Between Paris and Cairo: Balancing Security and Diplomacy
By Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman, May 31, 2016
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 342, May 31, 2016

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The measured Israeli reaction to the latest flurry of
problematic diplomatic activity reflects Jerusalem’s more central security
imperatives, as well as its newly-discovered sense of being a significant
regional player rather than a besieged small state in a hostile sea.

The loss of EgyptAir 804 on its way from Paris to Cairo – suspected to be an
act of terror – happened to coincide with efforts by both France and Egypt
to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. No causal connection should
be imputed. But for both countries, their perceptions of broad regional
security considerations play a significant role in driving their diplomatic
initiatives. That insight should, and apparently does, inform Israeli policy
responses.

Policymakers in Israel have ample reason to be apprehensive about French
peace initiatives. For many reasons, most notably the pressure exerted by a
large and vocal Muslim minority, French leaders have shown themselves ever
more eager to endorse schemes in support of Palestinian demands. At moments
of crisis, such as the internal EU debates during the Gaza fighting in 2014,
it was France that took the lead in driving through to EU endorsement a
position on permanent status that reflected Arab demands on borders,
Jerusalem, and the interpretation of UN resolutions. This drive to impose
"parameters" is inimical to Israeli interests.

France is planning to convene a conference on the Middle East peace process
in Paris on June 3, to be attended by assorted international and regional
players – though not by the protagonists themselves. Israeli reactions to
this initiative have been subdued, and recent visits to Jerusalem by the
French prime minister and foreign minister were amicable. To account for
this, it is necessary to take a broader look at regional dynamics and at
French policy responses, which tend to align closely with Israeli positions
on the issue that truly matters: the need to face up to the threat posed by
radical Islamist totalitarianism.

On more than one occasion, French positions and actions on this subject have
been more reassuring from an Israeli point of view than those of our
American ally. For example, France served as the hard-line anchor of the
P5+1 (or, as they prefer to count it, the E3+3). It was France that raised
questions about reliability and implementation (even as it was French
business interests that were among the first to bang on Tehran's doors).

In terms of action against Islamist terror groups, French forces have done
more than most, including a dramatic campaign in Mali. Equally important is
the French reluctance to buy into the illusion that the Muslim Brotherhood
could be a stabilizing partner, as well as the ongoing relationship between
France and the current regime in Egypt.

It is against this background that Israeli leadership has taken a cautious
line in response to the French peace initiative. Israel did make the point
repeatedly that the French initiative would prove counterproductive, insofar
as it would move Palestinian leadership even further away from compromise at
the negotiating table. But the point was not made aggressively, and French
motives and friendship with Israel were never subject to question. The
tempered Israeli response reflects, above all the importance of broader
regional imperatives in Israel's current diplomatic calculations.

The same applies to Egypt, which on May 28 led the Arab League in endorsing
the French initiative. From an Israeli perspective, there is little in
recent history to commend Egyptian intervention in the Palestinian
negotiations. Citing their "expertise" (khibra) in diplomacy with Israel,
Egyptians have all too often helped harden Palestinian positions and
demands. Egypt’s role in the last territorial adjustment, the Hebron
Agreement of 1997, was so problematic that King Hussein of Jordan had to be
pulled in to mitigate the consequences of its involvement.

However times change. The regional realities in 2016 have generated a very
different relationship between Israel and Egypt. The countries both face the
same threats to their security – Iran, IS, and the Muslim Brotherhood – even
if the Egyptian order of priorities is the reverse of the Israeli. The level
of security cooperation is unprecedented, and President Abd al-Fattah
al-Sisi has said so explicitly to foreign visitors.

Energetic cooperation, including economic, is within reach, particularly in
view of the easing of friction following the December 2015 release of
Israeli Beduin Odeh Tarabin after a long and unjustified incarceration.
Egyptian forces have acted vigorously in Sinai and have executed a
systematic campaign to eradicate the tunnel system supplying Gaza, operating
well above treaty specifications and with Israel’s explicit consent. Those
forces have become an important part of Israel's security equation in the
south.

In this context, it is easier to understand why Egypt's recent forays into
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process have been greeted warmly by Israel.
Sisi went so far, in a speech on May 17, as to openly intervene in Israeli
politics, calling (upon request?) for the center-left to join a broad unity
government. This move generated a strikingly positive response in Jerusalem.
In explaining the choices he made in his recent cabinet reshuffle, Netanyahu
spoke of intensive efforts underway for some time to revive peace efforts
with the help of key regional players. This was a thinly veiled reference to
Sisi, and probably also to the Saudis, whose close association with Sisi was
recently cemented by the Egyptian decision to return the Tiran and Sanafir
islands to Saudi sovereignty.

In short, the measured Israeli reaction to the latest flurry of diplomatic
activity reflects its security imperatives, as well as its newly discovered
sense of being a significant regional player rather than a besieged small
state in a hostile sea.

As to the forthcoming peace conference, there is little reason to be
sanguine. As expected, Palestinian positions have been hardening in response
to the diplomatic effort (and to what Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas views as cleavages within Israeli society, as his latest
speech at the Arab League indicates).

The concept of compromise, raised once again by John Kerry in recent weeks,
remains alien to Abbas’s negotiating posture. Hence, Abbas’ rejection of any
recognition of Israel's identity as the embodiment of the right of the
Jewish people to self-determination, and of any interim step short of "a
Palestinian state on all of the land taken in 1967 with its capital in
Jerusalem".

However, the true interests of France (and other Europeans) and Egypt (with
her regional allies and sponsors) are not necessarily focused, at this
stage, on permanent status. They are more interested in a practical
mechanism that might engender eventual progress, as well as a sense of
movement that will sap energy from the prevailing hostility and reduce the
prospect of escalating violence.

Their broader agenda requires that regional and international attention not
be diverted by Israeli-Palestinian violence, which always commands intense
media coverage and prompts disproportionate emotional reactions. On this
point, Jerusalem is in agreement with Paris and Cairo, and is therefore more
willing to seek ways to work around their diplomatic positions rather than
confront them directly.

Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman is a senior research associate at the BESA
Center, and former deputy for foreign policy and international affairs at
the National Security Council.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
Greg Rosshandler Family