Iran Is Progressing Towards Nuclear Weapons Via North Korea
By Lt. Col. (ret.) Dr. Refael Ofek and Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 415, February 28, 2017
https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-progressing-nuclear-weapons-via-north-korea/

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: This analysis argues that Iran is steadily making
progress towards a nuclear weapon and is doing so via North Korea. Iran is
unwilling to submit to a years-long freeze of its military nuclear program
as stipulated by the July 2015 Vienna Nuclear Deal. North Korea is ready and
able to provide a clandestine means of circumventing the deal, which would
allow the Iranians to covertly advance that nuclear program. At the same
time, Iran is likely assisting in the upgrading of certain North Korean
strategic capacities.

While the Vienna Nuclear Deal (VND) is focused on preventing (or at least
postponing) the development of nuclear weapons (NW) in Iran, its
restrictions are looser with regard to related delivery systems
(particularly nuclear-capable ballistic missiles) as well as to the transfer
of nuclear technology by Iran to other countries. Moreover, almost no limits
have been placed on the enhancement of Tehran's military nuclear program
outside Iran. North Korea (NK) arguably constitutes the ideal such location
for Iran.

The nuclear and ballistic interfaces between the two countries are
long-lasting, unique, and intriguing. The principal difference between the
countries is that while NK probably already possesses NW, Iran aspires to
acquire them but is subject to the VND. Iran has the ability, however, to
contribute significantly to NK’s nuclear program, in terms of both
technology (i.e., by upgrading gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment) and
finance (and there is an irony in this, as it is thanks to its VND-spurred
economic recovery that Iran is able to afford it).

This kind of strategic, military-technological collaboration is more than
merely plausible. It is entirely possible, indeed likely, that such a
collaboration is already underway.

This presumption assumes that Iran is unwilling to lose years to the freeze
on its military nuclear program. It further assumes that NK is ready and
able to furnish a route by which Iran can clandestinely circumvent the VND,
thus allowing it to make concrete progress on its NW program. And finally,
it assumes that the ongoing, rather vague interface between the two
countries reflects Iranian advances towards NW. The following components and
vectors comprise that interface.

From the 1990s onward, dozens – perhaps hundreds – of NK scientists and
technicians apparently worked in Iran in nuclear and ballistic facilities.
Ballistic missile field tests were held in Iran, for instance near Qom,
where the NK missiles Hwasong-6 (originally the Soviet Scud-C, which is
designated in Iran as Shehab-2) and Nodong-1 (designated in Iran as
Shehab-3) were tested. Moreover, in the mid-2000s, the Shehab-3 was
tentatively adjusted by Kamran Daneshjoo, a top Iranian scientist, to carry
a nuclear warhead.

Furthermore, calculations were made that were aimed at miniaturizing a
nuclear implosion device in order to fit its dimensions and weight to the
specifications of the Shehab-3 re-entry vehicle. These, together with
benchmark tests, were conducted in the highly classified facility of
Parchin. Even more significantly, Iranian experts were present at
Punggye-ri, the NK nuclear test site, when such tests were carried out in
the 2000s.

Syria served concurrently as another important platform for Iran – until the
destruction by Israel of the plutonium-based nuclear reactor that had been
constructed in Syria by NK. According to some reports, not only were the
Iranians fully aware of that project in real time, but the project was
heavily financed by Tehran. Considering Iranian interests, it was probably
intended as a backup for the heavy water plutonium production reactor of
Iran’s military nuclear program, and possibly as an alternative to the
Iranian uranium enrichment plant in Natanz in the event that it is
dismantled.

While the Iranian heavy water plutonium production reactor differed from the
NK gas-graphite reactor, the uranium enrichment routes of both countries are
based on the gas centrifuge technique. In that respect, Iran seems to be
ahead of NK, particularly in developing and manufacturing advanced
centrifuges of carbon fiber rotors.

A meaningful event took place in September 2012, when Daneshjoo, then the
Iranian Minister of Science and Technology, signed an agreement with NK
establishing formal cooperation. The agreement formally addressed such civil
applications as “information technology, energy, environment, agriculture
and food”. However, the memorandum of the agreement was ratified by Ali
Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Iranian
Supreme Leader Khamenei has since clarified that the agreement is an
"outcome of the fact that Iran and NK have common enemies, because the
arrogant powers do not accept independent states." It is reasonable to infer
that the agreement went far beyond its alleged civilian sphere.

The September 2012 agreement was probably intended to mask an evolving
Iranian-NK cryptic interface, intended by Iran to compensate technologically
for the following development. About two months earlier, President Obama had
sent this secret message to Iran's leaders: "We are prepared to open a
direct channel to resolve the nuclear agreement if you are prepared to do
the same thing and authorize it at the highest levels and engage in a
serious discussion on these issues." This message paved the way towards
talks that started in Kazakhstan in February 2013, continued through the
November 2013 Geneva and March 2015 Lausanne interim “Framework” agreements,
and culminated in the VND. The final agreement involved freezing substantial
portions of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for largely decreased
economic sanctions on Iran.

In tandem with the 2012-13 events, a permanent offshoot of Iranian missile
experts was established in NK that supported the successful field test of a
long-range ballistic missile in December 2012. Ballistic, or ballistic
together with nuclear warhead capabilities, are presumably included in the
Iranian-NK missile cooperation. Iran and NK upgraded the Shehab-3/Nodong-1
liquid-fueled motor missiles in a quite similar (though not identical)
fashion, with Iran producing the Ghadr (range 1600 km) and Emad (range 1700
km) derivatives. In addition, components of the liquid-fueled motor missile
Musudan (also called the BM-25), which has a range of 2,500-4,000 km and was
successfully field-tested in NK in 2016, have been supplied to Iran in the
past by NK. The more advanced solid-fueled motor technology, which included
the NK KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile and the Iranian Sajjil
missile (range 2,000 km), was apparently developed collaboratively by the
two countries. Also, a new NK ballistic missile test site was revealed in
2016 in Guemchang-ri – and it closely resembles the Iranian ballistic
missile test site near Tabriz.

A delegation of Iranian nuclear experts headed by Mohsen
Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, director of the Iranian NW project, was covertly
present at the third NK nuclear test in February 2013. This test was
apparently based – unlike the previous plutonium-core-based field tests – on
an HEU (highly enriched uranium) core nuclear device (as, presumably, were
the fourth and fifth nuclear tests, which took place in 2016). In 2015,
information exchanges and reciprocal delegation visits reportedly took place
that were aimed at the planning of nuclear warheads. These include four NK
delegations that visited Iran up until June 2015, one month before the VND
was completed. It may be noted that in August 2015, a new gas centrifuge
hall apparently became operational in the NK main uranium enrichment
facility.

Finally, in April 2016, a remarkable clash arose between Deputy Secretary of
State Antony Blinken and Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) during a US House Foreign
Affairs Committee hearing. They locked horns over planes that fly between
Iran and NK, which should land and be rigorously inspected in China so as to
ensure the prevention of NK proliferation of nuclear and missile technology,
let alone actual nuclear weapons, to Iran. Sherman charged that this had not
been handled with sufficient care by the Obama administration.

All in all, a major consequence of the VND is that the Obama administration
shot the US in the foot. It is expected that the terms of the VND and the
abundance of money transacted as a result with Iran – about US$150 billion –
will substantially facilitate the advancement of the NW and ballistic
missile programs of both Iran and NK.

The chronology, contents, and features of the overt interface between Iran
and NK mark an ongoing evolutionary process in terms of weapons technologies
at the highest strategic level. The two countries have followed fairly
similar nuclear and ballistic courses, with considerable, largely intended,
reciprocal technological complementarity. The numerous technological common
denominators that underlie the NW and ballistic missile programs of Iran and
NK cannot be regarded as coincidental. Rather, they likely indicate – in
conjunction with geopolitical and economic drives –a much broader degree of
undisclosed interaction between Tehran and Pyongyang.

The current Iranian-NK interface, which appears to be fully active,
presumably serves as a productive substitute for the Iranian activities
prohibited by the VND. It enables Iran, in other words, to continue its
pursuit of NW. If not strictly monitored by the western intelligence
communities, this cooperation might take the shape of conveyance from NK to
Iran of weapons-grade fissile material, weaponry components, or, in a
worst-case scenario, completed NW. To an appreciable degree, Iran is
simultaneously assisting in the upgrading of NK strategic capacities as
well. The Trump administration would be well advised to meticulously and
rigidly ascertain that such developments do not take place.


Lt. Col. (ret.) Dr. Refael Ofek is an expert in the field of nuclear physics
and technology, who served as a senior analyst in the Israeli intelligence
community.

Lt. Col. (ret.) Dr. Dany Shoham is an expert in the field of weapons of mass
destruction, who served as a senior intelligence analyst in the Israel
Defense Forces.

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