... we take it into account that there are Russian vessels out there who can
detect us, and you can never know what they will do with this information
and who they may pass it to
There is an Extensive Range of Threats in the Naval Battleground in the
North”
The Head of the IDF Navy Combat Systems Department presents his vision for
the future naval battlefield. Among other things, he unveils a secret
project for reducing the Radar signature of the Sa’ar-6 frigates
Or Heller | 23/12/2015
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/%E2%80%9Cthere-extensive-range-threats-naval-battleground-north%E2%80%9D

The naval battleground, like the other battlegrounds where IDF operates, is
changing every day in this ISIS-inspired Middle East in which we live.
Reality has changed from dealing with regular naval forces to dealing with
"terrorrilla" organizations, as they are called – between terrorism and
guerrilla, and, naturally, the new generation of terrorism – ISIS.

Col. Ariel Shir is the Head of the IDF Navy Combat Systems Department. He is
the person called upon to provide solutions to all of those changes in the
naval battleground of the State of Israel.

"We are divided between two different Mispan (Navy division) elements. There
is the staff Mispan (division) containing the weapon system organ. I belong
to the materiel Mispan (division), which is responsible for the
implementation activities. The materiel Mispan (division) is responsible for
technological development all the way to operational status. The weapon
systems are the responsibility of my department," says Colonel Shir. He is
forty-four and a half. Following his recruitment, he volunteered for the
Navy's naval officer cadet course and graduated as an electronics officer.
He served on board the missile frigates and in instruction positions at the
advanced naval command school, enrolled in electrical engineering studies at
the Technion, and when he returned to the Navy, he specialized in electronic
warfare and joined a weapon system project conducted jointly by Israel and a
"foreign partner". He will not reveal who's involved and what they are doing
in that project.

Col. Shir specializes in Radar systems, naval missiles and weapon systems.
Since 2013, he has served as Head of the Navy's Combat Systems Department,
which cooperates with MAFAT (the Weapon System & Technological
Infrastructure Research & Development Administration at IMOD). The Combat
Systems Department includes branches that deal with electronic warfare, a
branch that deals with surveillance systems (Radars and visual surveillance,
namely – optical surveillance and thermal systems), a weapon systems branch
(dealing with anything from short-range missile systems through 20mm cannon
systems to long-range missiles used to attack targets on land), an
underwater combat systems branch (torpedo, sonar) and two project branches:
the branch in charge of the Barak Adir system (which includes the Barak-8
missiles and the Adir Radar), and the branch dealing with the new
surface-to-surface missile of the Gabriel series, which replaces the
existing AGM-84 Harpoon missile.

Are naval battles in the style of the Yom-Kippur War still relevant in the
new ISIS-inspired Middle East?

"Generally speaking, they are still relevant. The naval battleground, like
any other battleground, is a living battleground. At the present time, the
Navy's surface vessels are less relevant in the north (Syria – O.H.), but
procurement of naval platforms is under way in the north, and I do not refer
to the Syrian Navy. I am looking at Lebanon, for example, which signed a
procurement deal for three naval platforms with the French. They definitely
intend to empower the Lebanese military through the addition of surface
vessels. The other aspect is that the development process is a
time-consuming process, and even if we were to say right now that there is
no real naval enemy in the north, if ten years from now we have an enemy
there, then that capability will gradually disappear. In the Navy we always
seek balances between the immediate future and the long-term build-up of
power. We are talking about layouts capable of performing more than one
task."

So what is the vision regarding surface-to-surface missile technology for
2015?

"Two things are always valid with regard to missile technology: accuracy and
lethality. You want to achieve your goal using a minimum number of missiles.
The missile has to cover a long distance, select the target and cope with
all of the electronic measures of the vessel that is the target."

Col. Ariel Shir reveals that the Navy is currently working on a project that
would convert the next generation of surface vessels, the "Sa'ar-6" as they
are called, into semi-stealthy vessels by reducing their Radar signature.
"This will make it difficult for the cruise missiles and the shore-to-sea
missiles to hit them. With a smaller Radar Cross-Section (RCS), they may be
protected using electronic warfare measures. When we started this project
with the Germans, we began with a certain profile that really resembles the
German vessels, and we showed them that even without changing the entire
structure, we can reach a substantially reduced Radar signature. Eventually,
the people who proved it to them were guys from the rank of sergeant to the
rank of major who specialize in this field, and they ran the analyses and
the simulations on how to convert that vessel into a vessel with a reduced
Radar signature."

Does the Russian Navy that recently returned to (the port of) Tartus in a
big way worry you? Do they discuss maritime coordination at the meetings
between IDF and the Russian military?

"We are definitely paying attention to those facts. You should be aware of
the vessels that operate over there, and at least as far as the
electromagnetic environment is concerned, it is now saturated with new
signals coming from the Russian vessels. You are also more exposed owing to
the capabilities of the Russian Navy and our operations now take into
consideration the fact that the other side currently possesses much more
advanced surveillance, monitoring, interpretation and electronic warfare
capabilities and that, without a doubt, is an additional variable thrown
into the battleground that we must take into consideration. Even in the
context of the war-between-the-wars (in which the Navy plays a central role,
dealing with the arms smuggling efforts from Iran – O.H.), this factor is
highly relevant.

"When we operate in a given battleground, you are used to operating
vis-à-vis a certain scenario. You know who your enemy is and what your
capabilities are vis-à-vis his capabilities. We are currently dealing with a
naval force whose surveillance, monitoring and interpretation capabilities
are by no means inferior to ours. Even during our normal intelligence
gathering activity during war-between-the-wars operations, we take it into
account that there are Russian vessels out there who can detect us, and you
can never know what they will do with this information and who they may pass
it to. We have seen a naval battleground emerging in the north with
characteristics that have a profound effect on our build-up of power. There
is an extensive range of threats over there and substantial quantities. It
started with the threat imposed by antitank weapons on routine security
vessels and now includes the entire range of missiles, from
electro-optically guided missiles to missiles with state-of-the-art Radars
like the Yakhont, and when you speak about economic waters, you also speak
about the threat of the steep-trajectory rockets.

"The fighting in the naval battleground does not end only at sea. The
ability of the Navy to influence will be measured by our ability to
influence the ground battle and accomplish two objectives: one – gain
command of the sea as independently as possible, and when I speak about
command of the sea I am also referring to the task of destroying the enemy's
shore-to-sea missiles (the shore-to-sea missiles of Hezbollah and the
Syrians – O.H.), which would have to be accomplished by our own forces. We
realize it cannot be left as just another item in the target bank of the
IAF. The second objective – if you want to be relevant you must influence
the over-all combat effort in the context of the ground maneuver, namely –
support the maneuver and support operations deep inside the ground medium."

Will the Barak missile system establish itself as the Iron Dome system of
the Navy that would also protect the offshore gas drilling rigs?

"We have recently seen a video clip of the Barak missile intercepting a
steep-trajectory threat. What we have here is a technological achievement of
the first magnitude. We took the Adir Radar (IAI/ELTA EL/M-2248 MF-STAR),
which is the most advanced Radar system in Israel – similar to the Radar of
the Iron Dome system – and made the necessary adaptations. The Radar of the
Barak system is not intended to spot a Grad rocket at the range of 40
kilometers. That is a pencil size target for it. We made the necessary
adaptations and did it with an established interceptor, the Barak-1, and
accomplished the operational capability of an interceptor of
steep-trajectory threats. Looking forward, there is no doubt that the
steep-trajectory threat will constitute one of the primary threats faced by
the offshore rigs."

Even a relatively weak opponent like Hamas can generate intensive rocket
salvos today. Will the Barak system be able to handle this threat?

"The Barak system is capable of handling a limited number of threats
simultaneously. When we speak about the build-up of power, we have to bear
in mind the fact that the Navy is currently replacing its surveillance
Radar. The Adir Radar will replace the older Radar system, and that will
enable us to engage multiple targets simultaneously. The interceptor used to
handle salvos will not be the Barak-1 but something more similar to the
Tamir, the interceptor missile of the Iron Dome system. When we attempt to
provide a solution to an operational problem, we look at the existing
systems and try to use systems that already serve in IDF and adapt them to
naval use. We try to take the Tamir interceptor and incorporate it in our
systems, then detect the target, close the circuit and accomplish
interception using the Tamir missile."

Will the number of operational hours logged by the unmanned vessels of the
Navy exceed the number of operational hours logged by the manned vessels any
time soon, as was the case in the IAF?

"In the future battleground, we will enter the world of unmanned vessels and
stand-off EW, and we realized that in the future battleground the employment
of unmanned surface vessels (USVs) or unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs)
will offer a major advantage. These vessels can perform an extensive range
of functions, from mine and submarine detection to the employment of various
types of EW measures even in remote areas of the battleground. That will be
a part of the future battleground."

What is the current status of the Barak-8, the state-of-the-art naval
defense missile system?

"We are, in fact, engaged in a sort of converging effort in the development
process, in preparation for a trial scheduled for late November or early
December. It will be the first launch from a naval vessel and in fact the
one before last trial prior to the process of making the system operational.
The specific scenario will simulate an aerial vehicle which could be an
Ababil (the Iranian-made UAV available to Hezbollah – O.H.). It will be
detected by the system, tracked, incriminated, the logic of the weapon
systems will be checked and eventually the target will be destroyed by
launching a Barak-8 missile from a naval vessel. This will enable us to
understand the capabilities of the interceptor and what can be achieved with
the missile. If we are called upon to intercept an Ababil UAV or an enemy
aircraft, then this capability will definitely be operational.

"The Barak-8 project encountered difficulties. In fact, the complexity here
pertains to two things. Firstly, there is the technological,
development-related complexity. The technology is mature, but the complexity
stems from the fact that the interceptor can intercept missiles in the
self-defense mode, when employed against shore-to-sea missiles, as well as
to operate as a long-range surface-to-air missile. There is no other
interceptor today that is capable of intercepting such wave-top grazing
shore-to-sea missiles as the Yakhont or the C-802 or C-704, and also capable
of intercepting a Sukhoi fighter aircraft. So, we have the complexity of
this type of interceptor. On the other hand, the development process
involves another country. In this case we have a country like India, and the
cultural-development process is a time-consuming process. Both sides
encounter difficulties and it takes time, too much time for my liking, but I
guess that's life. I estimate that we are currently emerging from the pit we
were in, and all of us are keeping our fingers crossed that the trial in
November is actually executed as planned, that it will accomplish its
objectives and set this train back on the track.”

What do you currently have on your desk as Head of the Navy's Combat Systems
Department?

"I think that the connectivity and network-centric operation of all of the
branches of the IDF, intended to enable the closure of fire circles and see
one another's targets is a capability we are working on very intensively
with the other service branches, and the element that stands behind those
systems is our human capital."