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Sunday, July 26, 2015
MEMRI: Critical Points To Consider In Understanding The Iranian Nuclear Deal

MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis | 1177 | July 24, 2015

Critical Points To Consider In Understanding The Iranian Nuclear Deal
By: Y. Carmon, A. Braunstein, and A. Savyon*

http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8676.htm

Introduction

The following analysis is the first in a series which will discuss the
Iranian nuclear deal and will examine the JCPOA from the American
perspective. It will focus on the components of the JCPOA as a legal
document. It will also draw on United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 2231 which endorsed the JCPOA for reference. It will not discuss
possible future implications, nor does it mean to be an overall assessment
of the deal.

It should be emphasized that, contrary to how it is perceived, the JCPOA is
not a bilateral or multilateral contract between the United States and/or
Europe and Iran. Nothing has been signed and nothing is judicially binding
between any of the parties. It is a set of understandings that was sent to a
third party, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), for endorsement.
This structure is a result of Iran's insistence to not sign any bilateral or
multilateral contract.

JCPOA Provisions Prevent Future Inspection Of Military Sites[1]

The provisions of the agreement can be interpreted to prevent the inspection
of military sites rather than enable inspection. The provisions for
inspection by the IAEA create two categories:

The first category dictates that inspectors may request to enter a site that
is suspected of having nuclear material. There is a subsequent process that
the IAEA must go through in order to access that site, involving a
back-and-forth exchange of requests and explanations with Iran. If an
agreement cannot be reached, the Joint Commission, which is composed of the
E3/EU+3 and Iran,[2] can decide on the appropriate means to resolve the
issue within 7 days on the basis of 5 votes out of its 8 members, and Iran
must implement the decision within 3 days.

The second category distinguishes military sites from the other sites to
which the IAEA may request access by stating, "…such requests [for access]
will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national
security activities."[3] This provision effectively excludes a priori sites
where Iran can claim that the IAEA is interfering with its military or
national security activities. Therefore, the process described in the first
category which would force Iran to submit to inspection at the end of the
24-day request period does not apply.[4]

The provisions of the JCPOA also stipulate that the IAEA will have to "make
available relevant information"[5] when explaining why they want access to a
site. This provision may serve as a basis for delay and obfuscation of
access by Iran, claiming that it needs relevant sources of intelligence
revealed, as it has done in the past.

Duration Of Sanctions Could Be Less than 8 Years Dependent On Report From
The Director General Of The IAEA

The JCPOA establishes an option to make Transition Day arrive sooner than
the specified 8 year time period by saying, "Transition Day will occur 8
years from Adoption Day or upon a report from the Director General of the
IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the UN Security
Council stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all
nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is
earlier."[6] There is no time limitation regarding in which year the
Director General of the IAEA could provide this report.

Re-Imposition Of Sanctions Dependent On Security Council

The Security Council adopted UNSCR 2231 on July 20, 2015. Articles 11 and 12
of the resolution stipulate that the re-imposition of sanctions in case of
"non-performance" by Iran may occur. However, the final sentence in Article
12 provides a loophole so that sanctions may not re-imposed by saying,
"…unless the Security Council decides otherwise."[7]

Accumulation Of Natural Uranium Permitted Equal To Present Amount Of
Enriched Uranium

The provisions of the JCPOA stipulate that Iran will have to dispose of its
10 tons of low-level enriched uranium either by transferring it to Russia or
by selling it in the commercial market. It also stipulates that the amount
of enriched uranium that Iran is allowed to have cannot exceed 300 kilograms
for 15 years. While the provisions are designed to inspect Iran's uranium
mining facilities, supply chain, and the quantity of enriched uranium it
possesses, it allows Iran to trade its enriched uranium for equal amounts of
natural uranium for 15 years. This uranium could be enriched to higher,
weapons-grade levels after the 15 year time limit.

PMD Investigation: Iran Demanded Only To Help In Process, Results Will Not
Impact Implementation Of JCPOA

The provisions in the JCPOA demand only that Iran collaborate with the IAEA
in the process of verification of the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) in
order for the process of lifting sanctions to begin. It is indifferent about
the results, i.e. it makes no mention of what would happen if the
verification process were to discover that Iran had previously attempted to
develop nuclear weapons.[8]

Parchin Investigation Put Into Secrecy

Under the JCPOA, the handling of the Parchin issue has been put into
secrecy. Parchin is an example of suspected nuclear weaponization activity
that took place in a military base.[9] Not revealing the details of the case
conceals Iran's attempt to build a military option contrary to its repeated
denials of such allegations.[10]

Arak Remains Heavy Water Facility, Authorized For Heavy Water Export

The Arak facility houses Iran's heavy water production plant and a heavy
water reactor. Despite the vague wording regarding the state of the reactor
following the endorsement of the JCPOA (i.e. Iran will "redesign" the
reactor and it will be "modernised"),[11] it will still continue to operate
partly using heavy water. In addition, "All excess heavy water will be made
available for export to the international market."[12]

Interview Of Military Scientists Excluded From JCPOA

The Western demand in the negotiations that Iran allow the interviewing of
Iranian nuclear scientists was excluded altogether from the JCPOA.

*Y. Carmon is President and Founder of MEMRI; A. Braunstein is a Research
Fellow at MEMRI; A. Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iranian Media Project.

[1] It should be noted that according to reports, the United States
administration did not see the inspection of military sites as
"appropriate." A government spokesman told reporters that, "The entry point
isn't we must be able to get into every military site, because the United
States of America wouldn't allow anybody to get into every military site, so
that's not appropriate."
http://news.yahoo.com/us-says-system-reached-un-access-suspect-iran-162509010.html

[2] The Joint Commission will "monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and
will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA. The Joint
Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA
and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the
relevant annex." JCPOA, Preamble and General Provisions, ix.
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/

[3] JCPOA, Annex I, Q.74. For full text, see Footnote 2.

[4] It should be mentioned that the JCPOA does not in any way mention
permission to access military sites. The term "military" is only referenced
in regard to the prevention of access to sites where such access may
interfere in military activities. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General
Hossein Dehqan confirmed this on July 20 by stating, "Definitely, we will
not give any (international) authority access to our military and security
secrets." http://www.tasnimnews.com/english/Home/Single/805144

Similarly, Supreme Leader Khamenei's top adviser for international affairs
Ali Akbar Velayati stated on July 21, "They (the westerners) have made some
comments about defensive and missile issues, but Iran will not allow them to
visit our military centers and interfere in decisions about the type of
Iran's defensive weapons."
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940430000961

[5] JCPOA, Annex I, Q.76. See Footnote 2 for link to text.

[6] JCPOA, Annex V, D.19. See Footnote 2 for link to text.

[7] http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2231

[8] For more information, see:
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8624.htm

[9] Parchin is a military facility in which, according to a 2011 IAEA
report, Iran conducted activities aimed at building nuclear weapons. See:
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Iran_24May2011.pdf

[10] Furthermore, the integrity of the IAEA investigation into Parchin has
come into question: during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on
July 23, Senator Bob Menendez questioned Secretary Kerry about whether the
soil samples that will be given to the IAEA to test would be provided by
Iran. Secretary Kerry only responded that the information was confidential.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=730&v=N4TK8hOLrNA

[11] JCPOA, I.B.8. See Footnote 2 for link to text.

[12] JCPOA, I.B.10. See Footnote 2 for link to text.

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