoings, the documents of which should be given to the
members...the implementation of the AP....is about exceptional cases, not
just any case.
... Iran will have to do its share, and simultaneously they have to do their
share. But it can't be based on a principle of the other side waiting until
we are done and then deciding what needs to be done. So this issue of
simultaneity is something we've insisted upon, and I think our colleagues
have understood this. They are in the same line of thinking as we are, and I
think this can be solved."

Interview: Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Ravanchi
Ariane Tabatabai Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 06/30/2015 - 10:07
[Ariane Tabatabai is a visiting assistant professor in the Security Studies
Program at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and an
associate in the Belfer Center's International]
http://thebulletin.org/interview-iranian-deputy-foreign-minister-majid-ravanchi8437

I had an opportunity to sit down with Iran's deputy foreign minister and one
of Iran’s chief negotiators, Majid Ravanchi, in the Coburg Hotel in Vienna,
Austria, where the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council, plus Germany) and Iran are working around the clock to strike a
nuclear deal that would curb Tehran's nuclear activities and provide
assurance of their peaceful nature, while granting Iran relief from
international economic sanctions. I asked Ravanchi about the state of play
in the negotiations and the stumbling blocks on the path toward a final
deal. The deputy foreign minister also shed some light on domestic aspects
of the Iranian nuclear negotiations.

Tabatabai: There are some rumors floating around the lobby of the Marriott
Hotel across the street (where journalists and analysts congregate) about
whether or not the P5+1 have added some elements to the discussions since
Lausanne. What's your take on this? Is everyone still negotiating within the
framework of Lausanne?

Ravanchi: What we reached there was a sort of understanding, not agreement,
some sort of solution to the problems. This has been the point of departure.
We have been working under the umbrella of this general understanding. But I
have to say, we didn't have time to go into detail about all subjects in
Lausanne. So, with our partners, we have been working to see if we can
resolve issues important to both sides. If you talk in general terms, you
can agree upon things more or less quickly. When you enter details, it takes
more time. Some times, you have to insist. Therefore, it is not an easy job
to get to the bottom of everything quickly. But we are following the logic
of Lausanne.

Tabatabai: What about the remaining issues then? Are they more political or
technical you'd say?

Ravanchi: I'd say both: There have been problems associated with issues on
both fronts. I don't want to go into detail here because of how sensitive
this stage is, but on both general topics, nuclear and sanctions, there are
still technical problems that need to be solved. And to be frank, there are
also political decisions that need to be made.

One other point I should emphasize here is that in Lausanne we went into a
lot of detail on the nuclear side. We also discussed sanctions, but compared
to what we achieved on the nuclear issue, we didn't get as far. So, this is
now of paramount importance. And as I said, if we are going further into
detail on the nuclear issue, we need to also do the same on the sanctions
issue.

Tabatabai: Speaking of the political side of things, how do you see the role
of Majles [the Iranian consultative assembly, or parliament] in the process?

Ravanchi: You know, a few days ago, the Majles adopted a bill ratified later
by the Council of Guardians. We don't need their approval, but the agreement
has to be submitted to the Majles by the Foreign Ministry and every six
months, the Foreign Ministry had to present an updated report to the
parliament. There are other provisions in [the] deal. For instance, we have
to work within the framework set up by the Majles. The Majles is very active
on this. The ratification of the Additional Protocol [to the International
Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement] has to go through parliament, and
we believe that even besides the ratification of the AP, even the
provisional implementation should have the blessing of the parliament. As
the government, we have to listen to the Majles, and they give us the
framework to operate within.

Tabatabai: So, how do you assess Iran's ability to implement the deal?

Ravanchi: If there is a deal, it should be a good deal. This is something we
all want, not just Iran. This needs to fall within the framework set for us
by both the Supreme Leader and Majles. In that case, the implementation will
go smoothly.

Tabatabai: The Supreme Leader's recent comments about visits to military
sites have raised a number of questions on this in the United States. Can
you get into a bit more detail on monitoring under the Additional Protocol
and also the issue of managed access versus inspection in military
facilities?

Ravanchi: First of all we have to see what Iran's international obligations
are under. We have a Safeguards Agreement with the [International Atomic
Energy] Agency based on which we've been operating for many years. There
haven't been any issues with that instrument. There is also the Additional
Protocol. We implemented it for more than two years between 2003 and 2005.
The agency had a free hand to go over different places in Iran at their
choosing, and there were not any problems at all with the places the agency
wanted to see or the places it wanted to talk to. So, as far as our record
in the implementation of the [Additional Protocol] goes, in those years
where we voluntarily implemented the AP, there was not a single problem. The
inspectors did their job in Iran. But also, Iran has given access to its
military facilities under the Chemical Weapons Convention. So, we don't have
an issue with honoring our obligations in accordance with our international
legal obligations.

Now we are entering a new phase. If we are going to reach a final deal, this
deal is going to include the AP. We have included in the text voluntary
implementation of the AP. This will be until a later stage, where it should
be ratified by the Iranian parliament. This means it will become part of
Iran's national laws. So, if we reach an agreement, Iran will abide by the
AP, which also entails managed access.

So if you're referring to recent developments and questions about whether or
not Iran will provide managed access, you can't just discuss them in a
vacuum. You have to see where and in what context these issues were raised.
If you remember, when a sort of understanding was reached in Lausanne, this
idea of Iran providing access to its military sites at all time, in any
location, any site was raised. This has created some kind of anxiety in Iran
on the actual purpose of all this. So, is this about the deal, or is it
about seeing what's going on in the Iranian military? We will not allow
anybody to enter the military complexes, because the AP isn't about letting
inspectors visit and have a free hand in wherever they want to go, whatever
they want to do, and talking about whoever they want to talk to. The AP is
about providing access to certain areas where there is proof that there have
been some alleged wrongdoings, the documents of which should be given to the
members.

I don't think there will be any problem in the future on the implementation
of the AP. You know, this is about exceptional cases, not just any case. Of
course, this makes people nervous. I can't imagine the United States for
instance allowing this. It's not just Iran being sensitive; no country will
just open up its [military] facilities. And Iran is not an exception. We've
tried to make the agency's job easier, given daily access to inspectors.

Tabatabai: So, to continue with topics covered by the Supreme Leader's
recent comments and generating a lot of discussion here obviously: Can you
explain where Iran stands and thinks about sanctions relief? Does the
Supreme Leader mean sanctions must be lifted the second a deal is reached,
as many seem to think?

Ravanchi: From the beginning of the negotiations, we have been insisting on
the fact that whatever we do should be in line and proportionate to whatever
the other side has to do. I don't mean that whatever Iran does on the
nuclear has to be done by the other side, of course. But we can't be
expected to do our job, meet our obligation, and then wait for the other
side to meet theirs. So there needs to be some proportionality here, and we
have told our P5+1 partners that Iran is ready to take a number of steps on
the nuclear issue (the work in Fordow, Natanz, or Arak, whatever we agree
upon), at the first stage, provided we get the assurance that the other side
(the US and European countries) do their end. We are still talking about all
this. But this issue [is] of simultaneity—that Iran will have to do its
share, and simultaneously they have to do their share. But it can't be based
on a principle of the other side waiting until we are done and then deciding
what needs to be done. So this issue of simultaneity is something we've
insisted upon, and I think our colleagues have understood this. They are in
the same line of thinking as we are, and I think this can be solved.

Tabatabai: How do you foresee a deal (or no deal) affecting your
administration?

Ravanchi: You know, we have been very sincere with everyone. If there's a
deal, it'll be in our interest, the interest of the region, the P5+1. It is
really an artificial crisis. But a deal needs to be good to be sustainable.
At the same time, if there's not deal, it won't be the end of the world. The
present administration is trying to step away from reliance on oil in its
economy, so that it can stop being hostage to the price of oil. So, in the
next few years, we hope to make that reliance go down to zero. We know it'll
be very difficult. No one can deny that not having foreign exchange is
difficult. But we think it's worth it to have a good deal, and if not, we'll
rely on ourselves.