Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:
1. Why does it serve our interests to contribute to the instability of our
moderate-Arab "allies" by having them in any way associated with
Israeli-Palestinian relations? Let's leave the cameras at home and continue
working together in the spheres in which we share a strategic interest.
2. Why suggest throwing a bone to the world with a selective freeze when the
Obama White House considered building a porch in the Jewish Quarter of the
Old City in Jerusalem to be as bad as a house in the most remote settlement?
3. A two-sovereign state solution solution is only viable when it does not
hinge on Palestinian compliance with the terms of the "solution" - this
since once a sovereign Palestinian state actually comes into existence its
continued existence is independent of if it honors its commitments!
3.1 So we are talking about conditions that cannot be expected to develop
within anyone's planning horizon.
3.2 We need a program that is relevant for the planning horizon:
3.2.1 Palestinian autonomy with maximum autonomy possible that does not
facilitate unilateral sovereignty.
3.2.1.1 It must be land-locked within Israel with all gateways from the West
Bank to the outside world Israeli territory.
3.2.2 Israeli sovereignty extended to Area C+ with full citizenship to Arabs
in Area C+
3.2.1.1 Israeli sovereignty assures the exercise of full citizenship rights
of both Jews and Arabs in Area C+, with an end to restrictions on
construction and development.

Security Council Resolution 2334 and a Strategy for Israel
Amos Yadlin INSS Insight No. 881, December 27, 2016
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=12729

SUMMARY: Security Council Resolution 2334 is a harsh finale to eight years
of a frozen political process between Israel and the Palestinians. Extremely
problematic for Israel and the peace process alike, the resolution is the
outcome of a Palestinian strategy that prefers to contend with Israel in
international institutions rather than through negotiations, and problematic
policies and behavior by both the Obama administration and the Netanyahu
government. The two leaders have awarded the Palestinians a diplomatic
prize, and the Palestinians were thus relieved of any responsibility for the
stalemate in the peace process while receiving a hefty political bonus from
the international community. With the new US administration, Israel
would do well to prove its commitment to the future viability of two states,
by implementing actions to generate changes to current trends. Israel can
initiate actions that encourage the construction of functional Palestinian
institutions and the expansion of Palestinian self-governance, toward the
establishment of a stable Palestinian economic system and the construction
of infrastructure enabling free movement – all these as a foundation for a
Palestinian state, once the conditions for its establishment materialize.

Obama and Netanyahu Reward the Palestinians

Security Council Resolution 2334 is a harsh finale to eight years of a
frozen political process between Israel and the Palestinians. It is the
outcome of a Palestinian strategy that prefers to contend with Israel in
international institutions rather than through negotiations, and problematic
policies and behavior by both the Obama administration and the Netanyahu
government. This Security Council resolution brings the peace process, which
aspires to a two-state solution, to its lowest point since 2008. President
Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu have brought on a severe political
avalanche and a resolution that is extremely problematic for Israel and the
peace process alike. Obama, in a severe anti-Israeli move, harmed the United
States’ staunchest ally in the Middle East, while Netanyahu clung to his
shortsighted approach to the US administration. As a result, at the end of
2016, together they awarded the Palestinians a diplomatic prize, and the
Palestinians were thus relieved of any responsibility for the stalemate in
the peace process while receiving a hefty political bonus from the
international community.


Israel is paying for Netanyahu’s problematic and erroneous reading of the
American and global system in recent years. Netanyahu pinned his hopes on
Congress – the same Congress that according to the American constitution
could not prevent a nuclear agreement with Iran or impose a veto in the
Security Council. The Prime Minister was reluctant to differentiate the
isolated Jewish settlements in the West Bank from the settlement blocs and
Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. However, a tacit understanding about
a freeze on construction east of the security barrier would have made it
difficult for Obama to abstain in face of a UN proposal that is detrimental
for Israel. Instead, the conduct of the Israeli government regarding the
settlement regulation bill; the delay in evacuating Amona; and assertions of
a right to annex Area C were all key factors that pushed the Obama
administration to abstain from imposing a veto on the problematic proposed
resolution. The incongruence between Netanyahu’s speech before the General
Assembly this past September about his vision of "an end to the automatic
majority against Israel in the United Nations," and the sweeping vote
against Israel on December 23, 2016 attests to the Prime Minister’s
incorrect reading of the international reality. This faulty understanding is
particularly noteworthy given that the resolution cannot be dismissed as a
United Nations anti-Israel reflex, but is rather a sweeping vote by all of
Israel’s closest friends – including its newest “ally,” Russia.

The mirror image of Netanyahu’s incorrect take on the situation is the Obama
administration’s lapsed reading of Israeli public opinion and the Israeli
political system, as well as the administration’s failure to examine the
validity of its basic assumptions about promoting a solution to the dispute.
The Obama administration’s inability to discern that there is a solid
consensus in Israel in support of the settlement blocs and the Jewish
neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and that the Israeli public is not prepared
to incur the same kinds of security risks that it had assumed in the past,
lay at the heart of the attempt to undermine Netanyahu – which ultimately
achieved the opposite result. Furthermore, the Obama’s disregard of Bush’s
letter to Sharon of April 2004 and of the Clinton parameters, which
recognized that the settlement blocs would be in Israeli territory, aroused
much suspicion in Israel regarding the Obama administration and its
intentions. Ascribing most of the blame for the lack of progress toward a
two-state solution to Israel and dwelling on the issue of the settlements,
while ignoring the major contribution of the Palestinians to the impasse in
the political process (the Palestinians are the party that did not accept
the principles of the framework agreement drafted by Secretary of State John
Kerry) – all these severely impeded the ability of the administration to
promote the peace process. With this action by the Security Council, the
Obama administration “concluded” a problematic legacy of failures in the
Middle East, including its standoff position to the destruction in Syria;
the inability to defeat the Islamic State; the creation of a vacuum in the
region that enabled Russia and Iran to fill the void; and a series of crises
of trust between the administration and its allies in the region.

By not casing a veto, the Obama administration awarded a highly valuable
prize to the Palestinians for their refusal to engage in direct negotiations
with Israel and severely undermined the chances that the bilateral
negotiations between the parties would resume any time in the foreseeable
future. The Palestinians cannot allow themselves either to present a more
moderate stance than that of the Security Council or to question that the
response to their demands will come from the UN rather than through
negotiations with Israel. For its part, Israel cannot sit down at the
negotiating table under conditions of a predefined demarcation of the
borders of the future Palestinian state. Instead of withdrawing from areas
to “secure and recognized boundaries,” as per Resolution 242, Israel will
have the 1967 boundaries, including in East Jerusalem, as its starting
point. Reflecting the rift between the Israeli government and the White
House, the Obama administration made no effort to coordinate its positions
with Israel or try to soften Resolution 2334 and thereby neutralize the
inherent obstacles in the resolution to renewed negotiations and achievement
of a two-state solution.

Threats to Israel Posed by Resolution 2334

1. In terms of Israel, the approach underlying Resolution 2334, whereby
“the Western Wall is tantamount to the Yitzhar settlement,” or “the Ramot
neighborhood in Jerusalem is equivalent to the settlement of Elon Moreh,”
eliminates any chances of negotiations toward a two-state arrangement.

2. The resolution rewards Palestinian obduracy, the Palestinian strategy of
avoiding negotiations with Israel, and the expectation that the
international arena will dictate the parameters for the arrangement.
Therefore, the resolution will encourage the Palestinians to adhere to their
refusal to return to the negotiating table and exhibit the flexibility
required in any genuine negotiation.

3. The resolution increased the risk of Israelis at certain political and
military echelons being brought to trial before the International Criminal
Court in The Hague. It will be difficult to conduct peace negotiations in an
atmosphere of “a legal witch hunt” of Israeli leaders and commanders.

4. The delegitimization movement and the boycott of Israel will become
stronger and receive moral and political encouragement, which can be
translated into legal, political, public, and economic measures.

5. The resolution places the Israeli issue as a bone of contention
between American Democrats and Republicans and threatens America’s
longstanding bipartisan support of Israel.

6. The resolution damages Israeli deterrence, since a significant portion
thereof is based on the strategic alliance with the United States and its
support of Israel.

7. The report on issues referred to in the resolution, which the UN
Secretary-General is requested to release every three months, will guarantee
constant preoccupation with these topics at the expense of more important
issues and will nourish an ongoing anti-Israeli campaign.

At the same time, Resolution 2334 was not passed pursuant to Chapter 7 of
the United Nations Charter, and, therefore does not allow the UN to impose
sanctions and other practical measures against Israel without a further
resolution. One can assess that the new administration in the United States,
which is more sympathetic toward Israel than the Obama administration, will
veto any attempt to pass resolutions pursuant to Chapter 7.

What Should Israel Do?

In the final days of 2016, it is more important to look ahead than to engage
in a retrospective analysis of the events that led to Resolution 2334.
Preparations must be made with the aims of minimizing the negative impact of
this resolution and formulating a more suitable policy for Israel,
considering the difficult political situation that the resolution has
created.

In the short term, feelings of anger, insult, betrayal, and rage, even if
understandable, are not a proper foundation for a judicious, effective
policy. Even if it is important to exact a price from the Palestinian
Authority (which initiated the effort towards this resolution) the Israeli
reaction should be put on hold until January 20, 2017, when President Donald
Trump enters the White House. Broad annexation of Palestinian territories
would not be wise in any case, and would be a mistake that would deepen
Israel’s isolation, or lead to more severe measures against it. Similarly,
political and diplomatic responses should be suspended until after the Trump
inauguration. Extreme measures are detrimental and work solely to intensify
Israel’s political isolation. Thus, the Prime Minister’s attack against the
states that supported the resolution is a rash and unnecessary response. It
is hardly in Israel’s interest to cultivate any “self-inflicted BDS,” which
ironically would be far more effective than any activity undertaken to date
by the BDS movement. On the other hand, strengthening the neighborhoods in
Jerusalem and the settlement blocs, encouraging the relocation of the US
embassy to Jerusalem, and gaining recognition of the current status of the
Golan Heights may be courses of action that Israel could coordinate with the
incoming Trump administration.


Three assumptions should underlie Israel’s long term strategy:

1. The Trump administration will be far friendlier toward Israel, and it
will be possible to reach understandings with it that were rejected
consistently by the Obama administration.

2. Any return to the negotiating table is impossible due to Palestinian
obstinacy – particularly since the drafting of a comprehensive final
agreement was not feasible until now (not with the Palestinian Authority and
certainly not with Hamas) – and this will be even more difficult to achieve,
now that Resolution 2334 has been passed. The resolution can be expected to
radicalize the Palestinians’ positions further and bolster the Israeli
public consensus about the need to strengthen the Jewish neighborhoods in
Jerusalem and in the settlement blocs.

3. However, the status quo is not good for Israel, and a change must be
initiated that will preserve the feasibility of a two-state solution, but
will lead to it in a manner that is viable under the current circumstances.
Israel must proceed toward separation from the Palestinians in a controlled,
cautious, and patient manner that will protect its interests as a
democratic, safe, and just Jewish state and will restore its political and
ethical standing in the world.

Building on these assumptions, it would be advisable for Israel to adopt a
proactive strategy that is based on understandings with the United States.
Israel could present a proposal to the Trump administration for a proactive
Israeli initiative that involves practical actions to shape an improved
reality. Israel must successfully resist the contentions that the
settlements are the obstacle to peace, while differentiating between
settlement blocs and isolated outposts; it is in the latter areas where
construction should be frozen. Taking a broader perspective, it would be
advisable for Israel to prove its commitment to the future viability of two
states, by implementing actions to generate changes in the current trends.
Within this scope, it would be correct for Israel to initiate actions that
encourage the construction of functional Palestinian institutions and the
expansion of Palestinian self-governance, toward the establishment of a
stable Palestinian economic system and the construction of infrastructure
enabling free movement – all these as a foundation for a Palestinian state,
once the conditions for its establishment materialize. It is critical to
gain the support of pragmatic Arab countries in order to realize this
policy, backed and led by the Trump administration. Naturally, such a change
in policy will also have repercussions in the political arena within Israel,
and in this respect, it would be advisable for the Prime Minister to rein in
the extremist tactics of those in the far right camp who have recently
dictated the actions of his government through legislative and policy
measures that are undermine Israel’s standing in the international arena.

The United States is Israel’s most important, and at times, only ally. It is
critical that Israel not allow itself to be dragged into a
Republican-Democratic dispute and that it once again achieve bipartisan
support. It is also important to reestablish trust between the two
countries, and mainly between their leaders – trust that was violated by
both sides during the Obama and Netanyahu tenures. It is necessary to resume
building foundations for special, strong relations between Israel and the
United States, which will guarantee the vital interests of both countries.