Eventually, a decisive victory means getting to the territory, to the soil,
dominating it operationally – and that cannot be accomplished by stand-off
fire.
Preparing for the Day of War
The commander of the Jerusalem Brigade in an exclusive interview about the
training and the challenges of the fighting opposite Hezbollah, which
acquired substantial combat experience over the course of four years of
fighting in Syria
Or Heller | 23/07/2015
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/preparing-day-war

The IDF "Jerusalem" Brigade boasts an illustrious heritage. It was founded
in 1948. During the Six-Day War (1967), it liberated the Jewish Quarters of
Bethlehem and Hebron along with the Paratroopers Brigade. When the
paratroopers liberated Temple Mount, the men of the "Jerusalem" Brigade went
to the Jewish Quarter. During the Yom-Kippur War (1973), the Brigade manned
14 of the 16 IDF strongholds along the Suez Canal and sustained the main
thrust of the Egyptian offensive. One-third of their troopers were killed,
one-third were taken prisoner and one-third suffer from post-traumatic
disorders to this day.


Moshe Dayan was the first commander of the 16th Brigade and the forth
commander was Haim Hertzog. These are definitely large shoes to step into
for their replacement in 2015, Colonel Yoav Mordechai.

"I grew up in the same team (of Sayeret Matkal – O.H.) with Naftali Bennett
and Immanuel Moreno (who was killed in Lebanon in a Sayeret Matkal operation
after the Second Lebanon War – O.H.)," recounts Colonel Mordechai, smiling.
On March 4, 1996, Mordechai served as a company commander in the 12th
("Barak") Battalion of the Golani Infantry Brigade. While chasing a
Hezbollah terrorist detachment near the IDF Tziporen stronghold, the
terrorists detonated an explosive charge on the Golani force. The commander
of the 12th Battalion, Lt. Col. Hussein Amar, and Lt. Uri Helman were
killed. Yoav Mordechai suffered severe fragmentation injuries.

The doctors predicted he would not be able to return to operational command
duty, but Yoav Mordechai fought to come back to life and to go back to
command duty in the IDF, telling his doctors, "You will see, I will serve as
battalion commander in the Golani Brigade!" True to his word, he served as
deputy commander of the 12th Battalion during Operation Defensive Shield, as
commander of the 13th Battalion of the same brigade during the Second
Lebanon War (2006), and since 2013 as commander of the reserve infantry
brigade – the Jerusalem Brigade.

With a paralyzed foot and knee joint restrictions, Mordechai now commands a
reserve brigade that prepares for the next war, first and foremost, opposite
Hezbollah in Lebanon.

We interviewed Colonel Mordechai at the command center of the Jerusalem
Brigade in Nachshonim. The Brigade belongs to the IDF 340th Division – the
Idan Formation. This is the primary reserve formation of IDF Central
Command, which, according to the decision of the former IDF Chief of Staff,
Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, who reorganized the divisions of the IDF, was
converted into a "multiple-sector division". In other words, it is an
overbalance division that, like the 36th and 162nd divisions, must be ready
to be deployed at any given moment to any sector, from Syria and Lebanon all
the way down to the Gaza Strip.

During Operation Defensive Shield, the brigade was mobilized to capture
Bethlehem. During Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip, in November
2012, the brigade was mobilized and waited in the south for the ground
operation – a maneuver that never materialized. During Operation Protective
Edge, the brigade was mobilized under an emergency order and replaced the
battalions previously stationed in the Judea and Samaria sector that were
redeployed opposite the Gaza Strip.

"We, the present commanders, are committed to keeping the torch of the
Jerusalem Brigade alight. We are deeply committed to the values of the
past," Mordechai said in an interview to IsraelDefense. "The main
characteristic of our reservist personnel and its commanders is the human
quality. It is a human nature reserve. Our people are highly motivated
Zionists who carry the liberty of the People of Israel on their shoulders."

In 2014, the Brigade won the IDF Ground Arm Commander's Excellence Award due
to the quality of its reservist personnel. "We conducted highly innovative
training activities, based on out-of-the-box thinking, not just with regard
to the practical aspect, but also with regard to learning and coaching." A
year later, the Brigade's reconnaissance battalion won the distinguished
battalion award in the context of the President's Prize.

The Brigade has recently completed a significant training activity. "We are
the first IDF brigade to have implemented the recommendations of
Major-General Ronnie Numa regarding the competence of the reserve OrBat: to
develop an extended training program for two weeks, non-stop. This has
changed the 3-year training model where the battalion training program was
one week long. The entire Brigade was assembled at the IDF training center
in Ze'elim. We conducted a training exercise by a brigade task force along
with an armored battalion from the 847th Brigade, which is included in our
operational plans. We completed a full week of live-fire training. Normally,
reserve unit training activities are carried out one battalion at a time. We
practiced the transition from a peacetime situation to an emergency
situation: mobilization of all of the Brigade's commanders, a battle
procedure simulating a war, buildup of the OrBat, we have taken the entire
brigade task force to assembly areas on the Golan Heights and initiated the
brigade training exercise. We flexed all of the Brigade's muscles in the
context of a complete battle procedure, and departed on a brigade exercise."

When people speak about preparations for a new round of fighting in Lebanon,
which has already been termed 'The Third Lebanon War', do you, as the
commander of a reserve brigade, take it into account that this time, the
ground ingress will take place much sooner than what we saw in the summer of
2006?

"The basic assumption is that the reserve OrBat will have between three and
four days from mobilization to actually going into war, and we take
advantage of that for outfitting and training. We have been placing the
emphasis on combined-arms task forces made up of infantry, armored, combat
engineering and artillery elements. We have placed the emphasis on combat
encounters in densely-foliated terrain. IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot
attended our last training exercise along with Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi,
commander of the IDF Northern Command and Maj. Gen. Ronnie Numa, commander
of the IDF Central Command. Our battalion commanders made a unanimous
statement – 'This training exercise was just like a war'. That was our
compass for the training exercise – to raise the bar. We fully realize that
it will be more difficult in a real war. We closed the circle of fire
support, utilization of intelligence and combined-arms battle procedures,
and we learned a lot. We improved our competence and preparedness. It was
very difficult, but it was worth it.

"The sentiment shared by the warfighters, the commanders and the command
centers was a sense of confidence in themselves – that we are ready for any
mission. We have a lot to improve. We have taken advantage of a tremendous
opportunity here. We were the only IDF brigade that conducted a training
exercise the likes of which even the veterans of our brigade cannot remember
attending in the last 25 years. It was a full-scale brigade exercise with
live fire. The intention is to expand this model in the coming years. We
were a pilot exercise of sorts."

Is the underground tunnel issue, which proved to be a highly complex
undertaking for the IDF during Operation Protective Edge, relevant to the
operational missions of the Jerusalem Brigade?

"It is definitely relevant. I would like to hope that when the next
confrontation in the Gaza Strip erupts, the Brigade will be mobilized and
committed to battle. We conducted commander training activities and
demonstrations for that. We are preparing for a confrontation in the south
as well as for a confrontation in the north, and will make the adjustments
for whatever region where missions will be assigned to us.

"The strength of the enemy in the north is increasing and becoming more
challenging. The more we prepare for it, the better we will be able to make
the necessary adjustments. Our compass, generally, is not the Gaza Strip but
the northern front."

Why do you regard Hezbollah as more challenging? Is it because of their
firepower? The competence of its warfighters?

"Without addressing the probability of Hezbollah's intentions for the
moment, we are looking at their capabilities. We realize they have acquired
substantial capabilities in Syria. They have considerably improved their
maneuverability and their ability to employ large formations. They are
currently assuming a shape where it is easier to spot the centers of gravity
and operate against them. They know how to operate company and battalion
formations with command and control, demolition, communication and antitank
capabilities. They have acquired extensive experience."

How do you rate Hezbollah's abilities to stage a battalion-size attack into
Israeli territory?

"In the past, we prepared for a scenario where they are engaged in defensive
action against us. In view of the combat experience they are acquiring in
Syria, they can now engage in offensive action as well – not just in
defensive action. The maneuvering areas in the territories they dominate are
essentially different from those in the Gaza Strip. This affects logistics
and C3 issues. The challenge over there is more complex. They possess
offensive capabilities in our territory that we had not attributed to them
in the past. In the past, they had intrusion capabilities like the terrorist
attack near Kibbutz Matzuva and the ability to employ covering and pin-down
fire. The Jerusalem Brigade, for its part, is preparing for offensive action
and maneuvering. Other forces will be responsible for border defense duty."

What are the implications of converting the IDF 340th Division, including
the Jerusalem Brigade, into a multiple-sector division?

"We should be prepared for any kind of confrontation. We have a definite
scale of priorities for our force build-up process. We prepare for a range
of activities, from a limited-scope maneuver on foot to a deep-penetration
mechanized maneuver. The future maneuver will not be any less deep than what
we saw during the Second Lebanon War, at the very least.

"In the next round it will not be 'in and out' but a single ingress. No
enemy, on any front, is capable of stopping a well-trained IDF brigade if we
operate with power and determination in each of the sectors. We will go in,
win and remain there as long as necessary. We gained many insights from the
Second Lebanon War."

What experience and insights do you, as someone who was a battalion
commander in 2006, bequeath as a brigade commander in 2015?

"We will be taken by surprise. Eventually, when it actually happens, we will
be taken by surprise. The idea is to be mentally prepared: alert the forces,
speak with the people about changing their mental software and about the
rapid transition from peacetime to a wartime situation. Our emergency stores
are in good condition – not excellent, but definitely good. We are well
equipped and in good shape.

"I learned from the war that anything that can go wrong – will go wrong, and
you must accept the changes with a smile. I learned firsthand how important
it is to have clearly-defined missions and a common language between
commanders. In the Second Lebanon War, there was no connection between the
mission and the objective. It was unclear whether we should accomplish
encirclement, isolation or domination. The tactical achievement required of
the force was unclear.

"I keep telling my men: I do not hold chaos sacred, but let's smile in the
face of unexpected changes. Let's be strict about the fundamentals: a clear
military language and mission-driven command."

In your view, has the dispute as to whether the enemy may be overpowered
from the air or whether a ground maneuver will be required ended, or is it
still ongoing at IDF GHQ?

"My world view is this: the conflict between us and our neighbors is about
territory. Eventually, a decisive victory means getting to the territory, to
the soil, dominating it operationally – and that cannot be accomplished by
stand-off fire. Maneuvering will be required in any operation where we
aspire to overpower the other side. Look at the war in Iraq: even the
Americans thought they could overpower the Iraqis by 'shock and awe' using
air strikes – but eventually they resorted to a substantial maneuver.

"Judge the Second Lebanon War. We effectively etched into the awareness of
Hezbollah the fact that they would not want to return to whatever we left
for them over there. This is something you can only do on the ground. I have
no doubt that during Operation Protective Edge, if they wanted to, our tanks
and APCs could have reached any point within the Gaza Strip. It is a
different dimension of deterrence."

Is it at all possible to win and overpower a hybrid, irregular enemy like
Hamas and Hezbollah?

"I am a brigade commander. I do not deal with issues of overbalance. I deal
with destroying the enemy and preventing enemy fire into the rear area out
of my sector of responsibility, until another mission is assigned to me. In
the tactical language, I have a mission and I should accomplish it. I
operate on the level of the clearly-defined, tangible things."