The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): Enhancing its Confidence-Building
Role
INSS Insight No. 796, February 11, 2016
Emily B. Landau
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11437
SUMMARY: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an international arms
control treaty that is little known in Israel, even though – in an important
step in support of the global arms control regime – Israel signed the treaty
in September 1996, one day after it was opened for signature. However,
Israel has so far withheld its ratification of the treaty, presumably
concerned with regional dynamics, with both Egypt and Iran presenting
obstacles. However, regional discussions on a Nuclear Test Free Zone (NTFZ)
could perhaps be set up in parallel to efforts to have the relevant states
ratify the treaty. The value of initiating discussion of an NTFZ is in
encouraging a regional approach to the disarmament issues that are at the
heart of the relevant treaties, and thinking about regional trust-building
mechanisms.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an international arms control
treaty that is little known in Israel, even though – in an important step in
support of the global arms control regime – Israel signed the treaty in
September 1996, one day after it was opened for signature. Yet as is the
case with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that it signed in 1993,
Israel has so far withheld its ratification of the treaty. On the occasion
of the April 2015 visit to Israel by Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of
the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Organization, (CTBTO), Minister Yuval Steinitz noted that Israel's basic
intention is to ratify the treaty, the question being when.
Inspectors from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
organisation take part in the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14)
operation held in Jordan near the Dead Sea on November 16, 2014. AFP PHOTO /
KHALIL MAZRAAWI
Israel also supports a moratorium on nuclear testing until the treaty
enters into force, and its overall approach to the treaty and the CTBTO has
been very positive, with good cooperation with the organization over the
past 20 years. Significantly, as part of the CTBTO monitoring system, Israel
hosts two auxiliary seismic stations – in Eilat and Mount Meron – and one
radionuclide laboratory at the Sorek Nuclear Research Center. In 2004 Israel
signed a Facility Agreement with the CTBTO to address issues relating to the
monitoring stations, and this agreement entered into force in February 2014.
Discussion of the CTBT in Israel takes place almost exclusively in official
circles, and has only rare and sporadic appearances in the media and/or
public debate. This is most likely not a consequence of Israel's policy of
ambiguity in the nuclear realm, because other aspects of Israel's nuclear
posture and policy have been debated quite openly in the public sphere for
at least 20 years. It is rather more likely attributable to the fact that
nuclear testing seems distant and removed from Israel's ongoing security
calculations and concerns, and is therefore not likely to find its way onto
Israel's crowded security agenda, where so many pressing issues compete for
attention.
To mark the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, the CTBTO in late January organized a week-long symposium in Vienna
entitled "Science and Diplomacy for Peace and Security," which focused on
the current status of the CTBT, its achievements, and the challenges it
still faces regarding entry into force. The conference was an important
opportunity to assess how the different states view the question of the
treaty's ratification and entry into force.
In her presentation in Vienna, Israel's ambassador to the IAEA and CTBTO,
Merav Zafary-Odiz, did not focus on Israel's calculations vis-à-vis
ratification, and instead emphasized the important confidence-building role
that the CTBT already plays, before entry into force, due to the
verification regime that is being established. The International Monitoring
System (IMS) consists of monitoring facilities all over the world, to
monitor for nuclear explosions, and 90 percent of the facilities – including
in Israel – are already up and running. Once the CTBT enters into force, the
treaty will also rely on On-Site Inspections (OSI), and exercises in on-site
monitoring are already underway in order to prepare for the day the treaty
enters into force. Moreover, an International Data Center was set up in
Vienna, where data from the monitoring stations across the globe are
processed and distributed to the CTBTO member states. Zafary-Odiz noted that
the sharing of technical data from the monitoring stations and participation
in OSI exercises are signs of positive cooperation generated by the treaty.
Israel's concerns regarding ratification seem to be rooted in regional
dynamics, with both Egypt and Iran presenting obstacles. Generally speaking,
Israel loses trust in the effectiveness of international treaties when it
sees states in the Middle East join such treaties – like the NPT – only to
later cheat on them, creating a serious trust-deficit in the region.
Moreover, regarding the CTBT specifically, in order to have the full
confidence-building effect of the treaty in the Middle East, all the
necessary stations must be built and begin to transfer data. Egypt's
unwillingness to have a monitoring station set up on its territory is to the
detriment of this role of the treaty. Moreover, Egyptian insistence on
linking the CTBT to Israel joining the NPT is unfortunate, and a clear
non-starter for Israel.
The one aspect of nuclear testing that could elicit more attention in Israel
is in connection to Iran. As Zafary-Odiz observed in her presentation on the
treaty's entry into force, "ratification of the CTBT by Iran was natural to
be included in the JCPOA, as it's another way to build the confidence of the
international community in the supposedly peaceful nature of the Iranian
nuclear program." It remains an open question why Iran was not required to
ratify the test ban treaty, especially as Iran insists it is a member in
good standing of the NPT and has no intention of ever working on a military
nuclear capability. Having not ratified the treaty itself, however, the US
was not in the best position to demand this in the negotiation.
On the occasion of the Vienna conference, Executive Secretary Zerbo
reportedly suggested that if Israel and Iran were to decide together to
ratify the CTBT, this might jumpstart the process of ratification in Egypt
as well, and pave the road for creating a Nuclear Test Free Zone in the
Middle East. While such a joint decision to ratify is unrealistic,
especially when the Iranians at the CTBTO won't even recognize Israel, the
idea of a Nuclear Test Free Zone (NTFZ) in the Middle East is worth
considering.
In suggesting a regional structure, Zerbo seemed to be taking his cue from
other regional initiatives, like Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and the idea to
hold a conference on a WMDFZ for the Middle East. Moreover, he evidently
envisions ratification of the CTBT as an essential first step to creating
such a zone.
But this is not the only way to think about the zone idea. Indeed, building
on the confidence-building aspect of the CTBTO, regional discussions could
perhaps be set up in parallel to efforts to have the relevant states ratify
the treaty. After Assad used chemical weapons against his own population,
killing hundreds of civilians in August 2013, some raised the idea of
leveraging Syria’s subsequent joining of the CWC as a platform for
initiating regional discussion on a Chemical Weapons Free Zone (CWFZ) with
an eye to encouraging both Israel and Egypt to join. The value of initiating
discussion of a CWFZ or a NTFZ is in encouraging a regional approach to the
disarmament issues that are at the heart of the relevant treaties, and
thinking about regional trust-building mechanisms. This is an idea that
could resonate with those interested in exploring new areas for regional
security dialogue in the Middle East, perhaps beginning at the unofficial
Track II level.
|
