The Defense Minister’s Plan: One Hand Gives, the Other Topples
INSS Insight No. 849, August 25, 2016
Kobi Michael, Udi Dekel
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=12256

SUMMARY: On August 17, 2016, Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman unveiled his
“carrot and stick” plan as a response to the wave of terrorism in the West
Bank. The plan rests on four pillars: (a) a distinction between the
population involved and the population not involved in terrorism; (b)
positive reinforcement for the latter population through infrastructure and
economic development and a generous attitude to work permits in Israel; (c)
sanctions and restrictions in areas from which terrorists set out and where
violent incidents occur; and (d) an appeal to the Palestinian public in the
West Bank, which bypasses the Palestinian Authority instead of using the
existing coordination channels. This latter element constitutes a direct
challenge to the PA and its leadership. However, it is best for the Israeli
government to develop the other components of the “carrot and stick” plan
in order to leverage its economic and infrastructure logic, and translate it
into a plan of action likely to lead to a positive change, including in the
social sphere in the Palestinian arena.

On August 17, 2016, Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman unveiled his “carrot
and stick” plan as a response to the wave of terrorism in the West Bank. The
plan, which reflects the outline of a new policy he seeks to implement,
rests on four pillars: (a) a distinction between the population involved and
the population not involved in terrorism; (b) positive reinforcement for the
latter population through infrastructure and economic development and a
generous attitude to work permits in Israel; (c) sanctions and restrictions
in areas from which terrorists set out and where violent incidents occur;
and (d) an appeal to the Palestinian public in the West Bank, which bypasses
the Palestinian Authority, instead of using the existing coordination
channels – the mechanism for civilian coordination and the PA Ministry of
Civil Affairs. Liberman also declared his intention of conducting a dialogue
with academics, artists, and other powerful and influential parties in the
territories, and of establishing a special website for dialogue with
Palestinian society in general.

The underlying logic in the plan, namely, the distinction between different
population groups and measures to improve the Palestinian economy, is not
new; it is based on the defense establishment’s policy, as designed and
formulated during the term of former Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon.
It appears that Liberman has likewise accepted the defense establishment’s
policy on the importance of increasing the number of work permits in Israel
and avoiding harm to the daily life of the population not involved in
terrorism and violence, as these measures help restrain violence. At the
same time, Liberman’s plan is new in two respects: Israeli willingness to
allocate land in Area C for economic and infrastructure development for the
Palestinians, and the intention to bypass the PA for the purpose of dialogue
with other powerful and influential parties in the territories, including
through the designated website.

Israeli willingness to allocate land in Area C for Palestinian development
is an important precedent that also establishes a possible basis for
progress in the political process or continuation of Israeli measures that
will maintain the possibility of a two-state solution once the conditions
are ripe. Steps toward development can contribute to the emergence of a new
regional dynamic if players from the Arab world and the international
community can be persuaded to lend a hand. It is likely, however, that the
regional and international parties will not cooperate with measures by the
Israeli government designed to bypass the PA and signal that Israel is
preparing for a period of stagnation in the political process.

In fact, refining the idea to include a distinction between different
development sections of Area C adjacent to Area A is likely to hasten
substantial PA economic and infrastructure development, materially improve
quality of life in the territories and the welfare of the Palestinian
population, and strengthen the factors restraining terrorism and violence.
For example, development areas can be defined  for tourism (e.g., the
Jericho area), agricultural ventures, water and energy infrastructure (solar
thermal collectors farms, for example), and industrial zones. It is
preferable to consult with the PA in this regard concerning its economic
initiatives and priorities. Moreover, a systematic approach and allocation
of land in Area C for Palestinian development is likely to be interpreted by
the international community as a positive signal from Israel, and reduce
disputes between Israel and the international community in relation to
project initiatives in these areas. It is not clear whether Israel
considered the consequences of the move vis-à-vis pressure to return to the
political process with the Palestinians.

On the other hand, Minister Liberman’s public statement concerning his
intention to conduct a dialogue with Palestinian groups that are not part of
the PA, and not through the PA, constitutes a direct challenge to the PA and
its leadership. This intention reflects the Defense Minister’s absolute loss
of hope in the PA, and especially its leader, and perhaps also skepticism as
to its long term survival. Furthermore, it reflects Liberman’s previous
statements citing PA President Mahmoud Abbas as an obstacle and as part of
the problem, not the solution.

Anticipating this criticism, Liberman cited the Facebook page of the IDF
Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories as an example of
queries by Palestinian residents addressed to the Israeli authorities that
bypass the PA. Indeed, a query by Palestinian residents, and by economic
entities, addressed directly to the civil administration in the West Bank is
a common occurrence, particularly among businessmen and heads of local
authorities having daily needs in this context, and occurs with the PA’s
knowledge. At the same time, President Abbas and senior parties on the
Palestinian side are worried about channels of political dialogue that
bypass the PA, and do not intend to allow independent initiatives that skirt
the PA mandate. Indeed, Abbas’s senior advisers responded immediately to
Minister Liberman’s statements by warning against deviation by Palestinian
individuals or groups from the national line, and against coordination with
Israel other than through the PA.

Against the background, there are increasing reports of the PA’s difficulty
in enforcing its control over violent groups, criminal gangs, and Tanzim
groups in municipal centers, refugee camps, and rural areas in the West
Bank. At the same time, the influence of prominent Palestinian clans and
families in making decisions pertaining to the management of the local
communities has grown, coupled with less dependence on the PA and the PA’s
reduced influence on daily life. These trends weaken the PA and undermine
any proper foundation for convening a responsible, stable, and functional
Palestinian government, which is an Israeli interest as well. It follows
that Minister Liberman’s plan to introduce channels of dialogue that bypass
the PA reinforces the current trend of undermining PA governance. Therefore,
even if it is desirable to develop channels of communication with
influential parties in the PA other than through the PA, from Israel’s
perspective, it is not correct to declare this publicly, because such a
declaration in effect prevents any real possibility of dialogue with
influential parties; such a dialogue will be considered subversion of the
PA. In addition, Israel is liable to arouse opposition from the
international community, which regards the PA as the sole legitimate
address, and suspects that Israel has no real intention of achieving a
two-state solution. In this context, if Israel acts to undermine the PA and
its influence on the Palestinian population, it will simply play into the
hands of those seeking to delegitimize Israel.

Furthermore, the declared intention to bypass the PA is liable to strengthen
groups in the PA opposed to coexistence with Israel, and is liable to
complicate the implementation of Israel’s other intentions involving
economic and infrastructure development. A declaration concerning allocation
of land in Area C for Palestinian development is liable to be interpreted as
one more element in a grand design aimed at causing the collapse of the PA.
It also invites criticism of Israel by those who regard its policy as aiming
to create a situation in which it can proclaim publicly that there is no
Palestinian partner, because it is difficult to believe that such a
declaration will promote dialogue with parties outside the PA. Such parties
will be perceived as traitors, certainly by the PA. It is therefore unclear
what benefit Minister Liberman seeks to achieve through this declaration.

The Liberman plan can be interpreted as a reflection of the intention by the
Israeli government, or parts of it, to cause the collapse of the PA, without
Israel being directly blamed for this process. Since the declaration has
already been made, the Israeli government needs to make it clear, mainly to
the Israeli public, whether it is indeed acting, even if indirectly, to
cause the PA’s collapse, or whether it regards the PA as the Palestinian
partner for settling or managing the conflict.

In any event, it is best for the Israeli government to develop the other
components of Minister Liberman’s “carrot and stick” plan in order to
leverage its economic and infrastructure logic, and translate it into a plan
of action likely to lead to a positive change, including in the social
sphere in the Palestinian arena, and hope for the resumption of political
negotiations.