#1. Minister Steinitz: "If I were American, I would oppose the agreement."
(Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser)

Energy, National Infrastructures and Water Minister Dr. Yuval Steinitz,
today (Tuesday, 4 August 2015), released the following statement in reply to
recent remarks by US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz regarding the nuclear
agreement with Iran:

"If I were American, I would oppose the agreement.

I would oppose the agreement because it ensures from the outset Iran's
becoming a nuclear power capable of producing dozens of atomic bombs per
month, ten years from today.

I would oppose the agreement because it is likely to lead to a nuclear arms
race between Iran and the Sunni Arab states – in complete contravention of
the avowed policy of the US.

I would oppose the agreement because even in the short term, the inspections
are not immediate and invasive, as was promised at the start.

I would oppose the agreement because it harms the national security of the
United States, Israel and every Western country."

Minister Steinitz met with US Energy Secretary Moniz approximately two
months ago in Washington for talks on the Iranian nuclear issue and other
energy matters as well.

#2. MFA: Deficiencies in the Iran nuclear deal
Deficiencies in the Iran nuclear deal
03 Aug 2015
See video:
https://youtu.be/0r-hadxzS8k ]

The agreement is supposed to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and should include an enforcement mechanism. However, no such
mechanism exists. Instead, conflicts can only be resolved by mutually agreed
consensus.

1. Inspections of suspicious sites

There are strong concerns regarding the access request mechanism:

First of all, permission to visit suspicious sites could take far longer to
arrange than 24 days. The 24-day countdown starts only after the IAEA turns
to Iran with its suspicions concerning a particular site (thereby revealing
to the Iranians the intelligence-based information the IAEA possesses). Iran
subsequently must supply an answer, but no time limit is specified for the
Iranian response. It is entirely possible that a long time will pass,
possibly even months, without an Iranian reply. During that time, the IAEA
cannot request to visit the site (which would start the 24-day countdown).

It is important to note that Iran will be able to cover up any signs of
prohibited activity within the 24-day period, particularly if this activity
does not involve fissile material (for example, calculations on the output
of a nuclear explosion or experiments using metal with a radioactive
signature that is not uranium).

Another important point to stress is that if Iran decides not to permit a
visit to the site even after the 24-day countdown no automatic enforcement
is applied. Instead, the matter is passed on to the Joint Commission, which
will have another 65 days to make a decision. It is also possible that the
commission's discussion will end without imposing any enforcement measures,
allowing Iran to refuse entry to the inspectors, again without any
punishment or enforcement actions.

Moreover, Iran has already signaled its unwillingness to allow inspections
of an entire category of sites: In Iran’s letter to the President of the
Security Council of July 20th it declares "such (military) facilities will
not be subject to inspection"

2. The agreement does not include an enforcement mechanism

The agreement, which has a technical character, is supposed to limit the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To achieve that goal, it
should include an enforcement mechanism, so that Iran’s violations of the
agreement (or its overly expansive interpretations of gray areas) would be
dealt with by enforcement actions. However, no such mechanism exists. The
so-called “snap back option” can only handle major violations. All other
Iranian violations that fall short of "significant non-performance” cannot
be addressed through the agreement’s mechanisms. This means that the
agreement is based on an all or nothing approach that is not capable of
dealing with the wide range of problematic Iranian behaviors that will
probably arise.

3. The conflict resolution mechanism relies on reaching consensus

Instead of an enforcement mechanism, the agreement includes a conflict
resolution mechanism. This mechanism is designed to only resolve conflicts
that can be mutually agreed-upon by consensus. In the absence of such a
consensus, this mechanism would be effectively paralyzed. As this agreement
concerns major conflicting interests between the sides, the chances of
arriving at a good-faith consensus are slender.

4. Issues with “snap back” sanctions

In theory, any of the P5 powers can reinstate the sanctions through the UN
Security Council and no veto is permitted. However, according to the
agreement and repetitive statements by Iran, should the “snap back option”
be utilized, Iran will withdraw from the agreement. Hence, any of the five
states that believes that the snap back option should be deployed can only
do so if it is willing to bear the consequences: the dissolution of the
agreement. This creates a strong deterrent effect against activating "snap
back" of the sanctions.

5. The agreement is unmanageable

Although the published nuclear agreement is long and contains many details,
in many topics the language used in the agreement is vague, lacking detail
or is not explicit enough to prevent widely varied interpretations of their
contents. Given its history in the nuclear field, Iran will probably exploit
these unclear or unequivocal formulations to its benefit.

6. The procurement channel for nuclear-related products is not tight, and
enforcement ability is incomplete:

Security Council resolution 2231 of July 20th established a channel for
monitoring the acquisition of products or raw materials used for
nuclear-related activities. The monitoring is based on declarations by the
exporting state and Joint Commission supervision. However, the mechanism
leaves too much up to the judgment of the exporting state, as to whether the
products or materials must be declared, and to the way their use will be
monitored. It is very likely that Iran will exploit this gap to its own
advantage.

Also, if a third party discovers violations in this area (such as a product
or service that should have been declared but was sold not through the
procurement channel), there is no effective recourse that allows sufficient
enforcement of the matter.

7. Removal of the arms embargo and restrictions regarding ballistic
missiles:

The agreement includes the removal of the embargo on Iranian armaments and
restrictions regarding its ballistic missiles after five and eight years
respectively. However, the agreement purports to be limited to the nuclear
issue (this is one of the justifications for not including other
destabilizing Iranian behaviors, such as its support of terrorism).

Furthermore, during the period while the embargo is still in place, there
will be no effective enforcement mechanisms: in the framework of canceling
previous Security Council resolutions, the Sanctions Committee and the Panel
of Experts that were in charge of enforcing the embargo on Iran were also
canceled. Allegedly, the embargo’s implementation will be monitored by some
mechanism in the Security Council Secretariat; however, this mechanism has
not yet been formulated, it will probably not be comprised of experts but
rather political figures, and the result will be, again, lack of effective
enforcement in the event that violations are discovered.

It is important to note that Iran and the P5+1 agreed ahead of time that a
violation of the embargo would not constitute a violation of the nuclear
agreement, but only(!) of Security Council resolution 2231; this according
to the Iranian negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Iran has
already announced that it will not honor these restrictions because they
are, according to Iran, "illegal" – just as in the past it didn’t honor the
Security Council resolutions that are canceled due to the agreement.
Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who continues to receive weapons
(including advanced missiles) from Iran, conveyed a similar message.

8. The possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program are not
a condition of the agreement:

It seems that the PMD issue (IAEA examination of Iran’s past military
nuclear program) was not included as a condition of the agreement’s
implementation or for the removal of sanctions. This makes it difficult to
determine the extent of Iran’s military nuclear program in the past.
Furthermore, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar
Salehi, said in this context that Iran has understandings with IAEA and that
the conclusions of the reports that will be submitted by the IAEA are known
to Iran in advance. This issue is important not only to understand what Iran
did in the past and what the possible penalization is for this action, but
also in order to understand what should be done in the future to prevent
Iran from progressing with its military program under the auspices of a
legitimate civilian program according to the agreement.

9. Legal aspects:

It should be noted that only parts of the agreement were drafted under
Chapter VII, Article 41of the UN Charter (which allows non-military
sanctions in the event of a violation). This weakens the legal force of the
agreement.