[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: A series of unexpected technical staff cuts also
sent a clear message that opting for a military career also carries with it
employment risks - with the possibility of having a challenging time finding
a civilian job that could value the military specific knowledge.]
The Great IDF Captains Crisis
The regular (permanent) service cadre of IDF is currently undergoing one of
the most severe crises in its history. At the same time, the IDF conducts a
training exercise and issues a massive technological tender. All in Amir
Rapaport's weekly column
Amir Rapaport | 22/09/2016
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/great-idf-captains-crisis

It is one of the most troubling issues as far as the Israeli defense
establishment is concerned, but no one will speak about it publicly: the
regular (permanent) service cadre of IDF is currently undergoing one of the
most severe crises in its history. Some of the indications of this crisis:
IDF seem unable to staff numerous positions normally staffed by officers at
captain's rank, and the quality of regular (permanent) service individuals
is declining alarmingly.

Assuming this trend continues, the characteristics of the IDF regular
service cadre will become similar to those of the Israel Prison Service, the
National Firefighting Service and the Israel Police.

As IDF normally pump the media with self-flattering information, talk about
the severe regular (permanent) service crisis is only heard behind closed
doors. The defense establishment is currently speaking, first and foremost,
about a 'Captains' Crisis', as the 'flight' from regular service is
reflected primarily among officers who complete their initial obligatory
regular service term and rush to civilian life.

In the past, IDF knew how to keep a major share of their outstanding young
officers in service, using lucrative wage and study programs and challenging
jobs, but that is not the situation today.

Naturally, some outstanding officers sign on for regular service, but they
become fewer and fewer. The bottom line: IDF face a shortage of hundreds of
captain rank officers for initial regular service positions, mainly in the
technological layouts. The situation is so grave that even at the cutting
edge of defense technology, MAFAT (IMOD's Weapon System & Technological
Infrastructure Research & Development Administration), many positions remain
open.

Most of the positions in the combat and logistic units of IDF are staffed,
but not with the first choice of officers IDF would have liked, not even
with the second choice.

In the past, IDF have already experienced quite a few crisis situations with
regard to the regular service cadre (the most severe crisis developed after
the First Lebanon War, when poor wages and a flawed public image discouraged
prospective regular service personnel from remaining in service). It took
the IDF many years to repair the damage sustained in the years 1983–1985.
Among other things, officers who began returning to service were treated to
meteoric promotion at the expense of professionalism. In that period,
officers were appointed to battalion commander positions at the ripe old age
of 27.

The first indications of the present crisis started emerging after the
Second Lebanon War, but recently the situation has deteriorated into a
full-blown avalanche. Apart from the grave shortage of captain rank officers
at key positions, anyone who has been monitoring IDF for any length of time
can get the impression that the quality of the regular service personnel is
on the decline. Professionals within the defense establishment say that the
data are misleading: the grades awarded to regular service personnel in
their periodic feedback and pre-promotion evaluations are relative, so the
average will always remain the same.

Nevertheless, one bit of information has been repeating itself in recent
years and causing serious concern among the top echelons of IDF: responding
to the questionnaires of the IDF Behavioral Sciences Department, many
regular servicemen state that they are looking for a job in civilian life
while still serving in IDF. In fact, anyone who finds a decent job – leaves
IDF. Today, it is relatively easy to leave at the age of 24–25. As the
pension is funded rather than unfunded, the officers can take the privileges
and benefits they had accumulated with them when they leave.

One of the causes of the "Captains' Crisis", mainly in the technological
layouts of IDF, has to do with the tempting wage offers in civilian life,
which normally include a company car, as the high-tech market is
flourishing.

But, according to Col. (res.) Eyal Efrati, that is not the primary cause.
Efrati had served as head of MAMDA, the IDF Behavioral Sciences Department,
and today provides personnel selection services to most of the civilian
security agencies.

"The situation is not about to change as long as regular service individuals
at the age of 22-23 feel ashamed to wear their IDF uniforms in public in the
civilian environment. The public image of the regular service is at an
all-time low, not just because of the severe verbal attacks by Ministry of
Finance officials.

"The problem is much more profound and stems from a profound change within
Israeli society, as today, the Jewish mother does not really want her
talented child to serve in IDF. The contract between Israeli society and the
regular servicemen was violated, which will affect the quality of the
regular (permanent) service cadre of IDF. This situation seems inevitable
and its implications will be dramatic.

"It is important to understand that IDF will always manage to staff the
positions of senior officers at major-general, brigadier-general and colonel
rank with talented individuals, as these appointments involve a small number
of people, and some population groups will continue to exist for whom
regular service offers a tremendous opportunity for social mobility, but
within the wider ranks of the military, the change is dramatic and the
picture is alarming. We will not be able to maintain the miracle of the
high-quality manpower of IDF."

The Training Exercise and What it means

The announcement by the IDF Spokesperson last Wednesday reported "the
conclusion of an IDF GHQ training exercise intended to improve the
preparedness of IDF for emergencies."

According to the announcement, a GHQ training exercise was conducted earlier
this week with the intention of improving the competence of the IDF General
Staff and its ability to command and conduct a confrontation involving a
multiple-theater scenario. The exercise was conducted under the leadership
of Maj. Gen. Shlomo (Sammy) Turjeman. In the context of the four-day
exercise, the senior command echelons of IDF addressed various issues and
practiced various scenarios that simulated the threats expected in a wartime
situation.

The exercise was intended to verify the competence and preparedness of the
various IDF layouts and organs in all of the sectors, including the regional
commands, the IDF Home Front Command, the Operations, Intelligence,
Logistics and C4I Directorates and the sea, air and land arms. It was
further reported that the exercise had been planned well in advance as part
of the training activity program for 2016, and that its objective was to
improve the preparedness of IDF for emergencies.

Now, here is something that is somewhat less obvious than the official
announcement: this was one of the most important training exercises IDF
conducted in many years. During the exercise, significant changes in the
IDF's methods of operation and operational concepts were put to the test.
Among other things, the objective was to enhance the lethality of IDF
strikes and improve the effectiveness of the solution for the missile threat
in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon (beyond interception by the Iron Dome
system). For obvious reasons, we are unable to elaborate on those new
concepts. The process of drawing lessons from this massive exercise will
take months to complete.

The Technological Tender

One of the most significant events of this week was the tender issued by
IMOD for the massive project of relocating the information systems of the
giant technological bases of IDF from the central region to the Negev.

This project involves the relocation of the bases of the IDF C4I Directorate
initially, and the prestigious bases of the IDF Intelligence Directorate
immediately thereafter.

The issuance of this tender, for which the world's leading corporations are
expected to bid, has been delayed for a while for various reasons. In the
last few months, the delay was the result of an argument between the IAF,
the IDF C4I Directorate and the IDF Intelligence Directorate as to which
organ would bear the cost of 200 million ILS associated with the project.
The argument has been settled just recently, by way of a compromise.

With the issuance of the tender, the major bidders appear to be Rafael, IAI,
and Bynet. Many other companies are involved in the bidding, hoping to land
this billion-dollar budget.

The tender issued draws the deadline for the completion of the process of
relocating the giant bases to the Negev in the years 2021-2022.