Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA - 7 August 2015:

IMRA contacted two experts who write about defense technology asking them to
react to the claim by Russian Major General Sergei Babakov that Russia has
the technology to shoot down B-2 stealth bombers and the possibility that
Iran may buy and implement this technology, thus effectively denying the
United States a conventional surgical strike option.

Their responses:

I agree with your analysis...I have been thinking about a longer piece on
stealth in general, because like any other technology it has a half life,
and I think we are on the downward slope as to what can be achieved given
advances in radar and other detection systems such as the Czech-developed
(now US owned) Vera system (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VERA_passive_sensor).​ Incidentally Vera is
an interesting story in and of itself and I analyze it in my forthcoming
book Technology Security and National Power: Winners and Losers.
Dr.Stephen D. Bryen
SDB Partners
Other professional appointments
Senior staff director of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy
Founder and first director of the Defense Technology Security Administration
Commissioner of the U.S. China Security Review Commission

“... it does not surprise me that the Russians (and the Chinese) have
systems that can detect and potentially shoot down a B-2. That's clearly a
reason behind LRS-B, but by the time that platform gets into service, the
GBADS threat will have developed further. It does raise the question whether
the very long development cycles for new combat aircraft are an Achilles
heel given the quicker development cycles and incremental improvement of
defence systems including counter-stealth radars. A better solution than a
small number of very advanced bombers might be larger numbers of lower-tech
but capable bombers carrying lots of really advanced high-speed long range
cruise missiles. If you need to penetrate an IADS then invest in a small
number of advanced UCAVs or find an entirely different approach to precision
attack on a hardened or mobile target. The point is, the current operational
paradigm is on borrowed time from my perspective.”
Dr. Malcolm Davis
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Faculty of Society and Design, Bond
University Australia
Other professional appointments
Assistant Director - Strategic External Relations and Education - Strategic
Policy Division, Department of Defence
Assistant Director - Strategic Policy Guidance - Strategic Policy Division,
Department of Defence


IMRA wrote to Dr. Avner Golov:

You write that "the United States must rehabilitate the credibility of a
military option in the form of a surgical strike". Given that the American
surgical strike plan today hinges on the use of B-2 stealth bombers with
bunker busters and the Russians already claim to have the ability to shoot
down B-2's (Major General Sergei Babakov quoted in US ‘Stealth’ Bombers Can’t
Hide From Russian Anti-Aircraft Missiles SputnikNews Military & Intelligence
17:50 05.07.2015(updated 18:01 05.07.2015)) isn't it reasonable to assume
that there is a significant possibility that within the next decade Iran
will have in place an anti-aircraft system that effectively denies the
United State a conventional surgical strike option?

Dr. Avner Golov replied:

Regarding your very interesting question: my advice is to treat General
Babakov's statement with a grain of salt. Every anti-aircraft system has a
weak link and if there is one air force that has the capability to find this
link and exploit it is the US Air Force. I can think at least on one other
country that can develop similar capabilities if needed in the next decade.

However, it is anything but clear that Russia will sell this advanced system
(whose extended form is not yet operational) to Iran in the next decade,
after the embargo-related-sanctions are lifted. There is a Russian
commitment to arm Iran with the S-300 system but this decision was postponed
so far. Before start talking about more advance systems, the Russian will
have to deliver this promise and it is going to take a while as both the US
and Israel will surely act to prevent it.

Lastly, a decade is a long time: the negotiations over the agreement and its
interpretation have just started. A new president in the US is going to
enter the White House in 2016 and nobody knows what the future holds for the
Iranian regime. Altogether, right now it seems that the prospects for Iran
to deny the American military option de facto are low. As US-Israel
cooperation in the field of active defense missile systems taught us: when
the US and Israel collaborate even the sky is not the limit. Maintaining a
credible military option against Iran is not different in this regard.
====================
The Long Road is the Shortest Road: Iran’s Possible Routes to a Bomb
INSS Insight No. 729, August 6, 2015
Avner Golov
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=10268

SUMMARY: Although the Vienna agreement reduces the chances of Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons within the coming decade, it does not completely
preclude the possibility that Iran will acquire a bomb. In fact, the
agreement actually provides Iran with an alternative route for doing so,
thereby increasing the chances of this occurring during the second decade of
the agreement. Given this threat, the United States must develop an
appropriate response. First, it must rehabilitate the credibility of a
military option in the form of a surgical strike. Second, determined efforts
must now be made to stop the Iranian missile program before it acquires the
ability to arm ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. For its part,
Israel must strive to reach a side agreement with the United States focused
on coordinating plans of action in the event of Iranian violations of the
agreement and intensifying the intelligence cooperation in an effort to
cover the remaining blind spots in the supervision of Iran’s nuclear
program.

The Vienna agreement between Iran and the world powers is intended to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, although the agreement
reduces the chances of this occurring within the coming decade, it does not
completely preclude the possibility that Iran will acquire a bomb. In fact,
the agreement actually provides Iran with an alternative route for doing so,
thereby increasing the chances of this occurring during the second decade of
the agreement. In this sense, the title chosen by Israeli Defense Minister
Moshe Yaalon for his book – The Long Short Road – might aptly describe the
nuclear strategy adopted by Iran when it signed the agreement.

Until the signing of the agreement, Iran had two routes to acquire nuclear
weapons. The first route, a “breakout” to a bomb, refers to Iran’s use of
all its abilities to cross the nuclear threshold quickly and openly. Since
the beginning of the Iranian nuclear program, the likelihood that such a
scenario would be realized was extremely low. Iranians learned from the
experiences of Iraq and North Korea and developed a strategy to progress by
means of the safest – as opposed to the shortest – route to a bomb. Over the
past decade the Iranian nuclear program advanced cautiously, maneuvering
between internal and international political constraints. Only in the event
of an existential threat against the regime, or an international crisis
viewed by Iran as a window of opportunity posing little risk, was Iran
expected to deviate from its cautious approach and “break out” to acquire
nuclear weapons.

The nuclear agreement, which extends the breakout time to a bomb from a
number of months to one year, increases the level of risk to Iran posed by
such a scenario. It does not, however, constitute an appropriate response to
the danger of an Iranian breakout. According to the agreement, Iranian
violations of the terms of the agreement will be dealt with by a
multilateral framework and result in the re-imposition of sanctions.
However, the feasibility of sanctions actually being snapped back is highly
questionable in light of Iran’s expected determination to break out to a
bomb. Economic sanctions, which by nature require an extended period of time
to wield a significant effect, are a tool with limited effectiveness in this
context, especially in the event that the Iranian regime feels an imminent
threat to its survival. An international punitive mechanism may also prove
to be ineffective if at the time in question the international community is
engaged with another crisis. A danger likewise exists that the more Iran
continues to develop its nuclear research program and more advanced and
efficient centrifuges, the greater the danger that the Iranian regime will
choose to break out toward a bomb in the event that it feels threatened or
is presented with a relatively low risk opportunity.

The second route, a “sneak out,” refers to secret Iranian nuclear activity
conducted in parallel to declared activity that would allow Iran to cross
the nuclear threshold slowly and secretly, thereby significantly minimizing
the risks involved. In practice, over the years Iran has pursued this route.
Because it is a continuous and slower strategy than the breakout scenario,
the nuclear agreement addresses it more effectively. Nonetheless, the
measures it institutes are far from ideal. Thus, in continuation of its
longstanding strategy, Iran can be expected to engage in gradual violations
of the agreement aimed at testing the awareness of the international
community as well as its response threshold and response time. The nuclear
agreement does not set an automatic response for “minor” violations, but
rather stipulates the visit of IAEA inspectors – with Iranian agreement – to
undeclared sites suspected of nuclear activity, and an enforcement mechanism
that requires at least one country to act to re-impose sanctions. Then will
the issue of American willingness to take action to enforce the agreement
emerge, and when it does, it can be expected to face the opposition of
Russia and China. During the negotiations with Iran, the United States
argued that re-imposing sanctions without consensus would in practice result
in their collapse. This assessment might be realized if in the future Iran
decides to sneak out to a bomb.

Therefore, the agreement provides only limited measures for contending with
these two potential routes to nuclearization. Perhaps even more serious,
however, is that it allows Iran to advance along a third, combined route to
acquire a bomb – a “step out.” If during the first decade of the agreement
the Iranian government decides that it will not endanger itself by crossing
the nuclear threshold, it can do so during the second decade, exposing
itself to only minimal risk, by gradually expanding the scope of its nuclear
program for five more years, until most of the imposed restrictions are
lifted. As noted by President Obama, this will reduce the breakout time to
near zero. In this third situation, Iran could cross the nuclear threshold
by means of quick action (as in the breakout scenario) but do so without
being discovered (as in the scenario of sneaking out to a bomb). This
scenario presents decision makers in the United States with new challenges.

For example, in such a situation, the US willingness to stop Iran will be
critical – particularly the ability to implement a military option in an
extremely short period of time. President Obama has stated that the
achievements of the military option would be limited and that its use would
result in war in the Middle East. It is questionable whether during the
second decade of the agreement this option – which may be the only way to
try to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons – will be any more
attractive than it is today. An attack on the Iranian nuclear program, which
will develop in accordance with the nuclear agreement on the basis of
international legitimacy, will demand unequivocal evidence of Iranian
violations and broad international legitimacy. Gathering the evidence and
mobilizing the required international support will require time that the US
administration will not have if it wants to stop Iran once Tehran chooses to
step out to a bomb.

Given this threat, the United States must develop an appropriate response.
First, it must rehabilitate the credibility of a military option in the form
of a surgical strike. Even if the administration is guided by the assessment
that employing this option will lead to war, statements to that effect
should be limited, as they weaken the validity of the nuclear agreement,
especially due to the fact that Iran is also not interested in a direct
nuclear confrontation with the United States. In contrast to the lack of
Iraqi and Syrian responses to attacks on their nuclear facilities, Iran can
be expected to respond. However, its response – like in the nuclear realm –
can be expected to be measured and cautious.

Second, and supplementary to the nuclear deal with Iran, determined efforts
must now be made to stop the Iranian missile program before it acquires the
ability to arm ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. If Iran succeeds in
developing a nuclear bomb despite the stipulations of the nuclear agreement,
the improvement of its missile program will be the final obstacle preventing
it from becoming a nuclear power. The agreement signed between the world
powers and Iran does not provide a sufficient response to the threat posed
by the Iranian missile program, and stipulates that the related sanctions
will be lifted in eight years. Limiting Iran’s missile program may help to
prevent an Iranian decision to cross the nuclear threshold, as such action
could prevent it from translating its technological capacity in the nuclear
realm into an operational nuclear missile program.

Israel’s ability to take action against the three roads to Iranian
nuclearization is currently limited. Therefore, it must strive to reach a
side agreement with the United States focused on coordinating plans of
action in the event of Iranian violations of the agreement, and on
intensifying the intelligence cooperation between the two countries in an
effort to cover the remaining blind spots in the supervision of Iran’s
nuclear program. An important aspect of this discussion should be planning a
joint response to the challenge that the Iranian nuclear program can be
expected to pose during the second decade of the agreement, once the primary
limitations on its scope are lifted. Moreover, the return of the Israeli
military option, in addition to the rehabilitation of the American military
threat, will increase the effectiveness of the nuclear agreement as a result
of the element of deterrence it carries with it, and will therefore reduce
the chances of actually needing to use it. In this way, the chances of
blocking Iran’s long road to a bomb can be enhanced.